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I. Introduction
Licenses issued by federal regulatory agencies are prerequisites to the pursuit
of a wide range of private activities. Many of these licenses can be issued only
after a hearing which is conducted at least partly as a formal adjudication under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).' While the statutory requirement of a
formal licensing hearing is not a new development,2 much recent attention has
focused on the permissible extent of private contacts between staff members in-
volved in the licensing proceeding and agency decisionmakers. Although this
issue has been raised previously in license suspension or revocation proceedings,
significantly it is now also being raised in initial licensing proceedings. 3 Those
challenging agency procedures argue that decisionmaker-staff contacts taint the
fairness of these procedures. Agencies respond that strict separation of functions
of personnel would dilute the benefits of the institutional decisional process. This
conflict between the need to protect the rights of private parties and the need for
administrative efficiency constitutes the crux of the separation of functions con-
troversy.
Since agencies were established to centralize expertise and thereby improve
governmental decisionmaking, the question of intra-agency contacts may appear
to be a non-issue. Staff members often work informally with a license applicant
1 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976). See, e.g., Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1264
(Supp. 1 1977); Deepwater Ports Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. § 1504 (1976); Federal Water Pollution Control
Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
2 In cases of initial licensing or license modification, suspension or revocation, many statutes expressly
provide for formal adjudications. See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission Act of 1934, as amended,
47 U.S.C. §§ 309, 409 (1976); Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1976).
3 In some instances, license holders or applicants themselves have challenged the agency for allowing
such private communications. See, e.g., Marathon Oil Company v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1264-65 (9th Cir.
1977). In other cases, intervenors have complained of these contacts. See, e.g., San Luis Obispo Mothers
for Peace v. Hendrie, 502 F. Supp. 408 (D.D.C. 1980) (dismissed on jurisdictional and exhaustion
grounds); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 880-88 (1st Cir. 1978).
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in the pre-hearing stage, investigate allegations made against the license appli-
cant or holder, or act as counsel for the agency during the formal adjudication
itself. Also, the "institutional decision" has been hailed as one of the greatest
assets of the present administrative system. As a result, allowing those agency
staff members most familiar with a case to maintain regular contact with agency
adjudicators to advise them on how to handle or decide the case seems appropri-
ate.
In the adjudicatory process, however, an agency must protect those whose
property and liberty interests may be affected by its decisions. Combining staff
advisory, investigatory and adversarial functions may threaten fair and impartial
decisionmaking. License applicants and licensees are understandably concerned
when hostile agency investigators or advocates with knowledge of substantial in-
formation not in the formal case record are called upon to privately advise the
agency decisionmakers. Similarly, intervenors contesting a license application
are understandably alarmed when agency trial staff that have promoted the ap-
plicant's position advise agency decisionmakers privately.
The current tension between efficient agency decisionmaking and concerns
for fairness has never been greater. Increasingly, agency decisions depend upon
the assimilation and analysis of scientific or economic data which staff members
most involved in the case can best provide. Also, as agencies have been opened to
public interest representatives and competitors of license holders and applicants,
license proceedings involve more parties in an adversarial situation. In this situa-
tion, fairness considerations regarding the competing parties are greater than
ever.
In 1976 analogous fairness considerations were specifically addressed by
Congress regarding exparte contacts between interested private persons involved
in formal adjudications and commissioners or other decisional employees. 4 Pri-
vate parties, much like agency staff members, possess knowledge about the issues
which would be useful to agency adjudicators if presented privately and infor-
mally. However, the unfairness of such contact led to Congress's prohibiting it.
Unfortunately, Congress has not adopted any generic legislation dealing with
internal separation of functions since the passage of section 554 of the APA over
30 years ago.5 Thus, agencies and private parties have wrestled with agencies'
4 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1976). It is important to distinguish between the terms "separation of functions"
and "er parte." Simply stated, separation of functions relates to the internal mechanisms in an agency
whereby decisionmaking personnel are "separated" from (i.e., not permitted to consult with) other agency
employees who perform investigatory or other functions. The bulk of § 554(d) of the APA deals with
separation of functions. The term "ex parlc" refers to communications made to a decisionmaker by only
one side in a proceeding, without notice to other parties. It has more often been used to describe private
contacts between persons outside an agency and agency decisionmakers. This is the use that Congress
made of the -term in § 557(d). It is also an appropriate term to describe the restrictions placed on an
agency employee who presides over the receipt of evidence and who is prohibited from certain communi-
cations under § 554(d)(1).
To the extent that some agency employees can be viewed as parties to a proceeding, it is possible to
use the term "ex parte communications" to refer to communications between them and agency deci-
sionmakers. For example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ex parc rule, 10 C.F.R. § 2.780 (1980),
has been applied to intra-agency communications and has, through interpretation, created far more barri-
ers to such communication than the agency's separation of functions rule, 10 C.F.R. § 2.719 (1980). How-
ever, since the term "separation of functions" is more accurate in that situation, it is used in this article.
5 During the 96th Congress, committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives did propose
new legislation which would have clarified many of the ambiguities in the current APA and, for the most
part, would have mandated more stringent separation of functions rules. SEN. COMM. ON GOVERNMEN-
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own statutes and procedural rules to resolve the tension inherent in any separa-
tion of functions scheme.
In recent years various agencies' separation of functions procedures have
spurred criticism. Reaction to the approaches of the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission (NRC) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) illustrates the
controversy engendered and the difficulty of balancing competing policies. Al-
though the NRC takes a very strict approach toward separation of its staff, and
the EPA has adopted a more lenient system, both approaches have been criti-
cized.
6
In its report, the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile
Island found that the NRC commissioners "have adopted unnecessarily stringent
ex parle rules to preserve their adjudicative impartiality . . . . 7 Although the
President's Commission declined to make any recommendations regarding these
rules, the report of the Chief Counsel of the President's Commission blamed the
ex parte rules, in part, for the "strained communication system within NRC"
which interferes with the agency's ability to protect public health and safety.8
The Chief Counsel's Report noted that, although not required by the APA, the
NRC's exparte rules apply to initial licensing cases and to all NRC staff.9 Thus,
the report suggests that if the NRC were willing to relax its exparle rules, many of
the agency's problems could be better resolved. Similarly, the "Rogovin Report"
concluded that NRC members are isolated "from detailed consideration of case-
related safety issues by the so-called 'expare rule.' "10 The report stated that the
NRC rule goes far beyond APA requirements in separating commissioners from
"those within their own agency who have the most knowledge and expertise
about those questions.""1 The Rogovin Report called for the NRC exparte rule
to be "very significantly limited and applied more rationally."'
12
While the NRC was criticized for inefficiency because it strictly adhered to
its procedures to assure fairness, the EPA was criticized for neglecting fairness in
attempting to maximize efficiency. The EPA attempts to maximize efficiency in
its decisionmaking while safeguarding fairness by giving its staff a neutral posture
in some proceedings. The EPA has formulated a system of "non-adversary" pro-
TAL AFFAIRS & SEN. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REFORM OF FEDERAL REGULATION: JOINT REPORT, S.
REP. No. 1018, pt. 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 30, 1980) (to accompany S. 262, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980)); H.R. REP. No. 1393, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 25, 1980) (to accompany H.R. 3263, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1980)). Both bills died without further action in the lame duck session of the 96th Congress.
6 The controversy over separation of functions was most recently reflected at the December 1980
plenary meeting of the Administrative Conference of the United States. The Conference's Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on Separation of Functions offered a lengthy recommendation which called upon agencies with
strict separation of functions rules, like the NRC, to liberalize those rules. After extensive debate, the
recommendation was tabled and the Committee was instructed to revise its proposal for re-submission to
the June, 1981 plenary session. Legal Times of Washington, Dec. 15, 1980 at 4.
7 U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND, REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION REPORT] 51 (1979). The NRC's rxpartr rule has been used like a separation of functions
rule. See note 4 .upra.
8 REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL ON THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [here-
inafter cited as CHIEF COUNSEL'S REPORT] 31 (1979).
9 Id. at 40. The NRC is considered a "party" to such cases.
10 NRC SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP, THREE MILE ISLAND: A REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONERS AND





cedures for initial licensing whereby a panel of experts cross-examines witnesses,
evaluates evidence, and advises the EPA Administrator in rendering the decision.
Unlike an adversarial trial staff, the panel is designed to be impartial in the hear-
ing. In a hearing on a water permit for the Seabrook nuclear power plant, the
EPA used and directed its staff "not to appear at this hearing as proponents of
any particular result, and avoid to the extent possible taking any adversary posi-
tion in it."13 Later, staff members who had taken a neutral part in the hearing
were able to advise the Administrator in making the decision. In a lawsuit chal-
lenging EPA's procedure, the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL) unsuccess-
fully argued that the staff was required by law to take a side since it was a party
to the proceeding and had a mandate to protect the environment. In remaining
neutral in order to be able to advise the decisionmaker, SAPL argued, the staff
had neglected its role as a zealous advocate of the public interest.
Although the court rejected SAPL's argument, the case suggests the variety
of available perspectives on the separation of functions issue and the proper role
of agency staff. Various agencies give their staffs different roles and create differ-
ent separation of functions problems. This article addresses the statutory and
constitutional principles regarding separation of functions in formal license pro-
ceedings which must be resolved on the basis of the record, how such principles
might apply to different agency staff configurations, and the policy implications
of different systems of separation of functions presently in use or proposed for use
in connection with formal licensing adjudications.
II. The General Treatment Under the APA of Separation of Functions in
Formal Licensing Proceedings
A. The Early Dispute over Separation of Functions
Separation of functions caused a major dispute among drafters of the APA.
As early as 1941, when administrative agency reform became the topic of pro-
posed legislation, separation of functions was debated. The 1941 bills grew out of
the Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure.t 4
Although the Committee agreed on a broad range of administrative reforms, sep-
aration of functions produced sharp disagreement. A minority of the Committee
advocated a complete separation of functions, with one agency making rules and
formulating policy, and another agency deciding cases. This organization was
likened to the separation between the Internal Revenue Service and the Tax
Court.' 5 However, the Committee majority rejected complete separation and
proposed internal separation of functions like that eventually established in the
APA. Prosecutors and decisionmakers could work in one agency provided they
engaged in no private consultation on cases before the agency. This prohibition
13 Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 597 F.2d 306, 307 (1st Cir. 1979).
14 In 1939 the Attorney General requested a committee to investigate existing administrative practices
and to recommend improvements. President Roosevelt, in anticipation of the Attorney General's Report,
vetoed in 1940 the Walter-Logan Bill, which Congress passed and which would have made significant
changes in administrative agency procedures. In January 1941, the Attorney General's Report was issued.
15 FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE [herein-
after cited as 1941 ATrORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT] 207-08 (1941). See also Hearings on S 674, S675 andS.
918 Before the S. Comm on theJudiiay, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. [hereinafter cited as 1941 Hearings] 1308-28
(1941).
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would assure that prosecutorial staff would not provide biased advice to deci-
sionmakers and would also help preclude interpolations from facts not on the
record but attributable to the staff's ex parte familiarity with the case.
The majority view was premised largely on the cost and duplication of effort
inherent in complete separation. The Committee majority also noted that com-
plete separation was not necessary to achieve fairness. Nonetheless, both the ma-
jority and minority agreed fairness was crucial in any administrative agency
process:
[I]nvestigators, if allowed to participate would be likely to interpolate facts and infor-
mation discovered by them ex parte and not adduced at the hearing, where the testi-
mony is sworn and subject to cross-examination and rebuttal .... A man who has
buried himself on one side of an issue is disabled from bringing to its decision that
dispassionate judgment which Anglo-American tradition demands of officials who
decide questions. Clearly the advocate's view ought to be presented publicly and not
privately to those who decide.
1 6
The majority's solution to the need for fairness-internal separation of func-
tions-was adopted by the framers of the APA in 1945-46. t 7 Yet the separation
of functions requirements in subsection 554(d) (2) (A) contain an exemption for
"determining applications for initial licenses." To understand how the exemp-
tion arose and whether it is consistent with the concern for fairness requires an
examination of the exemption's legislative history' 8 and its relationship to the
basic dichotomy in the APA between adjudication and rulemaking.
The initial licensing exemption grew from generalizations which may not
hold true in particular instances.19 In exempting such matters as the granting of
certificates of convenience and necessity which are of indefinite duration, Con-
gress relied upon the theory that "in most licensing cases the original application
may be much like rulemaking. '20 Unfortunately, however, because there is little
elaboration upon the similarities between initial licensing and rulemaking, one
must resort to general principles for guidance. Although a rule may be of general
or particular applicability, it is essentially future oriented and its adoption is typ-
ically based primarily on questions of policy rather than evidentiary fact. In
16 1941 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 15, at 56.
17 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1976). Se APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, SENATE DOCUMENTS Vol. 8, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. [hereinafter cited as SENATE DOCUMENTS] 24-25 (1946). The draft bill recommended by
the majority had no separation of functions provisions, but the APA clearly incorporated what was the
majority position on this issue.
18 As a general proposition, there is no need to examine legislative history when the terms of a statute
are clear. However, despite superficial appearances, the exemption for "initial licenses" is sufficiently un-
clear to have required several paragraphs of interpretation in the ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947) at 50-53. Furthermore, "ambiguity is not uniformly insisted on
as a prerequisite to the use of aids to construction. Thus it has been said that '[u]sually a court looks into
the legislative history to clear up some statutory ambiguity ... but such ambiguity is not the sine qua non
for a judicial inquiry into legislative history,' and that 'the plain meaning rule ... is not to be used to
thwart or distort the intent of Congress by excluding from consideration enlightening material from the
legislative files.'" 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.01 at 182 (4th ed. 1973)
noting Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
19 When an initial licensing proceeding is "accusatory in form" and involves sharply contested factual
issues, Congress apparently did not intend the initial licensing exemption to apply. See text accompanying
notes 28-41 nfia.
20 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT [hereinafter cited as 1947 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL] 50 (1947) (citing SENATE DOCUMENTS,
.rpra note 17, at 203, 262 in support). The APA does not require separation of functions for rulemaking.
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turn, policy determinations most often rely upon "legislative facts"' 21 of a broad
or general nature.22 The 1947 Attorney General's Manual states that:
The object of the rule making proceeding is the implementation or prescription of
law or policy for the future, rather than the evaluation of a respondent's past con-
duct. Typically, the issues relate not to the evidentiary facts, as to which the veracity
and demeanor of witnesses would often be important, but rather to the policymaking
conclusions to be drawn from the facts. 23
Given the nature of rulemaking, consultations between decisionmakers and
staff were considered necessary because staff expertise offered decisionmakers a
thorough understanding of technical matters and legislative facts from which
policy alternatives might emerge. Additionally, agency employees marshalling
material for rulemaking could be guided by the decisionmaker's expression of the
policy considerations most important to their decisions. Thus, if even in formal
rulemakings before an intra-agency lower tribunal or an administrative law
judge, decisionmakers can consult with agency staff experts who assist agency
heads in making policy decisions, "the intermediate decisions will be more useful
to the parties in advising them of the real issues .... *"24 Furthermore, in
rulemakings, unlike adjudications, consultations between staff experts and deci-
sionmakers were not thought to involve the same "Anglo-American tradition" of
fairness. In short, in Congress's view, there was much to be gained and nothing
to be lost by allowing such consultations in rulemakings.
Unlike rulemakings, adjudications are not usually future oriented. As the
1947 Attorney General's Manual suggests, a different type of fact finding is in-
volved in adjudication. The decisionmaker must determine "evidentiary facts, as
to which the veracity and demeanor of witnesses would often be important '25
because
[a]djudication is concerned with the determination of past and present rights and
liabilities. Normally, there is involved a decision as to whether past conduct was
unlawful, so that the proceeding is characterized by an accusatory flavor and may
result in disciplinary action. Or, it may involve the determination of a person's right
to benefits under existing law so that the issues relate to whether he is within the
established category of persons entitled to such benefits. In such proceedings, the
issues of fact are often sharply controverted.26
Thus, in Congress's view, two factors distinguishing rulemaking from adjudica-
tion justified establishing a separation of functions requirement for adjudication
but not for rulemaking: the accusatory nature of many adjudications and the
21 "Legislative facts" are "ordinarily general and do not concern the immediate parties." 2 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.03 at 353 (1958). Se also 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 12:3 at 413 (2d ed. 1979).
22 The classic example given is the Civil Aeronautics Board's proceedings for the issuance of certifi-
cates of convenience and necessity. In licensing an airline for a new route, certain relevant facts are consid-
ered (e.g., the extent of passenger travel between two cities, the number of existing routes, income to
airlines on a route, etc.). Some of these facts may favor approval of a certificate, and others may support
denial. Many of these relevant facts might be assumed or uncontested. Most important is the weight to be
given to the respective factors in light of developing agency policy towards airline travel, competition and
the like.
23 1947 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL supra note 20, at 14. See also 1.917 Hearings, supra note 15, at
657, 1298, 1451.
24 1947 ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 20, at 15.
25 Id. at 14.
26 Id. at 14-15.
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customary dispute over evidentiary facts. Although there may be benefits in con-
sultations between agency staff and decisionmakers in adjudications, "fundamen-
tal principles of due process" dictate that the decisionmakers should not be
exposed to off the record input from parties or staff intimately associated with
making the case for or against those parties.27 Because such staff might develop
the zeal of advocates in accusatory proceedings, they would abandon the proper
state of mind for providing neutral and dispassionate advice to decisionmakers.
B. The Initial Licensing Exemption
Generalizations about the differences between rulemaking and adjudication
may have been seriously questioned and undermined over the years.28 Nonethe-
less, the generalizations formed the basis for the initial licensing exemption.
Having found separation of functions unnecessary in rulemaking, and initial li-
censing more akin to rulemaking than adjudication, Congress could readily cre-
ate an exemption from separation of functions requirements for initial licensing
proceedings. 29 However, the APA's legislative history indicates that Congress re-
alized its generalizations about initial licensing would not always apply. The
Senate Judiciary Committee stated that when initial licensing cases are "accusa-
tory in form and involve sharply controversial factual issues," agencies "should
not apply the exceptions in such cases, because they are not to be interpreted as
precluding fair procedure where it is required."3 0 Thus, the initial licensing ex-
emption is not as broad as it may appear. 31 If an initial licensing proceeding
involves "sharply controversial factual issues" and is "accusatory in form," sepa-
ration of functions should be applied. 32 Although the phrase "sharply controver-
sial factual issues" requires little explanation, Congress's meaning of the phrase
''accusatory in form" warrants further inquiry.
In hearings on administrative procedure bills proposing separation of func-
tions, discussion had focused upon adjudications because they are primarily ac-
cusatory. According to the 1941 Attorney General's Report, the two proceedings
in which a combination of functions was least desirable were those in which "ei-
ther the agency initiates proceedings on its own motion, or private parties make
27 Id. at 55.
28 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.01 at 285-94 (1958).
29 Obviously Congress did not believe that initial licensing should be considered more like rulemaking
than adjudication in terms of the other protections accorded the applicant for an initial license (see 5
U.S.C. §§ 554(a)-(c); 555; 556(a)-(c), (e); 557(a), (c), (d); 558(c) and portions of §§ 556(d), 557(b) (1976)).
30 SENATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 17, at 204 (emphasis added). In its general comments on the bill,
the Senate Judiciary Committee noted that it had "expressed its reasons for the language used and has
stated that, where cases present sharply contested issues of fact, agencies should not as a matter of good
practice take advantage" of the initial licensing exemption. Id. at 216. While this summary omits the
requirement that the proceeding be accusatory, as well as involve controverted facts, the more specific
language earlier in the report more accurately presents the Committee's intent.
31 Examining the APA's legislative history in 1948, Professor Davis concluded that the congressional
intent "to draw a line between accusatory proceedings and policy-making proceedings was so strong as to
impel the suggestion that the line should govern even in the face of words of the Act which seem to put the
line elsewhere." Davis, Separation of Functtns on Administrative Agencies, 61 HARV. L. REV. 612, 637 (1948).
Professor Davis suggested that "[pierhaps interpretation should strive to give maximum weight to refer-
ences in the legislative history to the line between accusatory proceedings and policy-making proceedings,
and to give minimum weight to the literal meaning of the words 'initial license.'" Id. at 640.
32 The 1947 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL states that the separation of functions provision was
meant to apply to "all those phases of licensing in which accusatory or disciplinary factors are, or are likely
to be, present." 1947 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 20, at 51.
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complaints and the agency then makes those complaints its own."'33 The Senate
Judiciary Committee print of the original bill introduced by Senator McCarran
in 1945 explained in a note to what is now section 554(d) that separation of
functions applied "in so called 'accusatory' proceedings. '34
Thus, although the APA exemption for initial licensing was originally pro-
posed to be applicable to all "applications for licenses," the Senate Judiciary
Committee inserted the word "initial":
It is apparent from the legislative history that the word "initial" was inserted in the
exception to distinguish original applications for licenses, i.e., any agency "approval"
or "permission," from applications for renewals of licenses. This is entirely consistent
with the underlying analogy of initial licensing to rule making, because renewal pro-
ceedings frequently involve a review of the licensee's past conduct and thus resemble
adjudication rather than rule making.3 5
The phrase "accusatory in form" is perhaps most readily understood by examin-
ing the separation of functions rule as applied to adjudications. Congress viewed
adjudications as frequently concerned with the lawfulness of past conduct. The
phrase "accusatory in form" thus refers to proceedings involving violations of
laws or rules and not proceedings in which general derogatory charges are
made. 36 Congress thus chose to prevent decisionmakers from obtaining advice
from staff members performing "investigative or prosecuting functions. T3 7 The
statute's reference to "prosecuting functions" implies the narrow, legal interpre-
tation of the term "accusatory in form," rather than its popular definition. 38
Thus, a proceeding is "accusatory in form" if it involves charges of violations of
law or rules.39
Although the "initial licensing" exemption is not as broad as its language
indicates,4 0 it does apparently apply to proceedings to amend and modify
licenses. The Attorney General's Manual states that:
33 1941 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 15, at 208.
34 SENATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 17, at 24.
35 AI ORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 20, at 52.
36 "In its popular sense 'accusation' applies to all derogatory charges or imputations, whether or not
they relate to a punishable offense, and however made, whether orally, by newspaper, or otherwise....
But in legal phraseology, it is limited to such accusations as have taken shape in a prosecution." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 39 (4th ed. 1968).
37 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (1976).
38 As explained later, the term "investigative" must be viewed in this same light-i.e., an investigation
leading to a prosecution, or to charges of conduct violative of law or rule. See text accompanying notes 76-
77 injra.
39 There is a question about how the separation of functions rule should apply when a proceeding
only partially involves an accusatory element (i.e., there are charges of wrongdoing, accompanied by other,
non-accusatory issues). Congress did not provide guidance on this matter. However, where the accusatory
element is significant, the entire proceeding should be viewed as "accusatory in form." As a result of the
accusations, participants in the proceedings (including agency staff) can be forced into "taking sides" with
the result that impartiality or the appearance of impartiality on the non-accusatory issues may be difficult
or impossible to achieve. However, a different view of the matter is not unreasonable-i.e., that initial
licensings can be separated into accusatory and non-accusatory issues so as to disallow the use of the
exemption for the former issues, but to permit it for the latter issues. Also, the proceeding in which the
accusation is being made need not be a prosecution in the precise meaning of that word. For example, if it
is suggested that an initial license be denied to an applicant because he has violated several laws and
regulations with regard to an already licensed facility, the proceeding could be said to be "accusatory in
form"; the "penalty," rather than a fine, is a denial of a new license.
40 The Congressional committees which proposed the 1980 regulatory reform legislation stated that
there is no separation of functions requirement under the APA in initial licensing cases. S. REP. No. 1018,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 85-86 (Oct. 30, 1980); H.R. REP. No. 1393, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (Sept. 25, 1980).
This overbroad conclusion evidences a lack of knowledge of the clearly expressed intentions of the Con-
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In view of the function of the exemption, the phrase "application for initial li-
cense" must be construed to include applications by the licensee for modifications of
his original license. In effect, this gives full meaning to the broad definition of "li-
cense" in section 2(e), i.e., "the whole or part of any agency permit, certificate, ap-
proval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of
permission. . . ." In other words, the definition clearly suggests that any agency "ap-
proval" or "permission" is a license, regardless of whether it is in addition to or re-
lated to an earlier license. Only by such a construction can the appropriate
procedures be made applicable to those aspects of licensing which are dominated by
policy making considerations and in which accusatory and disciplinary factors are
absent. In this way, the basic dichotomy of the Act between rulemaking and adjudi-
cation is preserved, because section 5(c) will remain applicable to licensing proceed-
ings involving the renewal, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal or the
agenc-inilialed modification or amendment of licenses-i.e., all those phases of licens-
ing in which the accusatory or disciplinary factors are, or are likely to be, present.
4 1
To some extent, this logic is persuasive. Since Congress believed that policy ques-
tions and legislative facts predominate in initial licensing, it is reasonable to con-
clude that similar questions and facts will predominate in proceedings involving
amendments or modifications requested by a licensee. In contrast, agency initi-
ated license proceedings, especially renewals and revocations, might involve ac-
cusatory elements and sharply disputed adjudicative facts. Following the
reasoning behind the separation of functions provision, licensee originated modi-
fication proceedings might not require separation of functions while agency initi-
ated proceedings would.
However, such general conclusions have only limited applicability. For ex-
ample, if the NRC staff decides that because of recently conducted test results,
changes in a license are needed to better protect the public, the NRC will likely
persuade the licensee to file a formal application. If the licensee files such an
application, the initial licensing exemption would apparently apply. However, if
the licensee remains unpersuaded of the staff's position and the agency itself must
initiate action, there is little basis for concluding the amendment proceeding has
become accusatory in nature. Although the proceeding may be contested by the
staff and the applicant, the proceeding differs little functionally from a contested,
but non-accusatory, initial licensing case. In non-accusatory initial licensing
cases separation of functions does not apply. Yet the 1947 Attorney General's
Manual appears to require the separation of functions rule's application to
agency initiated amendment proceedings. Similarly, not all renewals, revoca-
tions or suspensions are accusatory in nature and should not require application
of the separation of functions rule. For example, the NRC license revocations or
suspensions may be necessitated by new technology in earthquake prediction or a
changed policy regarding emergency evacuation plans.
Despite the breakdown in the generalizations made by Congress when it
adopted the APA, it seems clear that Congress intended the initial licensing ex-
emption to include licensee initiated amendments and modifications, 4 2 on the
gress which adopted the APA that separation of functions should be applied in contested, accusatory,
initial licensing cases.
41 ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 20, at 51 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
42 Even licensee-initiated modifications may not be considered to be "initial-licensing," as is illus-
trated by an early District of Columbia Circuit case which wrestled with the question of what falls into the
"initial licensing" category. In Chotin Towing Corp. v. FPC, 250 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1957), the court
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general assumption that such proceedings will not be accusatory. In contrast,
Congress appears to have intended that agency initiated amendments or modifi-
cations, and all revocations, suspensions, renewals and the like, should not come
within the initial licensing exemption on the general assumption that these pro-
ceedings will likely be accusatory. These conclusions are supported by the Attor-
ney General's findings that they are consistent with the APA's general dichotomy
between rulemakings and adjudication and the legislative history of that stat-
ute.43 However, in the modern era when many licenses are issued, amended,
suspended or revoked on scientific or economic grounds, without any accusations
of misconduct, the aforementioned distinctions seem unreasonable and outmo-
ded.44
C. Illustrative Uses of Separation of Functions in Agency Licensing Proceedings
Reviewing several federal agencies' licensing practices reveals the practical
dimensions of the separation of functions controversy. Because of the initial li-
censing exemption's uncertain limits, only the EPA presently takes full advan-
examined an application to abandon a pipeline as a natural gas facility and to use it instead for transpor-
tation of petroleum products. The court held that this was not an application for an initial license, despite
the fact that it was not an accusatory adjudication and the licensee had initiated the process. The court
adopted the "common sense" principle suggested by petitioners that an "application to withdraw, limit,
terminate or modify all or part of. . . existing rights and obligations established in an outstanding license
is not an application for an initial license." Id. at 395. Chotin Towing thereby indicates the confusion over
whether license modifications, even in non-accusatory proceedings initiated by a licensee, come within the
"initial licensing" exemption to § 554(d). Without reference to the ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL and
relying upon only a tiny excerpt from the APA's legislative history, the Ninth Circuit expressed its ap-
proval of the Chotin Towing decision in Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1264 (9th Cir. 1977).
43 Referring to a Senate Committee Report on the initial licensing exemption, the Attorney General
noted that the inapplicability of the exemption to amendments or modifications was meant to include only
those amendments or modifications imposed by the agency on the ground that in such proceedings, as in
renewal proceedings, the issues would often relate to the licensee's past conduct. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
MANUAL, supra note 20, at 52.
44 Indeed, Congress itself may now be willing to revisit the distinctions it made 40 years ago. The
regulatory reform bills reported by the Senate and House committees in 1980 would have amended the
APA so as to require separation of functions in all formal adjudications conducted under § 554. In partic-
ular, the initial licensing exemption would have been abolished for such adjudications. S. REP. No. 1018,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 147 (Oct. 30, 1980) would have deleted § 554(d)(2)(A). H.R. REP. No. 1393, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (Sept. 25, 1980) would have recodified § 554(d) as § 556(e) and deleted § 554(d)(2)(A).
In addition, however, both committees provided for "expedited" hearing procedures in certain types
of formal adjudications (i.e., in any proceeding "which predominantly concerns policy issues of a general
character, including. . . initial licensing, rather than a proceeding which predominantly concerns specific
factual questions requiring trial-type procedures for their resolution, except that this subsection shall not
apply to any proceeding to impose civil penalties or fines or otherwise to establish that a culpable violation
of law has been committed by any person. . . "). S. REP. at 147-48. Similar language was used by the
House committee. H.R. REP. at 14. The Senate version of the expedited hearing procedures does not
contain a separation of functions requirement, but the House committee's bill would prohibit agency
employees who perform "investigative or litigating functions for an agency in a proceeding" from giving
private advice to decisionmakers in that expedited proceeding.
The failure of the two committees to agree on whether separation of functions should be applied in
expedited cases should not obscure a more significant development. Under both bills, unless an agency
can take advantage of the expedited procedures, it must utilize formal procedures that include separation
of functions. Accusatory-type cases could not be conducted according to expedited procedures, and hence
separation of functions would continue to apply, as presently. But, according to these bills, in non-accusa-
tory cases as well, where "specific factual questions requring trial-type procedures" predominate, the expe-
dited procedures would appear not to be available (even in initial licensing cases) and thus separation of
functions would be necessary. Accordingly, two of the distinctions made under the present APA (the
initial/non-initial licensing distinction and the accusatory/non-accusatory distinction) may soon disap-
pear, to be replaced by an adjudicatory scheme under which all cases that involve predominantly factual
questions requiring trial-type resolution will be subject to separation of functions requirements.
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tage of the exemption. Adopted in 1979, the EPA's "Non-Adversary Procedures
for Initial Licensing" for National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permits45 embrace the APA rationale that strict separation of functions
is not required in initial licensing cases because the final decision depends prima-
rily on "highly discretionary judgments on a variety of legal and factual issues"
and because the proceeding is non-accusatory.4 6 To avoid the adversary or accu-
satory format, the EPA dispenses with a trial staff in most cases and substitutes a
non-adversarial panel of experts. The panel cross-examines witnesses, evaluates
the evidence, and advises the presiding officer on the initial decision. When a
trial staff is involved, however, separation of functions provisions apply. EPA
initial license hearings rely primarily on written evidence and argument. Oral
argument is available at the discretion of the presiding officer. Upon appeal of
the initial decision, the Administrator may receive advice from only staff mem-
bers "without substantial prior connection with the matter." However, the "un-
connected" staff members may freely consult the presiding officer, the panel, or
any other staff members.
4 7
The NRC takes advantage of the initial licensing exemption only in uncon-
tested initial licensing proceedings. In such proceedings, the presiding officer
may consult any staff member as well as licensing board panel members not as-
signed to the case.48 However, because it does not include contested initial li-
censing cases which, if non-accusatory, could come within the exemption, the
NRC's rule does not fully utilize the initial licensing exemption. Also, because
future NRC licensing decisions will likely be hotly contested, the exemption will
be used rarely if at all. Thus, although it has chosen to stress fairness in its strict
separation of functions rule, the NRC apparently also recognizes that the logic
behind the initial licensing exemption (that policy issues and legislative facts usu-
ally predominate in initial licensing and make the proceedings more like
rulemakings than adjudications) may apply less to NRC proceedings where inter-
venors regularly inject sharply disputed evidentiary facts.
Other agencies have shown even less enthusiasm for the initial licensing ex-
emption and the "policy decision" rationale behind it. The Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC), which generally follows section 554(d), is forbidden by
45 These permits, required of water pollutant dischargers, go through several stages of public com-
ment and state and federal review. When the final permit is issued, any interested party may request an
evidentiary hearing on the contested issues. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a), 1342(a)(1) (1976). The courts have
interpreted the hearing requirement in these statutory provisions as mandating a formal adjudication
under 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976). Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978);
Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977); United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822
(7th Cir. 1977). If the permit is an "initial license," the hearing will fall under the special non-adversary
procedures, codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 124.111-.127 (1980).
46 44 Fed. Reg. 32888 (1979).
47 40 C.F.R. § 124.126 (1980). By allowing the Administrator's advisors to consult those who have
been involved with the case, the EPA seems to allow the Administrator himself to consult with those same
people, albeit indirectly. EPA's explanation is that the primary reason for appointing uninvolved staff
members to advise the Administrator is to have a "fresh look" at the evidence, rather than to prevent
unfairness that may arise from staff members reviewing their own decisions. EPA views the risk of unfair-
ness in that situation as minimal.
48 See 10 C.F.R. § 2.719(c) (1980). The NRC has a unique licensing process under which a formal
adjudication must be held before the issuance of a construction permit to build a nuclear facility, even if




statute to apply the initial licensing exemption. 49 Oddly, the FCC prohibition
was imposed in 1961 by amendments which generally streamlined FCC adjudi-
catory procedures, that had been stiffened by a 1952 amendment to the Commu-
nications Act of 1934. The 1952 amendment had barred commissioners from
consulting their general counsel or chief engineer on adjudicatory matters and
had completely separated prosecutors and investigators from all agency cases,
including those in which they were not involved. The 1961 amendments were
intended to allow the Commission "to make better use of its own time, and more
effective use of its experienced and technically qualified personnel to handle its
workload of adjudicatory cases with greater speed and efficiency than [had been]
possible."5 0 Given the amendment's goal of increased efficiency, it is significant
that Congress removed the initial licensing exemption option, which was itself
intended to streamline adjudicatory procedure. Aside from a general concern
about fairness, the legislative history gives no indication of any specific problems
prompting the initial licensing exemption's elimination. The Senate report
stated that the bill "will also speed up [FCC] adjudicatory proceedings whilepro-
viding the necessay safeguards to assure due process." 5' The House report on the bill
cryptically noted that "The committee feels that there are good reasons (in the
case of the Communications Act of 1934, at least) for applying the separation of
functions provisions of section 5(c) to cases involving applications for initial
licenses as well as to other cases of adjudication. '52 In any case, although it
acknowledged the provision mandating separation of functions went beyond
APA requirements, Congress included the provision apparently to ensure fairness
in licensing proceedings.
The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) has voluntarily refused to apply the
initial licensing exemption. Amending its separation of functions rule in 1978,
the CAB considered removing rate determination and initial licensing proceed-
ings from the rule's requirements. The Board cited the appearance of unfairness
as one reason for rejecting the removal. The appearance of unfairness was said to
result from the public's inability to respond to advice given decisionmakers by
advocates. 53 The Board apparently considered fairness no less a concern in ini-
tial licensing proceedings than in other adjudicatory proceedings, even though
Congress considered the former more policy-dominated.
Until 1973, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) took ad-
vantage of the initial licensing exemption. When its separation of functions rule
was discontinued, FERC noted that "The section currently provides an excep-
tion for initial licenses and proceedings involving the validity or application of
rates. As the Commission does not believe that current practice should or does
admit to this exception, we are eliminating it."154 The FERC obviously believed
49 "The provision in section 554(d) of Title 5 which states that such subsection shall not apply in
determining applications for initial licenses, shall not be applicable hereafter in the case of applications for
initial licenses before the Federal Communications Commission." 47 U.S.C. § 409(c)(2) (1976).
50 107 CONG. REC. 13704 (1961) (statement of Sen. Pastore).
51 S. REP. No. 576, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprintedin [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2462,
2464.
52 H.R. REP. No. 723, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1961).
53 See 43 Fed. Reg. 29933 (1978).
54 38 Fed. Reg. 9293, 9293-34 (1973).
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changing circumstances had invalidated the original rationale for exempting ini-
tial licensing from separation of functions requirements.
In sum, agencies have disagreed on whether their initial licensing proceed-
ings should incorporate a separation of functions requirement. With the recent
emphasis on removing regulatory "red tape" and the increasing complexity of
cases at agencies like the NRC or the EPA, more pressure to liberalize or remove
separation of functions requirements can be anticipated. It remains to be seen,
however, whether the rules adopted by individual agencies will conform with
APA and constitutional requirements as well as with each agency's organic stat-
ute.5
5
III. Section 554(d)(2) Separation of Functions Requirements
A. "Znveszgative or Prosecuting" Functions in Accusatog Cases
Protecting the rights of subjects of agency initiated accusatory proceedings
was, as previously noted, a major concern of the APA's drafters in the separation
of functions section. 56 This concern also underlies the interpretation of the
phrase "employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prose-
cuting functions" for an agency.
The typical adjudication envisioned by the drafters of the APA separation of
functions scheme involved an agency's accusing a party of violating a statute or
regulation-the Securities and Exchange Commission prosecuting a corporation
for failing to register securities, for example---culminating in the imposition of a
55 It might be argued that where an agency's statute requires a public hearing in all licensing cases, it
creates a mandate that the proceedings be open, thus requiring that consultations with staff prosecutors,
investigators or advocates be on the record. The licensing statute could be said to create a separation of
functions requirement that is independent of the APA. This argument follows from Seacoast Anti-Pollu-
tion League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978), where the court discussed
the initial licensing exemption of 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976). That section requires that parties be given the
right to present oral and written evidence, except that written evidence may suffice in initial licensing
cases. The court ruled that since an EPA water permit statute required a "public hearing," this was
sufficient to nullify the initial licensing exemption in § 556(d) and to create an independent basis for
requiring an oral hearing and cross-examination. Similarly, one might argue that the requirement to hold
a "public hearing" overrides the initial licensing exemption in § 554(d) and creates an independent basis
for a separation of functions system that includes even advocates in non-accusatory licensing cases.
The logic behind the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League case is questionable. The EPA's reasoning, on the
remand of the case, is persuasive:
To say that [the initial licensing exemption] does not apply whenever the statute at issue re-
quires a "hearing" would be in effect to say that it never or almost never applied, since a statu-
tory "hearing" requirement is necessary to make the APA applicable in the first place. It would
be in effect to say that the same statutory reference that makes formal hearing procedures appli-
cable generally also makes the . . . initial licensing [exemption] . . . inapplicable ....
44 Fed. Reg. 32890 (1979).
This reasoning should prevail, whether an agency's statute requires merely a "hearing" or a "public hear-
ing," since the type of hearing covered by the APA is, of course, a public one. However, on occasions
where the legislative history behind an agency's statutory hearing mandate expressly states or strongly
suggests that Congress envisioned a licensing hearing with separation of functions safeguards, the result
suggested by Seacoast Anti-Pollution League is not objectionable. See also United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal
Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 539-41 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Cf. Oral Presentations Before the Commission
and Communications With Commissioners and Their Staffs in Trade Regulation Rulemaking Proceed-
ings, 45 Fed. Reg. 78626 (1980) (FTC implementation of specific separation of functions requirement
imposed in hybrid rulemakings by § 12 of FTC Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252).
56 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1976) provides:
An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for
an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the
decision, recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to section 557 of this title, except as
witness or counsel in public proceedings.
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penalty or a withdrawal of benefits. In such a proceeding, the staff counsel argu-
ing the case in the agency hearing engages in a prosecuting function.5 7 The
counsel's aides may engage in "investigative" functions relative to the prosecu-
tion, as do those actually investigating the violations. 58
Determining when other staff members are sufficiently involved to be per-
forming "investigative or prosecuting functions" within the meaning of the stat-
ute is more difficult.59 In making this determination, it is useful to examine
several different groups of staff members, while keeping in mind the aims of the
separation of functions provision: preventing biased advice by staff with a "will
to win" and precluding interpolation from facts not on the record but gleaned
from an ex parte familiarity with the case. Further, it is necessary to recall the
Attorney General's admonition that the APA's separation of functions section is
not intended to "isolate the agency heads from their staffs." 60
The first staff group to be considered consists of supervisors, those mid-level
employees who report to agency heads and who supervise staffers performing
57 An interesting situation is the case in which an agency's staff sides with a party accused of miscon-
duct by an intervenor. Would the staff be "prosecutors" in that situation? The writers of the APA appar-
ently did not anticipate such a case, though it may be quite likely to occur today. One could say that the
staff is not trying to find a violation, so the staff would not be performing prosecutorial functions in the
traditional sense of the word. Since Congress's primary concern was to protect party defendants from
unfair, private consultations between decisionmakers and staff opposed to the party, it would not conform
to Congressional intent to interpret the separation requirement to apply to staff members who side with
the party. One could argue that it is likely that the writers of the APA might have prohibited such
contacts if they had envisioned this situation, but the fact remains that they chose the word "prosecuting,"
leaving the matter uncovered by the statute.
On the other hand, it is possible to argue that the word "prosecuting" is equivalent to "advocacy,"
and that staff consultations are prohibited even when the staff (as an advocate) sides with the party de-
fendant. Certaintly a staff member on the side of the party in an accusatory case has "buried himself on
the side" of a controversial charge of misconduct, and one might question that member's ability to advise
an agency objectively. There are extensive references in the legislative history of the APA to support this
notion. For example, in the 1945 print of the bill, "advocate" is used in place of "prosecutor," SENATE
DOCUMENTS, supra note 17, at 25; in the 1941 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 15, at 55-56,
"prosecution" is used interchangeably with "advocacy" and "advocate" is defined as "the agency's attor-
ney." The 1947 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL refers to separation of functions as forbidding consulta-
tion with "employees of the agency who have had such previous participation in an adversary capacity,"
1947 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, surpa note 20, at 57 (emphasis added), and there is little reason to
believe this could not be viewed as "adversary" to an intervenor. However, the better argument is that the
term "prosecuting" in the APA does not include advocacy in non-accusatory cases. See text accompanying
notes 68-81 hinfa.
58 Some examples would be a member of the NRC's Inspection and Enforcement staff who had in-
spected a plant, or an assistant to a commissioner who had contacts with the investigative file in the pre-
adjudicative phase of a case. A recent case has given broad reading to the terms "investigative or prosecut-
ing." In Grolier, Inc. v. FTC, 615 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1980), the court held that by using these terms,
Congress "intended to preclude from decisionmaking in a particular case not only individuals with the
title of 'investigator' or 'prosecutor,' but all persons who had, in that or a factually related case, been
involved with exparte information or who had developed, by prior involvement with the case, a 'will to
win.'" Id. at 1220. See also Twigger v. Schultz, 484 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1973) in which the court found a
violation of § 554(d) where an adjudicating officer, prior to his having served as adjudicator, had reviewed
investigative reports from a special agent and had recommended prosecution of the case to his superiors.
59 It should be emphasized that staff members who perform "investigative or prosecuting functions"
in a "factually related case" may not participate or advise in an agency decision in a case. The term
"factually related case" refers to "two different proceedings arising out of the same or a connected set of
facts," such as a cease and desist proceeding and license revocation proceeding stemming from the same
violation. 1947 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 20, at 57. See also Giambanco v. Immigration
& Naturalization Service, 531 F.2d 141, 150 n.4 (3d Cir. 1976), in which Judge Gibbons, dissenting on
another issue, provided a good discussion of the "factually related case" standard. Id. at 150 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting). Thus, staff members would not be prohibited from advising the agency in a case simply
because they were involved in another case which had a similar pattern of facts.
60 1947 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 20, at 57.
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investigations or prosecutions. The Attorney General's Manual suggests that a
supervisor, such as a general counsel, who has not consulted significantly with the
prosecuting staff under him probably could advise the decisionmaker. However,
the Manual assumes that if a supervisor has consulted extensively with his subor-
dinates, he becomes unavailable for consultation or advice regarding the deci-
sion. 61 This interpretation comports with the philosophy of separation because a
supervisor's bias would tend to increase the more he consulted.
The case law holds that a supervisor is disqualified from advising in a case
developed by his subordinates only when he has been personally involved. In
Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC 6 2 the court held that a supervisor of the Division of
Corporate Finance who later became a commissioner of the SEC could not de-
cide a case he had helped develop as supervisor. The court cited as grounds for
its decision section 554(d) (then section 1004(c)) and the due process clause. The
court also indicated that initiating an investigation, weighing its results, and
recommending filing charges constitutes prosecuting or investigating.63 A super-
visor merely overseeing an initial investigation before a decision to prosecute is
made might argue his was not an investigative or prosecuting function. 64 But
even if a supervisor directs an investigation without actually bringing the case to
prosecution, he could be barred under section 554(d)(2) from advising the deci-
sionmaker since he, the supervisor, engaged in investigative functions in a case
leading to a prosecution. Thus, if the supervisor merely points the investigation
toward prosecution, Amos Treat indicates the supervisor would be barred from
consulting with the decisionmaker. In all the above situations, the prevention of
biased advice is not the only policy consideration involved in separation of func-
tions. The other consideration, interjection ofexpare facts, might be implicated
if the supervisor gathers such facts and inadvertently injects them, off the record,
during the decisionmaking process.
The second category of agency employees to be examined consists of lower
level agency adjudicators. Persons performing solely adjudicative functions do
not perform investigative or prosecuting functions, nor are they exposed to ex
parte material. Thus, the APA65 does not appear to prohibit initial deci-
sionmakers consulting other initial decisionmakers not involved in the case.
Through such consultations, lower level decisionmakers receive an opportunity to
better understand the agency's decisions and policies. Likewise, appellate board
61 Id. at 58.
62 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
63 Id. at 266.
64 Soon after the APA was passed, Professor Davis argued that initiating proceedings was not inconsis-
tent with participating in the decision, on the theory that the initial decision to prosecute is similar to the
decision of a judge to issue a temporary restraining order. The judge only makes a preliminary determina-
tion based on the evidence then available. Professor Davis conceded, however, that such a decision tends
to commit the judge (or administrative decisionmaker) "to some extent as to his view of the probable facts
in advance of a full development of the evidence." Davis, supra note 31, at 612. This latter sentiment
accords more closely with case law as it has developed, in Amos Treat and R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 366
F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389.U.S. 991 (1967), to the point that only personal involvement in
initiating proceedings was said to constitute the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions.
65 One might argue that there are due process problems in allowing hearing officers or boards to
consult with those who will review their decisions in advance of those decisions. Similarly, a due process
claim might be made with regard to agency members seeking advice from appellate boards or hearing
boards (or appellate boards seeking advice from hearing boards) on the ground that the lower deci-
sionmakers might have a stake in their decisions being upheld. See text accompanying notes 227-238 infra.
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members may benefit from consulting with initial decisionmakers because the
trier of fact may be able to assist the appellate board member in reviewing the
record for decision.
These rationales apply equally to consultations between agency commission-
ers, initial decisionmakers and appellate boards. In such consultations, however,
the members of the agency may have performed either investigative or prosecut-
ing functions in the early, pre-hearing stages of a case. Under section 554(d)(2),
the agency members are evidently excluded from advising hearing officers or
boards and appellate boards with regard to the facts, law or policy in case. How-
ever, the section 554(d)(2)(C) exemption applies here because the separation of
functions provision does not apply to the "members of. . . the agency."'66 This
exemption reflects Congress's recognition that members of an agency must pos-
sess some freedom to initiate investigations or prosecutions, and not sacrifice their
right to guide lower level decisionmakers where desirable.
Finally, staff members who testify as witnesses in licensing proceedings war-
rant special mention. The APA does not deal specifically with staff witnesses and
separation of functions. Even in accusatory proceedings, a witness is not a prose-
cutor in the traditional sense. A witness does not present the agency's case, even
though his testimony may further it. In testifying on technical matters, a staff
member need not become biased. Nor would a staff member's testifying result in
his absorbing off the record facts which he might interject ex parle during the
decisionmaking process. In fact, Professor Davis has concluded the APA does not
prevent "a member of an agency's staff from serving as an expert witness at the
hearing and later advising the heads of the agency in making the decision."'67
Nonetheless, upon testifying on behalf of the agency and being cross-ex-
amined and forced to publicly defend the agency's position, a staff witness may
become biased toward the agency's point of view. Were the witness a member of
the investigative and prosecuting staff, he could certainly not later advise. On
the other hand, Professor Davis argues that a staff member who has been cross-
examined should advise since his views already have been subject to dispute on
the record. Whatever the policy merits, the APA apparently allows private con-
sultation between decisionmakers and staff witnesses who have not performed
investigative or prosecuting functions.
B. "Tnvestigative or Prosecuting" Functions in Non-Accusatog Cases
In non-accusatory adjudications involving disputed issues, do staff members
perform a "prosecuting function" under the APA by taking a side on the issues?
That is, does "prosecuting function" amount to advocacy in the general sense?
Evidently, Congress did not intend to characterize staff advocates in non-
accusatory proceedings as performing a "prosecuting" function. As previously
noted, Congress appears to have been concerned solely with accusatory adjudica-
tions when it adopted the separation of functions provision of the APA.68 A staff
advocate in non-accusatory proceedings would be able to advise the deci-
sionmaker. He is an advocate, but not a prosecutor. Even though non-accusa-
66 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2)(C) (1976).
67 Davis, supra note 3 1, at 649.
68 See text accompanying notes 35-44 supra.
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tory proceedings may involve disputed issues, such proceedings do not involve
the misconduct of a private party. Instead, Congress believed that the issues in
such proceedings are primarily policy-oriented. Consequently, staff generally of-
fers opinions on technical and policy matters, and under this view any alleged
bias would not generate the same type of error as might occur in a proceeding
where evidentiary facts predominate. In addressing this matter, Professor Davis
provides the example of the CAB public counsel opposing the merger application
of two airlines. 69 Although an advocate, it is questionable whether the staff
member should be considered a prosecutor under the APA.70 Professor Davis
asserts that although its language arguably includes proceedings which are accu-
satory in nature even if no formal charges are being pressed, section 554(d) might
not include non-accusatory proceedings. 7 '
Professor Davis's assertion is not irrefutable, however. If "investigative or
prosecuting functions" do not include advocacy in non-accusatory cases, then
what did Congress intend by specifically denying the FCC the initial licensing
exemption? 72 Because FCC initial licensings are rarely accusatory and rarely
involve "investigative or prosecuting functions," subjecting the FCC's initial
licensings to the separation of functions requirement in section 554(d) would
mean nothing if the requirement does not include advocacy functions. More re-
cently, in passing section 55 7(d) of the APA, proscribing exparle communications
in all accusatory or non-accusatory formal adjudications, Congress evidently as-
sumed that in advocating an agency staff position, "an agency attorney litigating
the case for the agency will not be involved in the decisionmaking process of the
agency." 73 Nonetheless, although these Congressional sentiments appear to re-
flect a broader view of the separation of functions proscription, they are hardly
sufficient to overcome the more clearly expressed intentions of Congress in pass-
ing the APA. 74
Interpreting "investigative" functions in section 554(d) also requires examin-
ing the policy and legislative history behind the APA. A literal reading of section
69 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.07 at 218 (1958); Davis, supra note 31, at 619.
70 Davis, supra note 31, at 620.
71 Id.
72 See text accompanying notes 49-52 supra.
73 S. REP. No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 880, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1976).
It may be, of course, that this statement was made not with regard to APA requirements, but rather with
the belief that either good practice or due process would require this result.
74 The regulatory reform bill recently reported by a Senate committee would resolve any doubts
about the applicability of separation of functions in non-accusatory cases. In addition to eliminating the
initial licensing exemption (see note 44 supra), the prohibition on private advice would apply to agency
employees performing "litigating" functions, rather than prosecuting functions. The committee report has
recognized that the "bill extends the category of agency employees barred from having any role in partici-
pating or advising in the agency decision." SEN. REP. No. 1018, pt. 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (Oct. 30,
1980). With particular reference to the terms "prosecuting" and "litigating," the report states that the
"prohibition in the current law bars involvement in the decisionmaking process by those prosecuting the
case on behalf of the agency. Since the word prosecuting fails to accurately describe all the kinds of formal
proceedings which may now be subject to the prohibition of this section, the term litigating has been
substituted for it." Id. at 86 (emphasis in original). The House bill, however, only creates further
problems in resolving the question of whether the "prosecuting" function under the present law includes
advocacy functions in non-accusatory cases. Although the House bill would require a separation of func-
tions scheme applicable to "litigating" employees in expedited formal adjudications (see note 44 supra), it
would retain the word "prosecuting" in the present § 554(d) for non-expedited cases. H.R. REP. No. 1393,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 69, 71 (Sept. 25, 1980). As stated in the text, a narrower statutory interpretation of
the term "prosecuting" seems more in order with Congress's earlier intention of protecting rights in cases
which were essentially accusatory in nature.
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554(d) bars anyone investigating any accusatory or non-accusatory case from ad-
vising in its decision. However, Professor Davis and others believe the term "in-
vestigative" should be read narrowly and applied to investigations looking
toward prosecutions. 75 Thus, in a non-accusatory proceeding investigators could
consult decisionmakers since, under the rationale expressed by the APA's draft-
ers, the decisionmakers' questions would typically be policy oriented. Professor
Davis gives the example of a Social Security investigator who simply gathers rele-
vant information without siding for or against the claimant. That investigator
would not have developed the "state of mind incompatible with . ..objective
impartiality" that the APA's drafters feared in prosecutors and investigators.
76
The legislative history supports a narrow reading of the term "investiga-
tive." The explanation given in the section in the 1945 printing of the original
Senate bill states that the section was meant to protect fairness in "so-called 'ac-
cusatory' proceedings." 77 In addressing the "investigative and prosecuting" part
of section 554(d), the print telescoped "investigative and prosecuting" into the
word "prosecuting" when referring to the "segregation of deciding and prosecut-
ing functions." Impliedly, investigating is a subset of prosecuting. 78 Likewise,
the committee report on the bill also telescoped "investigative and prosecuting"
under the general term "prosecuting." The report explained section 554(d)(2),
which requires the hearing examiner to be not subject to the supervision of an
employee "engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting func-
tions," by saying, "they may not be made subject to the supervision of prosecut-
ing officers."' 79 The committee report further explained that prosecuting officers
"may not participate in the decisions except as witness or counsel in public pro-
ceedings." 8 0 Significantly almost every other time the term "investigative" and
"prosecuting" are mentioned, they are used together-in the language of the
statute, in the Attorney General's Manual, and in the legislative history. Al-
though "prosecuting" is sometimes used to denote the two together, the term
"investigative" does not appear to have been used separately. Thus, the legisla-
tive history indicates that the term "investigative functions" applies to investiga-
tions related to prosecutions in accusatory proceedings. Because the separation
of functions doctrine was intended by Congress to protect parties whose past con-
duct is being questioned, a narrow reading-of the term "investigative functions"
is preferable.8 '
In short, in light of both the APA's legislative history and policy, staff mem-
bers of an agency do not perform "prosecuting" or "investigative" functions-as
those terms were used by Congress in the APA-in non-accusatory adjudications.
75 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 13.07 at 216-18 (1958); Davis, supra note 31, at
616-18.
76 Davis, supra note 31, at 618.
77 SENATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 17, at 24.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 203.
80 Id.
81 One could argue that to be excluded from decisionmaking on the basis of having performed "inves-
tigative" functions, an agency employee must have had both a "will to win" for the prosecutorial team and
exposure to extra-record material. However, in Grolier, Inc. v. FTC, 615 F.2d at 1220, 1221, the court
concluded that mere exposure to exparle material by an investigator in any case covered by § 554(d) was
sufficient to mandate disqualification.
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C. The Meaning of "Participate or Advise in the Decis'on,
Recommended Decision, or Agency Review"
Investigators and prosecutors in accusatory cases are not absolutely prohib-
ited from communicating with agency adjudicators. Investigators and prosecu-
tors are not to "participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or
agency review pursuant to section 557."82 Clearly, this provision forbids investi-
gators and prosecutors from privately advising adjudicators how to resolve issues
of law, fact or policy in a pending case. However, the permissibility of other
contacts by investigators and prosecutors with adjudicators, particularly commis-
sioners, remains unclear. Considering the policies underlying separation of func-
tions helps determine the scope of the section 554(d)(2) ban.
As previously stated, in adopting the separation of functions rule Congress
intended to protect decisionmakers from biased advice and exposure to off the
record facts introduced by investigators and prosecutors familiar with the case.
However, these problems were discussed as arising in the context of the deci-
sionmakers' being provided biased advice or off the record information as they
perform their adjudicative roles. Congress recognized that communications be-
tween commissioners and the entire agency staff, including prosecutors and inves-
tigators, were appropriate when made in connection with the commissioners'
performance of their non-adjudicative responsibilities. Thus, if initiation of an
investigation or prosecution is generally approved by agency members, allowing
investigators and prosecutors to consult with commissioners on whether to inves-
tigate or prosecute would present no problem. Such consultations would not be
"participat[ing] or advis[ing] in the decision, recommended decision or agency
review," since no adjudication would have commenced and no decision would be
under consideration. 83
Once an accusatory adjudication has begun, however, what contacts may
commissioners have with investigators and prosecutors? Apparently, short of
participating or advising in the decision, any contacts are proper.8 4 Proper con-
tacts may arise as commissioners perform other duties: investigation or prosecu-
tion, rulemaking, informal adjudicative decisionmaking, or supervising agency
staff generally or regarding particular pending adjudications. Each of these re-
sponsibilities will be considered in turn.
Assume Company A's conduct is at issue in accusatory adjudication X. As-
sume also that the agency staff has discovered new information indicating that
additional charges should be brought against Company A, and that Company B
should be investigated and possibly prosecuted. Can the investigators and prose-
cutors conducting adjudication X confer privately with the commissioners about
the need for additional investigation or prosecution against either Company A or
Company B when the facts to be discussed relate directly to adjudication X
82 5 U.S.C. § 54(d)(2) (1976).
83 See, e.g., Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League of America v. NRC, 606 F.2d 1363, 1370-
71 (D.C. Cir. 1979) in which the court recognized that § 554(d) does not apply in the pre-hearing investi-
gative phase of a case.
84 As stated in the 1947 ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, the APA "merely excludes from any such
participation n the decision of a case those employees of the agency who have had such previous participation
in an adversary capacity in that or a factually related case. 1947 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL,
supra note 20, at 57 (emphasis added).
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which is before the commissioners for decision? The following answer was pro-
vided by the court in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA:
It may happen that during the course of an agency proceeding against two individu-
als the "prosecuting" staff discerns from the evidence that proceedings should also be
instituted against, or the initial proceeding broadened to include, a third individual.
The prosecutorial staff would not be debarred from consulting with the agency head
about these steps by the mere fact that a related proceeding was already under way.
The same conclusion is applicable where there is no new party but the emerging
evidence indicates that a new charge or a broadened charge is appropriate.
Congress has not accepted the view that the possibilities of unfairness require
prohibition of an administrative structure that permits the same agency to issue the
notice that begins a proceeding and to make the ultimate determination. . . . It has
accepted a pragmatic view that the need for effective control by the agency head over
the commencement of proceedings requires an ability to conduct consultations in
candor with an investigative section on the question whether a notice should be is-
sued and a proceeding begun, and this notwithstanding any residual possibilities of
unfairness. [In this case] there is no allegation of communication between "prosecu-
tor" and agency head regarding the final decision .... 85
Thus, even if an accusatory adjudication requiring separation of functions is
pending, the APA does not prevent commissioners from consulting with the pros-
ecutors and investigators in that proceeding if such consultations relate to com-
mencing an additional investigation or prosecution, or broadening the pending
charges.8 6
A similar conclusion may be reached regarding an agency discharging
rulemaking and other adjudicative responsibilities. Assume the NRC has pend-
ing or is considering initiating a generic rulemaking proceeding on seismic
problems facing nuclear power plants. Although the agency may wish to consult
privately with its staff experts on seismic problems in the rulemaking,8 7 these
85 510 F.2d 1292, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
86 Additional support for this view can be found in Pangbum v. CAB, 311 F.2d 349 (Ist Cir. 1962),
which rejected a due process challenge in a similar setting. In that case members of the CAB conducted an
investigation and issued a report on the probable cause of an accident and, at the very same time, adjudi-
cated an appeal from the pilot, who was involved in the accident and whose license had been suspended by
a CAB hearing examiner. The court focused on two statutory duties of the CAB: to investigate and to
report on accidents for the purposes of determining probable cause and considering safety recommenda-
tions, and to decide through adjudicatory proceedings whether the public interest requires suspension of
the licenses of pilots involved in accidents. The court recognized that although "similar questions may
frequently be involved in the two proceedings," Congress had determined to vest in the agency these two
important, clear-cut and fundamentally different functions. Id. at 356. Although no APA claim was
made, the court specifically mentioned that separation of functions would not apply in the case before it to
"members of ... the agency" because of the exemption in § 554(d)(2)(C) of the APA. Id.
87 It is assumed, of course, that there is no statutory or constitutional bar to the commissioners' con-
suiting privately with agency staff members who are involved in such rulemakings. Clearly, there are no
APA prohibitions on decisionmakers consulting privately with agency staff members in rulemaking pro-
ceedings. See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Kleindienst, 478 F.2d I (3d Cir. 1973) and cases cited at
note 206 infia. The view apparently adopted by the writers of the APA was stated in the 1941 ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 20, at 57-58:
Particularly in cases where adjudicatory functions are not a principal part of the agency's
work or are closely interrelated with other activities, whatever gains might result from separa-
tion would be plainly outweighed by the loss in consistency of action as a whole .... In
greater or lesser degree these same considerations are applicable wherever the adjudicatory and
nonadjudicatory functions or an agency are required to be exercised in harmony with each
other and where the knowledge secured in the exercise of the one group of functions is impor-
tant in the wise exercise of the other .... These powers must be exercised consistently and,
therefore, by the same body, not only to realize the public purposes which the statutes are
designed to further but also to avoid confusion of the private interests.
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experts may have performed investigative or prosecuting functions in a pending
accusatory adjudication.8 8 Even if the rulemaking involves some of the same
factual, legal or policy matters which arose in the adjudicatory proceeding, the
APA should not bar the commissioners from consulting with the investigators or
prosecutors about the rulemaking. The investigators or prosecutors should not
be considered as providing advice "in the decision, recommended decision or
agency review" of the adjudicatory proceeding.
The same argument could be made where rather than being concerned with
a rulemaking proceeding, the NRC commissioners had to resolve the seismic is-
sue as part of an informal adjudication, such as an export license application.8 9
This might occur where a seismic problem had a global impact. In order to
obtain expert advice on how to resolve the seismic issues in this informal adjudi-
cation, the commissioners should be permitted to consult-consistent with the
APA-knowledgeable prosecutors and investigators who are involved in a factu-
ally related accusatory adjudication.90
Finally, general supervision by commissioners of investigative or prosecuting
staff warrants consideration. If the supervision concerns generic issues tran-
scending individual cases and provides guidance on general agency policies, su-
pervisory contacts should not violate APA separation of functions
requirements. 91 By such contacts, agency investigators and prosecutors would
not be participating on or advising a particular decision.
More difficult problems may arise regarding commission efforts to supervise
investigators and prosecutors in connection with a particular accusatory adjudi-
cation. Although they permitted agency members to oversee investigations and
approve commencing prosecutions, the APA's drafters preferred that commis-
sioners "delegate the actual supervision of investigation and initiation of cases to
responsible subordinate officers," and reserve for themselves the decisionmaking
function. 92 Congress apparently did not envision commissioners actually super-
vising the conduct of a particular prosecution. This does not mean, however,
88 For a discussion of the constitutional questions raised by decisionmakers' private contacts with
agency staff, see text accompanying notes 194-226 infra. One could assume that a licensee has been
charged with violating certain NRC rules with regard to protection against seismic hazards, and that this
misconduct is the subject of an enforcement adjudication.
89 Unlike license proceedings for domestic nuclear power plants, license proceedings involving the
export of reactor components or fuel are informal adjudications. 42 U.S.C. § 2155a (Supp. 11 1978).
90 If export license applications were required to be resolved according to formal adjudicatory proce-
dures (assuming the initial licensing exemption did not apply), the knowledgeable prosecutors and investi-
gators in a factually related formal adjudication would be barred by 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1976) from
advising in the export license case.
91 For example, suppose the Commission has had to reverse lower level decisionmakers on the basis of
policy considerations. The commissioners may desire to talk to the investigative and prosecuting staff in
order to assure that these persons are aware of the new policy, and that their investigations and prosecu-
tions will be carried out in accordance with that policy.
92 SENATE DOCUMENTs, supra note 20, at 204. The 1941 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, which laid
the foundation for the APA, did not envision involvement by commissioners in the day-to-day activities of
the agency, but it left little doubt that such involvement would be appropriate:
Save at the level of the agency heads, an internal separation of function can afford substantially
complete protection against the danger that impartiality of decision will be impaired by the
personal precommitments of the investigator and the advocate. Even at the level of ultimate
decision there can be similar protection, for the sheer volume of work does not permit the
agency heads to participate actively in developing one side of any single side but requires that
they reserve themselves for the task of deciding questions presented to them by others. Never-
theless, so far as the agency is empowered to initiate action at all, the agency heads do have the
responsibility of determining the general policy according to which action is taken. They have at
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that such supervision is improper under the APA. The question is whether a
commissioner's supervising a particular prosecution would lead to participation
or advice to commissioners regarding how to decide the particular case. Al-
though directions by commissioners to prosecutors to "do this" or "don't do that"
should not be interpreted to violate the statutory prohibition, an extensive in-
terchange between agency prosecutors and commissioners about the specific facts
and policies applicable to a particular proceeding might allow a court to con-
clude that the prosecutors or investigators had, in effect, advised the deci-
sionmaker on how the case should be resolved. 93
Of course, such supervision may expose commissioners to the facts of a par-
ticular adjudication. The commissioners may later be required to take a position
regarding those facts to resolve the proceeding which earlier caused them to seek
the advice of the technical staff. However, when it bestowed various responsibili-
ties upon agencies, Congress recognized that agencies should not be forced to
sacrifice some goals to obtain others. For example, commissioners should not be
faced with sacrificing expert advice in an investigative proceeding merely be-
cause the same experts are involved in a factually related accusatory adjudica-
tion. 94
There are, however, limits to the consultations the APA appears to sanction.
The consultations must truly involve the resolution of a non-accusatory proceed-
ing. That is, the consultations cannot be used to circumvent the proscription in
section 554(d)(2) against investigators and prosecutors advising in the adjudica-
tion or in one factually related. The line between circumvention and proper
conversations may be fine. The totality of the circumstances surrounding the
consultation should be considered, including the extent of overlapping facts, the
expressed intent of the communicants, the nature of the consultation (informa-
tional, advocacy, and so forth), and the necessity for the consultation. Addition-
ally, the commissioners should not prejudge any issues which must be resolved
later on the basis of the record in the accusatory proceeding.95 To the extent
such judgments are necessary in the context of the proceeding causing the consul-
tations, those judgments should be strictly limited to that other proceeding.96
least residual powers to control, supervise, and direct all the activities ofthe agenc, including the various
preliminary and deciding phases of the process of disposing of particular cases.
1941 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 20, at 57 (emphasis added).
93 A more serious problem in this situation is not the problem of the APA, but rather a question of due
process. There seems to be some inherent unfairness in having the person who approved and supervised
the investigation, who agreed to the prosecution, and who actually supervised the prosecution team also
adjudicate the case. Furthermore, there are concerns that through such close supervision, the adjudicators
will prejudge the case. For a discussion of these issues, see text accompanying notes 122-238 in/a.
94 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
95 The APA requires that an on the record adjudication must be resolved strictly on the basis of the
evidence presented in that case. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(e), 706(2)(E) (1976). If additional information reaches
the decisionmaker, whether through persons outside the agency or agency staffmnembers, the decision may
be reversed unless the information is made public and there is an opportunity for rebuttal, and cross-
examination where appropriate. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Twiggs v.
United States Small Business Administration, 541 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1976). See text accompanying note
226 in/a.
96 The principle allowing for consultations with staff should also extend to agency administrative
matters (e.g., budget preparation or congressional testimony) where some issues that are being litigated in
a formal licensing case may arise. In the context of congressional hearings, however, not only must the
staff refrain from associating the consultations with resolution of a pending adjudication, but Congress
itself must avoid intruding into that adjudication. Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966);
Koniag, Inc., Village of Uyak v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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Finally, because in non-accusatory licensing cases there are no prosecutors or
investigators within the meaning of section 554(d), the APA does not prohibit
supervisory consultations between agency advocates or witnesses and commis-
sioners. Such consultations may be for purposes of the commissioners' obtaining
advice about deciding a particular non-accusatory case or because the commis-
sioners wish to supervise the staff presentation in such a case. 97
IV. Section 554(d)(1) Separation of Functions Requirements
Section 554(d)(1) of the APA provides that a hearing officer may not consult
with "any person or party" on any "fact in issue, unless on notice and opportu-
nity for all parties to participate. '98 Read literally, this provision means that a
presiding officer may not consult privately with staff members not involved in the
case since they are "persons." 99 A strict reading would even preclude advice
from law clerks and assistants. But the legislative history of the APA and con-
temporary commentary support the conclusion that a hearing examiner may
consult non-involved staff members despite the "person or party" limitation.
The "person or party" language most likely refers to persons or parties outside
the agency.
In 1941, a minority of the Attorney General's Committee proposed a clause
prohibiting the hearing examiner from consulting privately with anyone but his
law clerk and personal assistant. 0 0 This prohibition was sharply criticized in
congressional hearings because hearing examiners would inevitably discuss cases
with other hearing examiners and would need the help of staff experts to make
intelligent decisions.i °i Separation of functions concerns were relevant to hear-
ing examiners because of the desirability of ensuring that prosecuting staff would
not privately advise decisionmakers. No reason is given why a hearing examiner
should not consult privately with non-involved staff members. In short, there is
no indication the APA drafters adopted the minority position of the 1941 Attor-
ney General's Committee.
The 1947 Attorney General's Manual, however, specifically states that even
97 The meaning of the term "participate or advise in the agency decision" is relevant, however, in
determining the constitutionality of consultations between decisionmakers and agency advocates in non-
accusatory cases. As a general proposition for non-accusatory adjudications, there will be a potential due
process problem only when the agency staff member who consults with the decisionmakers is thereby
participating or advising in the decision. Accordingly, the bulk of the discussion in the due process section
of this article will be concerned with staff advocates, witnesses and the like who advise in the decision in
non-accusatory cases and not with staff members who consult with decisionmakers in a manner that does
not amount to such participation or advice in an adjudication. See text accompanying notes 122-238 infra.
98 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1976) provides that:
The employee who presides at the reception of evidence pursuant to section 556 of this title shall
make the recommended decision or initial decision required by section 557 of this title, unless he
becomes unavailable to the agency. Except to the extent required for the disposition of ex parte
matters as authorized by law, such an employee may not-
(1) consult a person or party on a fact in issue, unless on notice and opportunity for all parties
to participate; or
(2) be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged
in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency.
99 "Person" is defined at 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (1976) to include an "individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or public or private organization other than an agency." A staff member is certainly an "indi-
vidual."
100 1941 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 15, at 236.
101 141 Hearings, supra note 15, at 592, 734, 736, 737.
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in cases where separation of functions is required, a hearing officer may consult
with non-prosecuting agency personnel:
[I]t is manifest from the third sentence of section [554(d)]. . . that the hearing officer
may obtain advice from or consult with agency personnel not engaged in investiga-
tive or prosecuting functions in that or a factually related case.
10 2
Such consultations were considered desirable in assuring a decision based on
sound factual determinations and reflecting agency policy. In light of the legisla-
tive history, how can the "person or party" language be read to not include
agency staff? Professor Nathanson confronted this problem in an article written
soon after the passage of the APA.10 3 Noting it was "inconceivable" that Con-
gress meant to preclude private staff assistance for hearing officers, Professor Na-
thanson proposed two alternative meanings for this part of section 554(d).
First, Professor Nathanson suggested the statutory reference to the hearing
examiner included staff assistants or clerks assigned to help him in his duties.
That is, the staff assistants and clerks, together with the actual hearing officer,
form a "corporate person," the "hearing officer."1 04 This reading comports with
the common view that an action required of a certain official may be performed
by his subordinates,10 5 or at least with the assistance of his subordinates. 106
Professor Nathanson also suggested that "person or party" refers only to per-
sons outside the agency. 10 7 Professor Davis supported this reading in an article
written soon after Professor Nathanson's. Both commentators cited two reasons
why staff members are not "persons or parties" with whom, under the statute, the
hearing examiner may not privately consult. First, keeping in mind the general
intent of section 554(d) to avoid consultations with persons biased toward one
side of the case, there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress
meant to impair the institutional decisionmaking process by preventing advice
by non-involved agency staff. Second, the APA consistently uses "person or
party" to refer to individuals outside the agency. Professor Davis counted thirty-
eight references in the APA to "person" or "party," and concluded that "in every
instance [Congress] seem[s] to have reference only to outsiders and not to mem-
bers of the agency's staff."' 08 When Congress intended to refer to agency staff, it
typically used the terms "officer," "employee," or "agent." For example, the
phrase in section 554(d) "employee or agent engaged in the performance of inves-
tigative or prosecuting functions for an agency" could have been written "persons
engaged in. . ." if "persons" were intended to include staff members. Moreover,
if the reference to "person or party" includes staff members, the succeeding para-
graph prohibiting decisionmakers from consulting prosecuting staff would be su-
perfluous insofar as presiding officers are concerned. Thus, "person or party"
most likely refers to persons outside the agency.
102 1947 ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 20, at 55.
103 Nathanson, Some Comments on the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 Ill. L. Rev. 368 (1946).
104 Id. at 388-89.
105 See, e.g., Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 351 n.8 (1956); Shafer v. United States, 229 F.2d 124, 129 (4th
Cir. 1956); Johnson v. United States, 206 F.2d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1953).
106 See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481-82 (1936); De Remer v. United States, 340
F.2d 712, 716-17 (8th Cir. 1965).
107 Nathanson, supra note 103, at 389-90.
108 2 K. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 11.17 at 107 (1958); Davis, supra note 31, at 613-
16.
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However, there is a case to be made for reading the statute literally in order
to bar hearing examiners from consulting privately all staff members. 10 9 For pol-
icy reasons, if the hearing examiner consults with someone, including non-in-
volved staff, off the record, he may be provided information not on the record,
and not subject to rebuttal and cross-examination by the parties affected. This
was the major concern of the minority of the Attorney General's Committee 10
Moreover, in Butz v. Economou,III the only reported case addressing the issue, the
Supreme Court referred to the APA's prohibiting a hearing examiner from con-
sulting "any person or party, including other agency officials.""12 However,
given the total picture portrayed in the legislative history, such a view was evi-
dently not adopted by Congress in passing the APA. Professor Davis concluded
that:
Altogether, the problem of interpreting "person or party" is a close question which
could go either way. The literal interpretation has the merit of simplicity and is
likely to be adopted by a court that fails to make a rather profound and extended
inquiry into the problem. But a court which digs deeply enough may well be im-
pressed with the reasons for rejecting the literal interpretation.13
Professor Nathanson's conclusion was more forceful:
I conclude then that the subsection is designed to isolate the hearing officer only from
those engaged in prosecutory or investigatory questions in the particular case before
him or in factually related cases. Otherwise, he is free to avail himself of the assist-
ance of all the facilities of the agency. Such freedom clearly works toward strength-
ening, not weakening, the position of the hearing officer in the administrative
process. 114
Thus, the better view holds that when Congress prohibited hearing examiners
from consulting privately with "persons or parties" on a fact in issue, Congress
meant persons or parties outside the agency, and did not mean to prohibit con-
sultation with agency staff.' 15
109 The obvious reason is simply the "natural meaning of the words used." The plain meaning ex-
cluded all persons, and normally a statute will be construed to mean what it says. A similar argument can
be made with regard to the word "party." See, e.g., New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 582 F.2d 87, 94 n.12 (1st Cir. 1978).
110 See text accompanying note 100 supra.
111 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
112 Id. at 514. Butz can hardly be viewed as precedent since the quoted phrase is pure dictum; the case
did not concern separation of functions. In Butz the issue was whether, and to what extent, federal agency
officials are entitled to immunity from damage suits. Regarding persons performing adjudicatory func-
tions within federal agencies, the Supreme Court found that there was absolute immunity. In its reason-
ing, the Court declared that federal administrative law judges are "functionally comparable" to court
judges, citing a series of APA provisions, including § 554. Id. at 513-14. The reference to § 554 was off-
hand, with no reference to legislative history, scholarly comment or the 1947 ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MAN-
UAL.
113 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.17 at 109 (1958). Apparently, some 35 years
after the APA was adopted, there are still no court cases which provide a definite ruling on which of the
two interpretations is correct.
114 Nathanson, supra note 103, at 390.
115 This conclusion means that, to a great extent, § 554(d)(1) is superfluous in light of the recent prohi-
bition in § 557(d). In fact, the American Bar Association recommended that § 554(d)(1) be deleted in
favor of adopting a more general restriction on exparle contacts. Government in the Sunshine: Hearings Before
Subcomm. on Reorganization, Research, & Int'l Organizations of Sen. ov't Operations Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
373 (1974). However, as the head of the Administrative Conference of the United States observed,
§ 554(d)(1) prohibits private contacts about facts in issue with any person outside the agency, and not
merely interested parties covered by § 557(d) (e.g., presumably persons such as outside experts). Id. at 258.
Of course, Congress did not delete § 554(d) when it adopted § 557(d).
[February 1981]
SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS
V. The Interplay between the Ex Parte Provision in Section 557(d) and the
Separation of Functions Provision in Section 554(d)
Although agencies may take advantage of the initial licensing exemption in
non-accusatory proceedings, failing to separate administrative functions may en-
cumber licensing procedures because of the application of section 557(d) of the
APA.1 6 Section 557 applies when agency adjudicators consult with staff mem-
bers concerning the record in a licensing proceeding under review by the com-
missioners. In such cases, the advising staff members are "employee[s] who [are]
or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional process of the
proceeding," under the exparte provision in section 557(d). Pursuant to that pro-
vision, after a licensing case is noticed for hearing, "no interested person outside
the agency"-including applicants and intervenors--could communicate with
such staff members about the merits of the licensing proceeding unless these com-
munications were "on the public record" or the other parties had advance notice.
Such an application of section 557 could restructure the licensing process in
some agencies if adjudicators seek decisional advice from staff members assigned
to review, litigate or testify in the license application. Such staff members would
no longer be available for unlimited, informal, private communications with ap-
plicants, particularly after the license application has been noticed for hearing.
Informality would have to give way to pre-planned communications in which all
parties could participate, as judges cannot speak with one party outside the pres-
ence of the other parties. Furthermore, the scope of communications between
staff members involved in the decisional process and other staff members might
be restricted on the following rationale. Section 557(d) arguably breaks agency
employees into two mutually exclusive classes for purposes of on the record adju-
dications: (1) those "involved in the decisional process of the agency" and who,
consequently, may not communicate privately and informally about the merits
of the case with persons outside the agency; and (2) those who may continue to
communicate privately and informally with persons outside the agency about the
merits of the case and who, consequently, may not be "involved in the decisional
process of the agency." The question remaining is what kind of communications
are permitted between these two classes of employees?
If the section 557 (d) prohibition is to have meaning, the first class of employ-
ees (those assisting adjudicators to decide the case) should not be able to seek
116 The relevant sections of 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1) (1976) read as follows:
In any agency proceeding which is subject to subsection (a) of this section, except to the extent
required for the disposition of ex parte matters as authorized by law-
(A) no interested person outside the agency shall make or knowingly cause to be made to
any member of the body comprising the agency, administrative law judge, or other em-
ployee who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional process of the
proceeding, an ex parte communication relevant to the merits of the proceeding;
(B) no member of the body comprising the agency, administrative law judge, or other
employee who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional process of
the proceeding, shall make or knowingly cause to be made to any interested person outside
the agency an ex parte communication relevant to the merits of the proceeding;
(E) the prohibitions of this subsection shall apply beginning at such time as the agency
may designate, but in no case shall they begin to apply later than the time at which a
proceeding is noticed for hearing unless the person responsible for the communication has
knowledge that it will be noticed, in which case the prohibitions shall apply beginning at
the time of his acquisition of such knowledge.
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private advice from the second class of employees (those continuing informal
communications with outsiders and not assisting adjudicators in deciding the
case) on how the issues in the case should be determined; otherwise, the second
class of employees would be "involved in the decisional process of the agency."
However, the separation between these two classes of employees effectuated by
section 557(d) is not absolute. As long as the communications between these two
groups does not involve the second class in the "decisional process of the agency"
or cause members of the first class to become members of a prosecutorial or advo-
cacy team and thereby cause other APA or constitutional problems, such com-
munications are proper. For example, assume the first class includes staff
supervisors and the second class includes staff attorneys and witnesses involved in
the licensing case. The attorneys and witnesses could seek general advice from
the supervisors about what policy and legal issues are implicated in the case and
what sorts of evidence are relevant to these issues. Analogously, the supervisors
could give policy and evidence instructions to the staff attorneys and witnesses. 11 7
For the most part, such communications should not result in the staff attorneys'
and witnesses' becoming "involved in the decisional process of the agency."
However, when the initial decisionmakers or the commissioners decide the case,
only the supervisors (assuming they have had no ex parte contacts with persons
outside the agency and have not themselves become prosecutors or advocates)
can advise in the decisional process; the staff attorneys and witnesses (assuming
they have had ex parle contacts with persons outside the agency) cannot advise
the licensing board or the commission directly, or indirectly by advising the su-
pervisors.
There are three caveats implicit in the conclusion that certain types of com-
munications between the two classes of staff employees are permissible even after
a license application is noticed for hearing. First, private contacts between the
second class of employees "acting as agents for interested persons outside the
agency" and the first class of employees are "clearly within the scope of the
prohibitions" in section 557(d).'1 8 Thus, the communications allowable between
both classes of employees presume a good faith desire to seek advice or provide
supervision, rather than an intent to secretly pass along outsiders' comments to
employees who will later assist the adjudicators deciding the case. Second, be-
cause the first class of employees will be involved in the case's decisional process,
such employees should not allow their communications with or supervision of
other staff members to result in their prejudging the issues or their becoming
advocates themselves. Otherwise, a due process claim that the decisionmaker
was tainted by biased advice may be maintained. Third, conversations between
117 It may be that for reasons other than § 557(d), the supervisors may not be able to advise in the
decisional process if, through their extensive involvement with the staff, they have become akin to staff
advocates for a particular viewpoint. For example, if the supervisor has directed the staff to take a specific
position and to introduce evidence in support of it, the supervisor may be little different from the staff
advocate litigating the case. Accordingly, if the staff advocate is precluded from privately advising the
adjudicators because of potential legal problems, the supervisor who is heavily involved in the case may
suffer the same prohibitions. In the end, through the application of § 557(d) and the due process clause,
the commission could be left with a supervisor who will render advice to adjudicators in their deliberation
of a particular case, but who will be foreclosed from private consultations with outsiders in that case and
whose supervisory authority over the staff in that case will be limited to rather general guidance that is
given from a detached and more neutral perspective. Se notes 223-225 in a and accompanying text.
118 S. REP. No. 354, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 36 (1975).
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the two classes of employees should be based solely upon information publicly
available or soon available. Should secret material enter into these conversa-
tions, a due process objection, might arise on the ground that a person involved in
the decisionmaking process and advising the adjudicators has been exposed to,
and has had his judgment colored by, private, off the record information. In
short, an agency's decision to use certain staff members as advisors during an
adjudication apparently prohibits any substantive communications after the ad-
judication is noticed, between those persons and persons outside the agency. Fur-
ther, that decision evidently restricts the contacts between those persons and
other agency staff members."19
The initial licensing exemption appears to be of no use in avoiding such
results since there is no indication in the legislative history or in the language of
section 557(d) that Congress did not intend the exparte restrictions to apply in
initial licensing cases. In fact, the contrary appears to be the case. Section
55 7(d) (1) provides that the ex parte provision applies "in any agency proceeding
which is subject to subsection (a) of this section." Subsection (a) states that "this
section applies, according to the provisions thereof, when a hearing is required to
be conducted in accordance with section 556 of this title." Section 556(a) states
that "this section [i.e., section 556] applies, according to the provisions thereof, to
hearings required by section 553 or 554 of this title to be conducted in accord-
ance with this section." Section 554(c) expressly states that "to the extent that
the parties are unable so to determine a controversy by consent, hearing and
decision on notice and in accordance with sections 556 and 557 of this title" there
must be an opportunity for hearing afforded interested parties. The initial licens-
ing exemption which appears in subsection (d) of section 554, does not affect the
reach of subsection (c) of section 554. Thus, section 557(d)'s exparte provisions
apply to initial licensing cases, as they apply to all adjudications required by
statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hear-
ing.120 Because an agency charged with licensing determines the extent to which
119 Amendment of § 557(d) might be considered if Congress feels that the first class of staff members,
who directly advise the adjudicators, should be allowed to consult freely about the case with the second
class of staff members, who may have had exparte contacts with outsiders about the case. This would allow
more extensive use of staff expertise, and would rely upon the first group of staff advisers as a "buffer"
against contamination of the actual decisionmakers.
120 The NRC is faced with a unique and difficult question of whether § 557(d) applies to uncontested
proceedings. On the one hand, as discussed above, the application of that subsection comes about through
the series of statutory references back to § 554. However, § 554(c)(2) states that the hearing and notice
provisions of §§ 556 and 557 apply "to the extent that the parties are unable so to determine a controversy
by consent." Obviously, in an uncontested construction permit proceeding, the parties (the staff and the
applicant) have agreed how the case should be resolved. Furthermore, there is no "controversy" which
need be resolved. Apparently, the APA did not envision a complete, on the record adjudicatory hearing in
such uncontested situations and hence there is little reason to believe that Congress intended the exparte
restrictions in § 557(d) to apply.
On the other hand, it is very possible to read § 554(d) to conclude that, at least with regard to uncon-
tested construction permits (as opposed to uncontested initial operating license cases) the staff and the
applicant are "unable" to resolve the case by consent. This is because § 189a of the Atomic Energy Act 42
U.S.C. § 2239 (1976), has been interpreted to require a formal, on the record adjudication in uncontested,
as well as contested, construction permit cases. Compare Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 445 U.S. 198
(1980). In view of the fact that such formal procedures must be followed, it is also reasonable to argue that
the exparte restrictions in § 557(d) should apply; the decision on the construction permit should be based
solely on the record in the case and communications known to both the staff and the applicant. Thus,
where a person outside the agency seeks to privately influence an adjudicator to deny the license applica-
tion, even if it is formally uncontested, this is obviously unfair to the applicant. Furthermore, if the out-
sider is siding with the applicant and the staff, the public may be denied its statutory right to have the
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members of the agency staff are involved in the decisionmaking process, it must
weigh the impact these consultations will have on the present flexibility and in-
formality of communications between staff and applicants or intervenors, and
between staff involved in the decisionmaking process and other staff members.' 2'
VI. Separation of Functions under the Due Process Clause
A. The Constitutional Framework
Although the APA would not prohibit consultations between an agency's
commissioners and its regulatory staff, including the staff counsel, in non-accusa-
tory licensing proceedings 22 the limitations required by the due process clause
for initial licensing and other proceedings remain unclear. 123
Due process is required whenever government action deprives a person of
life, liberty or property. However, "due process is flexible and calls for such pro-
cedural protections as the particular situation demands."' 24 In Mathews v. El-
mandatory construction permit hearing resolved solely on the basis of record evidence. Private comments
from supportive outsiders may inject new information into the adjudicator's mind, and although this infor-
mation may assist the applicant in getting a license, the public may never know about it.
This discussion is important because the question of whether § 557(d) applies to uncontested cases,
which would be asked in the construction permit situation, does have some implications for the relaxation
of the separation of functions rules at the NRC. Of course, in uncontested cases there would be no prob-
lem with a communication between the agency staff member who was to advise the adjudicators and the
license applicant because this would not be an exparte communication: the only parties to the proceeding,
the staff and the applicant, would obviously have notice of and be involved in the communication. How-
ever, a problem might result if the staff desired to consult with some interested person outside the agency,
other than the applicant, about the merits of the uncontested case. Unless such communication was on the
record or the applicant had notice of it, this might be viewed as an ex parte communication between the
outsider and the staff member who is an advisor to the adjudicator. If this interpretation of the law were
to prevail, even in uncontested cases the NRC would have to sacrifice either the informality of communi-
cations between staff members serving as advisors to adjudicators and persons outside the agency or the
prospect of consultations between these staff members and the adjudicators. As with contested cases, the
NRC would not be able to have both. In light of these consequences, and because of the unique require-
ment of a mandatory formal adjudication on even uncontested licensing cases, § 557(d) should be inter-
preted as not applying to uncontested cases.
121 One other point must be made about the potential application of § 557(d) in contested or uncon-
tested cases. The statute requires that the restriction on expartk communications must commence at the
time that a hearing is noticed, "unless the person responsible for the communication has knowledge that it
will be noticed." § 557(d)(1)(E). Obviously, in the case of NRC construction permits, it is known to
everyone that there will be a hearing. While it may be said that Congress never intended the expare rules
to apply in every respect to the unique type of mandatory construction permit hearing conducted by the
NRC, it is necessary to note that a broad reading of § 557(d) could well destroy the flexibility of the
Commission's licensing process. If the adjudicators wish to consult with staff assigned to advocate or inves-
tigate in a construction permit case, a broad reading of§ 557(d) would mean that these persons could not
consult informally with the applicant or others outside the agency even before a formal hearing was noticed
because everyone would know that a hearing will definitely be held. This interpretation of the statute is
not compelled and, in fact, it is not very likely. However, it is possible that a court may reach the opposite
conclusion.
122 As to whether an agency's organic statute would bar such consultations, see note 55 supra and
accompanying text.
123 Most of the discussion in this section concerns staff members who have been involved in a case and
who later serve as advisors to the adjudicators in the course of their decisionmaking process. Any potential
due process problems are far more likely to be associated with such advisory consultations, rather than
with efforts of the commissioners to supervise the staff involved in a proceeding or with consultations
between these involved staff members and the commissioners about other matters such as independent, but
factually related, investigations, rulemaking and the like (though the latter situations do not present
merely frivolous concerns). See notes 82-97 supra and accompanying text. As for due process problems
which might result where new information or arguments, not already on the record, were privately com-
municated by staff to the adjudicators, see note 226 infra and accompanying text.
124 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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dndge,125 the Supreme Court indicated that a delicate balancing of three distinct
factors must be undertaken to determine whether a particular procedure satisfies
the due process clause:
[First], the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and admin-
istrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would en-
tail.126
B. Interests at Stake in Licensing Cases
Whether a life, liberty or property interest is at stake in a licensing proceed-
ing depends, in large part, upon who asserts the due process claim. The interest
of a license applicant or a license holder threatened with revocation or suspension
differs from the interest of an intervenor in a license related proceeding claiming
to be adversely affected by the grant of or a failure to revoke or suspend a license.
Applying for or holding a license likely implicates a property interest. The
determination of whether such an interest exists is made according to the test set
forth in Board of Regents v. Roth :127
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an
abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.
He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. t 28
Whether a "legitimate claim of entitlement" exists, however, does not depend
upon the Constitution. Instead, "[p]roperty interests . . . are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law . . ."129 Where federal entitlements are
concerned, the source of the property interests may be federal statutes 30 or
agency regulations.13 1
Even before the statutory entitlement principle was announced, courts rec-
ognized that if a person held a license necessary to his livelihood, he had a pro-
tected property interest which could not be revoked without procedural due
process.1 32 More recently, a property interest has been found to exist whenever a
license is "essential in the pursuit of a livelihood."'133 Thus, where agencies are
charged with issuing licenses and regulating licensees, the agencies have been
125 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
126 Id. at 335.
127 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The Roth test followed, by two years, what appears to have been the formal
abandonment in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970), of the "right/privilege" test for defining a
property interest. See Reich, Individual Rights and Social We/fare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J.
1245, 1255 (1965), cited in Golberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8, for the proposition that "[s]ociety today is built
around entitlement." For a harsh result worked by application of the "right/privilege" test, which assists
in understanding why it is outmoded today, see United States ex ret. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537(1950).
128 408 U.S. at 577.
129 Id.
130 See, e.g., Pence v. Kleppe, 529 F.2d 135, 140-42 (9th Cir. 1976).
131 See, e.g., Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1240-41 (4th Cir. 1973).
132 See, e.g. ,In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968) (license to practice law); Semler v. Oregon State Board of
Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935) (license to practice dentistry).
133 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979) (suspension of race
horse trainer's license).
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required to afford licensees due process before suspending, revoking or modifying
licenses relating to radio or television service,1 34 air carrier service1 35 or securities
broker-dealer registration. 3 6 Termination of license related benefits differs little
from revocation of other statutorily created entitlements which implicate due
process protections.
137
Applications for initial licenses required for pursuing a business or profession
have also been found to involve protected property interests.13 8 Whether there is
a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to an initial license depends upon the statu-
tory scheme involved.' 39 Although even under the current expansive definition
of property, every initial license application may not qualify for due process pro-
tection, t4° the current refusal to distinguish between applications for initial
licenses and suspensions or revocations comports with the realities of modern day
life.' 4 1 In many instances an initial license may be required to continue an ongo-
ing business. For example, a nuclear equipment supplier's request for an initial
license for a nuclear test facility may be essential to normal business expansion or
product testing. Similarly, a drug manufacturer may seek an initial license for a
new drug to match competitors. Also, a steel plant operator may seek an initial
license to discharge wastes which are by-products of a new process indispensable
to the plant's continued operation. Even if the license is required for initiating,
rather than the continuing, a business, it must be recognized that with the wide
range of present day governmentally licensed activities, a significant investment
of resources is often required to comply with application requirements.142 Few
134 See, e.g., L. B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC, 170 F.2d 793, 798, 802-03 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
135 See, e.g., Standard Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 177 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
136 See, e.g., Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
137 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.9, in which the Court, in deciding that welfare
benefits constituted a property interst, analogized to licensing cases.
138 See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (application for license to practice
law); Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926) (application for admission to bar of govern-
ment board); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (application for license to practice dentistry);
Freitag v. Carter, 489 F.2d 1377 (7th Cir. 1973) (chauffeur's license application); Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d
748 (1st Cir. 1973) (driver's license application); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964) (liquor
license application).
139 In Roth, the Court explained its earlier holding in Goldsmith in terms consistent with the entitlement
concept: "ITihe existence of the Board's eligibility rules gave the petitioner an interest andclaim to practice
before the Board to which procedural due process requirements applied." 408 U.S. at 576 n.15 (emphasis
added). Lower courts which have found protected property interests in applications for initial licenses or
government benefits have similarly looked to the statutory scheme. See, e.g., Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d
118 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 445 U.S. 970 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (welfare benefits) and cases
cited at note 138 supra.
140 In Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, the Supreme Court found that although the State of Ohio had a
practice of allowing out-of-state attorneys to practicepro hac vice in its courts, an individual attorney could
not claim a constitutional right based upon a "wholly and expressly discretionary state privilege. . . ." Id.
at 444 n.5 (emphasis in original). See Schlake v. Beatrice Prod. Credit Ass'n, 596 F.2d 278 (8th Cir. 1979)
(credit loan application); Berry v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes, 420 F. Supp. 934 (D. Wyo. 1976) (liquor
license).
141 In Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) the Supreme Court recognized a "cru-
cial distinction between being deprived of a liberty one has, as in parole, and being denied a conditional
liberty that one desires." Id. at 9. While this statement may be true and legally significant in the context
of parole revocation versus parole granting, its application in other situations is doubtful. Moreover, the
Court may have been concerned about the bounds of the liberty interest, which finds its genesis in funda-
mental rights, unlike property interests, which are created by normative laws. Thus the Court recognized
the highly subjective and discretionary nature of parole release decisions. Id. at 9-10. Even in this context
of convicted offenders, however, four Justices rejected the distinction between being granted freedom and
not having one's freedom terminated. Id. at 18, 22 (Powell & Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part).
142 There is a two-step licensing process at the FCC, 47 U.S.C. §§ 308-309 (1976), and the NRC,
whereby an applicant for an initial license must first obtain a construction permit and, after construction is
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would make such expenditures knowing their applications could be arbitrarily
denied and their investment destroyed. Nor would arbitrary denials foster entry
into the marketplace and the increased competition that would result from the
applicant's exercising his right to compete.143
A liberty interest may also be implicated by initial application for or suspen-
sion, revocation or modification of a license associated with conducting a business
or profession,' 44 at least if natural persons are concerned. 45
In modern administrative law practice, the license applicant is often not the
only non-governmental party to the adjudication. The intervention explosion
after Ofie of Communication of United Church of Chrit v. FCC 146 has included exten-
sive involvement in licensing proceedings at virtually every federal agency by
persons and organizations who claim either a personal stake in the outcome of
the licensing case or an interest in protecting the public good. If these interven-
ors possess a property or liberty interest which will be impacted by the decision
whether to grant, modify or revoke a license, they may not be deprived of that
interest without due process of law.
To the extent that an intervenor is permitted, in an agency's discretion, to
take part in a licensing adjudication even though he asserts no interest not shared
by all members of the public, it is difficult to argue that there is any statutory
entitlement that rises to the level of a property interest. 4 7 Where, however, a
federal statute expressly provides for intervention on the part of affected parties,
completed, an operating license. The latter may be viewed "as a logical, but not an automatic, sequel to
the fulfillment of the conditions of the construction permit." In re Power Reactor Development Co., 1
A.E.C. 128, 137-38 (1959) afd Power Reactor Development Co. v. Electrical Workers, 367 U.S. 396 (1961)
(rev'g Court of Appeals opinion setting aside Atomic Energy Commission order). In such instances, not
only is application of the "entitlement" analysis appropriate, but it is difficult to justify any distinction
between the application for the initial operating license and agency action to suspend or revoke an existing
license.
143 Rather than distinguishing between initial and non-initial licensing, one might more appropriately
distinguish between accusatory and non-accusatory licensing cases. Accusatory adjudications involve
damage to a licensee's reputation and/or the creation of a stigma associated with the licensee, unfair
consequences if the accusations are false. The Supreme Court has ruled, however, that reputation alone is
not a liberty interest protected by the due process clause. The stigma attached to the licensee in the
accusatory proceeding is only one factor that is useful in evaluating the extent of harm caused by govern-
mental action that otherwise deprives a person of property or liberty. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977).
144 In Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243 (1906), the Supreme Court stated that
"the liberty guaranteed by the 14th Amendment against deprivation otherwise than by due process of law
embraces the rights to pursue a lawful calling and enter into all contracts proper, necessary, and essential
to the carrying out of such calling." Id. at 253. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (termination
of employment); Shaw v. Hospital Auth., 507 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1975) (application by doctor for hospital
staff privileges).
Of course, agencies license individuals to engage in activities which are unrelated to the pursuit of
employment. For example, the CAB issues pilot licenses to private pilots, 14 C.F.R. § 61.5(a)(ii) (1980),
the FCC issues citizens band licenses, 47 C.F.R. § 95.401, rule 3 (1980), and, on the state level, driver's
licenses are issued. Courts have held that even licenses granted for such recreational purposes come within
the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Set, e.g., Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878, 882 (1st
Cir.), ert denied, 346 U.S. 915 (1953); Perez v. Tynan, 307 F. Supp. 1235, 1238 (D. Conn. 1969).
145 In Riggs, the Supreme Court stated that "[tihe liberty referred to in [the Fourteenth] Amendment is
the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons." 203 U.S. at 255. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 535 (1925). Butsee New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978). One exception
to this general proposition is that "[f]reedom of speech and the other freedoms encompassed by the First
Amendment always have been viewed as fundamental components of the liberty guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause" for natural and artificial persons. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780
(1978).
146 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
147 Compare Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
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this would be strong evidence that Congress intended to create a protectable
property interest. 148 Similarly, where a licensing decision may result in the dep-
rivation of a property right created by state law,14 9 due process safeguards would
be applicable.15 0
C. Risk of Error Associated with Combinations of Functions
After identifying the property or liberty interests that are implicated in a
regulatory licensing scheme, due process analysis must identify the risks of erro-
neous decisionmaking associated with a combination of functions. The extent of
these risks depends primarily upon which functions are combined and which
agency personnel are involved. The APA drafters recognized at least two dan-
gers in combining functions which could harm the decisionmaking process.
These are concern about advice to adjudicators from staff members who had
performed conflicting non-judicial functions and concern about these staff mem-
bers interjecting off the record facts into adjudicative deliberations. Two addi-
tional possible dangers not reflected in the APA's separation of functions section
are that decisionmaking personnel may prejudge the case' 5 ' or decisionmakers
may be called upon to evaluate their own prior conclusions. Each of these dan-
gers is discussed generally. Then their application to specific combinations of
functions is examined.
The existence of a partial decisionmaker or advisor constitutes the first po-
tential danger. The impartiality of the decisionmaker is perhaps the most impor-
tant element of the adjudicatory process. The due process clause "entitles a
person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal
cases."' 152 This principle applies whether the case is before a court or an adminis-
148 An intervenor's right to a hearing on the license may itself constitute a property interest. For
example, in Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court stated
that "[d]ue process does indeed require that, where a right to be heard exists, it must be accommodated 'at
a meaningful time in a meaningful manner.'" In that case, the Atomic Energy Act created a right to be
heard. See alro Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
in which the court assumed that an intervenor in an agency licensing proceeding had due process rights,
although the court did not identify the particular property or liberty interest at stake. An intervenor's
right to a hearing in a licensing case might also reflect congressional recognition of a more substantive
property or liberty interest. Se alro Davis v. Ball Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, - F.2d -, 49 U.S.L.W. 2294
(7th Cir. Oct. 3, 1980) (No. 80-1209). Compare Geneva Towers Tenants' Organization v. Federated Mort-
gage Investors, 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974) and Gramercy Spire Tenants' Ass'n v. Harris, 446 F. Supp. 814
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) with Grace Towers Tenants' Ass'n v. Grace Hous. Dev. Fund Co., 538 F.2d 491 (2d Cir.
1976).
149 Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836, 858-62 (N.D. Ill.
1979), aft'd, 616 F.2d 1006, 1015 (majority opinion), 1017-19 (Pell, J., dissenting) (7th Cir. 1980). The
municipality's zoning actions in this case can profitably be analogized to an agency's licensing determina-
tion which will have an adverse impact on the property of third persons. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nurs-
ing Center, 100 S. Ct. 2467, 2475 n.17 (1980).
150 In O'Bannon, the Supreme Court concluded that there is a "distinction between government action
that directly affects a citizen's legal rights, or imposes a direct restraint on his liberty, and action that is
directed against a third party and affects the citizen only indirectly or incidentally ...." 100 S. Ct. at
2476. Thus, it found that residents of a governmentally funded nursing home could not be said to be
"deprived" of liberty or property when they are forced to leave the home because the state has revoked the
home's license. The critical question, in the licensing context, is whether the effect on the citizen which
arises from government action for or against a licensee is sufficiently direct to constitute a deprivation,
assuming the existence of a property or liberty interest.
151 There is a specific provision in § 556(b) requiring lower level presiding employees to be "impartial"
and allowing the agency to disqualify such employees for "personal bias," but there is no similar provision
applicable to commissioners.
152 Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). The requirement of a neutral decisionmaker is
so central to the fulfillment of due process that in its absence a violation of constitutional rights should be
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trative agency 153 and whether the proceeding is accusatory or non-accusatory. 154
The term "impartial and disinterested" adjudicator means a decisionmaker
whose job does not include performing functions which arguably conflict with an
objective evaluation of the merits of the case.155 For example, in accusatory cases
an investigator who ferrets out facts to support initiating an enforcement action
or a prosecutor who litigates the enforcement action are not impartial or disinter-
ested. The performance of such non-adjudicatory functions, rather than the
unique actions or judgments of a particular individual, destroys impartiality. To
the extent such persons participate in the decisionmaking process, the Supreme
Court declared in Withrow v. Larkin 156 that they "would be so psychologically
wedded to their complaints that they would consciously or unconsciously avoid
the appearance of having erred or changed position."' 1 7 As a result, these per-
sons, who have developed a "will to win, '' is 8 might view the factual issues in a
case in a biased manner. Despite Congress's early belief that initial license pro-
ceedings resemble rulemakings because policy concerns rather than factual dis-
putes predominate, modern day agencies do more factfinding than policymaking
in individual licensing cases. For the most part, an agency's policy judgments are
made in its regulations which incorporate the delicate balancing of competing
policies. For example, at the NRC, once a license applicant has satisfied the
found without the necessity of balancing. See, e.g., NLRB v. Phelps, 136 F.2d 562, 563-64 (5th Cir. 1943).
The seminal case on separation of functions, Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), did not engage in a
balancing analysis; it was, however, decided before Mathews. Moreover, since the Withrow Court con-
cluded there was an impartial decisionmaker, it was not necessary to go further and balance other inter-
ests. In Hortonville Joint School Dist. v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976), the Court did use
the Mathews balancing test to approve a combination of functions; but it did so after finding no lack of
impartiality on the part of the decisionmaker, and in the course of evaluating the general fairness of the
proceeding.
153 See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 12.04 at 250 (3d ed. 1972), cited with approval in
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 271.
154 Gibson v. Berrnhill was an accusatory adjudication involving revocation of an optometrist's license for
unprofessional conduct. Goldberg a. Kely was a non-accusatory adjudication concerning revocation of wel-
fare benefits for failure to meet financial and other eligibility requirements.
155 Of course, financial interest in the outcome of a case is disqualifying, Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S.
245 (1977), Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), as is personal bias against or in favor of a party, May-
berry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
156 421 U.S. 33 (1975).
157 Id. at 57. Withrow rejected the idea that, as a general proposition, the combination of investigating
and judging functions in the same person or agency was necessarily tantamount to a denial of due process.
In that case a state licensing board had conducted an investigative proceeding involving a doctor in order
to determine whether to commence formal license suspension proceedings, over which the same board
would preside. The doctor claimed that the board's combination of investigative and adjudicative respon-
sibilities was a denial of due process. The Supreme Court rejected this claim of "institutional" bias, stating
that the claim must "overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators;
and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of the psychological tendencies and human weakness,
conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individual poses such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately
implemented." Id. at 47. The Court focused on the different functions being performed by the board in
its investigative and adjudicative capacities: to find "probable cause" sufficient to commence a prosecu-
tion in the former, but to make a finding of an actual violation based solely on the record evidence in the
latter. In this context, the Court rejected the bias claim.
Although the Withrow case concerned alleged bias in the ultimate decisionmakers, many of the princi-
ples enunciated therein are equally applicable to initial decisionmakers (administrative law judges, appeal
boards, etc.) and to agency staff who assist all adjudicators in making their decisions.
158 See S. REP. No. 1018, pt. 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (Oct. 30, 1980).
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agency's regulations, the applicant is entitled to a license.' 59 Although in many
licensing cases the factual dispute involves the reliability of testing procedures,
formulae or results, resolving such disputes usually involves weighing expert
opinion evidence or the underlying data, which itself may be highly disputed. 160
In these and in less technical disputes, the agency's decision must be based upon
"reliable, probative and substantial evidence."' 6 1 Thus, in every decision, an
agency performs a factfinding role, regardless of whether there are also policy
choices involved.
The nature of the facts in a particular licensing proceeding affects the poten-
tial for decisionmaking error. For example, because disputes between experts
might appear evenly balanced from reading a written record, the interjection of
private advice by a biased advisor on the vital issue of expert credibility could
skew the decision. Further, given the complicated nature of scientific disputes,
and the massive amounts of data involved, a decisionmaker may tend to forgo
firsthand detailed analysis and rely upon available advice. This susceptibility to
persuasion by biased advisors could also distort the factfinding process where
experts have little involvement in particular types of cases, but where witness
veracity might be critical. 162 While a decisionmaker can obtain most informa-
tion from the written record, he may not know which facts to weigh most heavily.
Advice from the agency litigator who sponsored a witness's testimony could cause
the adjudicator to focus on the strengths of a witness's testimony and ignore its
own inconsistencies or its conflicts with other testimony. To conclude, the risk of
error associated with private advice to decisionmakers from biased staffers in li-
censing proceedings is not insubstantial.
The second source of error associated with combining functions is that facts
not on the record might be interjected into the adjudicative process by persons
who have performed non-adjudicative functions. On one hand, "mere familiar-
ity with the facts of a case gained by an agency in the performance of its statu-
tory role does not . . . disqualify a decisionmaker."' 63 For example, prior to a
hearing agency members consult freely with the investigators and prosecutors
recommending commencement of formal adjudicatory hearings to suspend or re-
voke licenses. Such pre-hearing consultations might expose members to informa-
tion which might not, or could not, be admitted into evidence at a formal
hearing. But this practice has been upheld against due process objections. In
159 Public Serice Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), Atomic Licensing App. Bd.
No. 422, 6 N.R.C. 33, 42-43 (1977).
Another good example of how policy determinations are generally reflected in agency regulations is
illustrated in Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The petitioners sought t hearing on whether the
renewal of a radio license was consistent with the statutory public interest standard. Those opposed to the
renewal argued that the multiple stations owned by the applicant presented an undue concentration of
media control. The court upheld the FCC's refusal to act on the issue in the context of the renewal
adjudication, finding that an ongoing FCC rulemaking was the preferred method for dealing with the
general policy question of multiple ownership licensees.
160 See, e.g., Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 881 (1st Cir. 1978); Deutsch v.
United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 401 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
161 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976).
162 See, e.g., Pressley v. FCC, 437 F.2d 716 (D.C. Cir. 1970), where witness credibility was critical to
determining if a license should be denied on grounds that the license renewal applicant had improperly
encouraged a third party to compete for a license. Many other FCC cases involve charges where veracity
is important, e.g., race or sex discrimination, news distortion or slanting, etc.
163 Hortonville Joint School Dist. v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. at 493.
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Wit 'hrow the Court declared that "mere exposure to evidence presented in non-
adversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness"
of a later adversary proceeding. 164 The Court based its conclusion on the as-
sumption that agency members are people "of conscience and intellectual disci-
pline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own
circumstances."' 6 5 Similarly, agency staffers arguably are included in this as-
sumption in connection with the risk they might introduce off the record material
into an adjudicative decision in which they are asked to give private advice after
having performed non-adjudicative duties. Under this reasoning, pre-hearing ex-
posure alone to extra-record material does not pose a sufficient justification for
precluding agency staff from advising decisionmakers in a particular adjudica-
tion. 1 66 The risk of error associated with the infusion of such material into the
decisionmaking process is not great enough to conflict with due process require-
ments. Where additional dangers167 exist, however, the risk of error could easily
be compounded if these staff members have been exposed to extra-record mate-
rial which they would be psychologically less able to ignore.
A less acceptable risk of error exists when the adjudicator or those advising
him have prejudged the case as a result of having performed other duties. Pre-
judgment should be distinguished from partiality. Partiality depends largely
upon the nature and scope of the non-adjudicatory role played by one who must
also adjudicate; it involves an institutional overview. Prejudgment, however, fo-
cuses on a conclusion about the facts of a particular case before formal adjudica-
tory procedures have been exhausted. However, prejudgment, like partiality,
automatically disqualifies one charged with deciding a case.' 68
Although various tests could be used to determine when an improper pre-
judgment has been made, the courts have evidently adopted the opinion that
when "a disinterested observer may conclude that [the agency]. . . has in some
measure adjudged the facts as well as the law of a particular case in advance of
hearing it" an improper prejudgment has been made. 169 The prejudgment in-
164 421 U.S. at 55. See also United States v. Litton Indus., Inc., 462 F.2d 14 .(9th Cir. 1972).
165 Id. (citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941)).
166 One could argue that agency staffers, unlike virtually all other agency members, are not appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate, with the result that their consciences and intellectual disci-
pline have not been subjected--and will not be so subjected--to the type of public scrutiny which allows
the assumption of fairness to be made. While this concern is not frivolous, it is problematic whether it is a
sufficient reason to distinguish between agency members and staffers for due process purposes.
167 E.g., advice coming from partial staff members.
168 See Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FrC, 425 F.2d 583, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1970); 2 K.
DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREAIsE §§ 12.01-.06 at 130 (1958).
169 425 F.2d at 591 (quoting Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 469 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 361
U.S. 896 (1959)).
See Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1964), vated and remanded on other grounds, 381
U.S. 739 (1965). This general test was reaffirmed recently in Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, No. 78-2201, slip
op. at 97-99 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 1980). But see American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 765 (6th
Cir. 1966) in which the court simply concluded that a commissioner should be disqualified for having
formed, in advance of a hearing, "conclusions as to the facts". The Supreme Court itself has not formu-
lated any single, general test. It refused to disqualify commissioners in FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683
(1948) because it was not shown that their "minds ...were irrevocably closed. . . " Id. at 701. In
Withrow the Court opined that disqualification might be proper if a member's "initial view of the facts
based on the evidence derived from non-adversarial processes as a practical or legal matter foreclosed fair
and effective consideration at a subsequent adversary hearing leading to ultimate decision . . . 2' 421
U.S. at 58. In Hortonille, the Court asked if the adjudicator was "capable of judging a particular contro-
versy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances." 426 U.S. at 493.
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quiry entails examining all the facts and circumstances relating to the charge of
prejudgment, such as the depth of the adjudicator's prior contact with the factual
issues in the case, the extent of factual overlap, the prior role of the adjudicator
and his public utterances. 1 70 This inquiry must focus on whether thefacts of the
case have been prejudged. A decisionmaker is not disqualified on due process
grounds for taking "a position, even in public, on a policy issue related to the
dispute,"1 7 1 or for expressing a preference for a particular legal standard. 172
Finally, combining functions may result in an unacceptable risk of error
where adjudicators are asked to review their own prior adjudications. 73 Due
largely to the ambiguous language in recent Supreme Court decisions the rule in
such cases is somewhat confusing. A judge is not disqualified from sitting in a
retrial because he was reversed on earlier rulings, nor is an administrative law
judge precluded from sitting because he ruled against a party in a first 'hear-
ing.174 This rule was reaffirmed in Withrow, 175 although the Court concluded by
noting that "[a]llowing a decisionmaker to review and evaluate his own prior
decision raises problems that are not present here."' 176 The risk of error in such
situations is obvious: having carefully scrutinized the facts of a case and publicly
announced his decision, the adjudicator will tend to defend his decision against
any argument that it is incorrect. Because there are two or three levels of deci-
sionmaking in federal agencies, the risk of error could vary depending upon
which adjudicators are being consulted about a case, the status of the case during
the consultation, and the purpose of the consultation.
D. Separation of Functions Safeguards or Other Procedural Requirements
Separation of functions requirements could decrease the risks of error in an
adjudicative process. The chance for an impartial decision increases when those
persons who have performed non-adjudicatory functions and may have become
psychologically wedded to a viewpoint are precluded from participating in the
decision. The potential effect of off the record information is also reduced if per-
sons exposed to that information do not decide the case. Obviously, grave error
would result and an adjudication would exist in name only if those who had
prejudged a case were allowed to decide it. Finally, persons who have served in
one adjudicative capacity in a case could increase the chance of error if they are
allowed to adjudicate the facts again and sit in judgment of their own prior deci-
sion.
Although the risks of error may be diminished by requiring separation of
functions, alternative safeguards might overcome these risks. The greatest safe-
guard is the requirement that the adjudicator base his decision solely on the rec-
170 See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, slip op. at 96-97 (citing Amei'can Cyanamid). For an illustration of
how these factors can be balanced, see Safeway Stores, Inc. v. FTC, 366 F.2d 795, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 932 (1967).
171 426 U.S. at 493.
172 333 U.S. at 703.
173 The combination of functions in this context is the performance of two different adjudicatory func-
tions by the same persons, for example, an administrative law judge who issued an initial decision being
called upon later to advise the members of the agency who are reviewing his decision.
174 NLRB v. Donnely Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219, 236-37 (1947). Stealso 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1976).
175 421 U.S. at 49, 57.
176 Id. at 58 n.25.
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ord in the case. 177 A panoply of procedural protections is associated with this
obligation. Sections 557(c)(l)-(3) require that the parties be permitted to submit
proposed findings and conclusions (or exceptions to initial decisions) and sup-
porting reasons, and section 557(c)(3)(A) requires that the record show a ruling
on each such proposed finding, conclusion and exception, and that the decisions
include specific findings, conclusions and reasoning of the adjudicator. More-
over, although independent, close judicial review cannot legitimize an otherwise
constitutionally infirm initial adjudication,1 78 such review strengthens procedu-
ral protections at the agency level. Finally, when a biased person advises the
decisionmaker, the decisionmaker might simply discount the advice. However,
even taken together, these safeguards probably cannot adequately protect against
the risks of error attributable to a combination of functions. There are always
some facts supporting a result desired by a biased adjudicator or an adjudicator
who has prejudged the case. Even exparte information, though not in the record
to support a decision, may influence inferences drawn from the evidence. The
doctrine precluding examining the mental processes of a decisionmaker 179 makes
it virtually impossible to establish the existence of an effort to direct the decision
to a particular result. Perhaps the only safeguard in this respect is a separation of
functions rule which prevents biased staffers from taking part in the private deci-
sionmaking process.
Although further safeguards could be added, they would undercut the es-
sence of combined functions. For example, consultations between adjudicators
and agency staff members who had performed non-adjudicative duties could be
required to occur in public or transcripts of such consultations could be required.
While salutary in many respects, exposing such consultations to public scrutiny
would not really preserve the classic concept of combination of functions which
includes informality and privacy.180
E. Government Interests and their Relationship to a Requirement
of Separation of Functions
Due process analysis requires looking at the government interests to be
weighed against the personal interests at stake and the risks of error associated
with a combination of functions. Several government interests apply to virtually
all agencies. Additionally, an agency's own statutory mandate plays an impor-
tant role.
The primary government interest in a combination of functions is the ability
177 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (1976).
178 Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972).
179 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938). The MAorgan doctrine has been somewhat modified
by Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971), which recognized the possibility
that an adjudicator might be required to submit to questioning about the decisional processes he employed
where the record compiled by the agency does not give any basis for a decision. Moreover, courts have
compelled agency heads to go behind the stated grounds for their decisions to reveal improper cx parte
contacts. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 52-53 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977).
180 Under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1976), separation of functions is required in that persons who
investigate or prosecute in a case may not participate in the decision in that case or a factually related case
"except as witness or counsel in public proceedings." It is the requirement of formality and public scru-
tiny, and not any absolute ban on participation in the decisionmaking process, which results in the separa-
tion of functions.
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of agency decisionmakers to call upon the specialized knowledge of those most
familiar with the facts of a case. A thorough grasp of a complex scientific process
can often be gained only by long-term, in-depth investigation and analysis. An
agency has few experts in fields such as nuclear energy or toxic substances. These
experts frequently perform the pre-adjudicatory work on a license application.
To foreclose their providing advice to the agency's administrative law judges or
commissioners would nullify an important strength of the administrative proc-
ess-the integration of diverse expertise in a single agency.
Agencies could hire additional specialists so their adjudicative apparatus
would mirror its investigative and analytical departments. The investigative and
analytical departments would then focus solely on pre-adjudicative preparation
or other processes unrelated to adjudications such as rulemaking. However, such
duplication would be expensive and perhaps even impossible. Agencies presently
have difficulties attracting specialists from lucrative industry positions. Even if
available, the best talent is expensive. 8" In Mathews, the Supreme Court ex-
pressly authorized consideration of the cost factor:
Financial cost alone is not a controlling weight in determining whether due process
requires a particular procedural safeguard prior to some administrative decision. But
the Government's interest, and hence that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal
and administrative resources, is a factor that must be weighed.13
2
A separation of functions requirement will likely impair an agency's ability
to exercise its discretion in determining which combination of staff responsibili-
ties best serves the public. The government has a significant interest in assuring
that agencies are not hamstrung by procedural requirements not imposed by
Congress. 18 3
These government interests point to perhaps the overriding concern about a
separation of functions requirement: that an agency will be unable to carry out
its statutory mandate to protect the public. This consideration had decisive per-
suasiveness in FTC v. Cement Institute. 8 4 In that case the Court noted that if FTC
commissioners were required to disqualify themselves for having investigated cer-
tain practices, the legality of which they were later called upon to adjudicate, the
agency's statutory mandate could not have been carried out by those appointed
to regulate.' 8 5 Although this rationale supports a combination of functions in
commissioners, it still would be possible for an agency to perform its duties under
a strict separation of functions rule applicable to lower staff members. For de-
cades, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the NRC have performed
their adjudicative roles under one of the most severe, self-imposed separation of
functions schemes. 8 6 Nonetheless, as both the President's Commission on Three
Mile Island and the Rogovin Commission suggested, the commissioners' inability
to consult freely and privately with staff members could easily deny them access
181 The question of federal salaries has received extensive attention recently, especially because such
salaries have not kept pace with the rate of inflation. See, e.g., Panel Urges Big Pay Boosts for Top Fedeat
Ojftials, Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1980, at A-6; Administrative Conference Report on ABA Proposals To Amend
The Administrative Praoedures Act, 25 AD. L. REV. 419, 435-36 n.2 (1973).
182 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
183 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 546.
184 333 U.S. 683.
185 Id. at 701.
186 Se text accompanying note 48 supra.
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to information and ideas they might need to better protect public health and
safety. 18 7 Concerns that procedural protections might interfere with protection
of the public is a critical element in due process analysis.' 88 Unlike agencies
which have operated with strict separations of functions, agencies which have
come to depend heavily on non-separated staffs in adjudicatory cases might make
a case for the harm which would result from separation. Moreover, although
threats to public health and safety are of paramount concern, agency mandates
relating to economic harm also warrant consideration. 189
Finally, the government itself has an interest in assuring its licensing pro-
ceedings are conducted fairly, appear to have been conducted fairly and leave
parties satisfied that license applications or objections to the issuance of licenses
receive just consideration. t90 The axiom that government depends upon the con-
sent of the governed is even more appropriate when the very concept of adminis-
trative agency regulation is being questioned. 19' To the extent it undermines
fairness concerns, a combination of functions is counterproductive to good gov-
ernment.
F. Application of the Balancing Test to Particular Combinations of Functions
As the Supreme Court recognized in W4ithrow, "the growth, variety, and
complexity of the administrative processes have made any one solution [to the
separation of functions debate] highly unlikely."' 192 Although a combination of
investigative and adjudicative functions in agency commissioners, even in an ac-
cusatory licensing case, does not violate due process, the opposite may be true
where lower level agency staffers are assigned both prosecutorial and adjudica-
tive duties. The nature of the consultations, the persons involved, the type of
proceeding and many other factors could tip the balance away from that in
Withrow. Absent a definite Supreme Court decision, the circumstances under
which separation of functions is constitutionally required remain unclear. None-
theless, it is useful to analyze various combinations under the Mathews balancing
test. Furthermore, because accusatory adjudications raise concerns not existing
in non-accusatory cases, each class will be discussed separately. 193
187 See text accompanying notes 7-12 supra.
188 See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (protection of community from dangerous ten-
dencies of some mentally ill patients must be considered in determining standard of proof for commit-
ment); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977) (public safety of roads is important factor in deciding on
procedures for suspension of driver's license); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (public interest in
protection from paroled convicts is factor to be weighed when deciding procedures for revocation of pa-
role).
189 In FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 701-02, the Court focused on the need to protect the
public from unfair trade practices. In Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 65 (1979), the Court was concerned
about harm to the public from a horseracing industry in which the horses on which bets were placed might
be drugged.
190 Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
191 Congress has recently passed legislation to substantially deregulate the airline industry, Airline Der-
egulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (Supp.
11 1978)); the railroad industry, Railroad Transportation Policy Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448 and the
trucking industry, Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793. A modest deregulatory
proposal applicable to all agencies was adopted in the Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94
Stat 1164 (1980).
192 421 U.S. at 51.
193 The following analysis applies to advocates who are participating or advising in the formal adjudi-
cation in question, or in a factually related formal adjudication. As under the APA, these advocates
should be permitted to advise agency heads privately in connection with rulemaldngs, preparation of
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1. Communications between Agency Adjudicators and Agency Regulatory
Staff in Accusatory Proceedings
Typically involving suspensions or revocations, accusatory licensing pro-
ceedings may result in a licensee's loss of property or liberty insofar as his pursu-
ing the licensed occupation or operation is concerned. Despite the gravity of this
interest, the Withrow decision rejects the argument that a combination of investi-
gative and adjudicative duties in the members of an agency during the course of
an accusatory proceeding raises an unacceptable risk of bias violating due proc-
ess. 194 Moreover, insofar as the agency commissioners delegate the actual investi-
gative tasks to the regulatory staff (which, in turn, makes a recommendation to
the commissioners on whether to commence formal proceedings), there are no
due process problems with the commissioners consulting privately with and su-
pervising the investigators during the investigation, at least until a formal hear-
ing is ordered.' 9 5 However, after a hearing has commenced, consultations about
how to decide the case between commissioners or initial adjudicators and the
investigative or prosecuting staff should be circumscribed to afford the parties
due process.
After a hearing has commenced, commissioners may want to supervise the
prosecutorial staff in a particular case. By so doing, the commissioners them-
selves perform prosecutorial functions. A combination of prosecutorial and adju-
dicative functions in the same person has been found to violate due process, both
before' 96 and after 9 7 Withrow. On the other hand, Professor Davis, noting the
congressional testimony and similar budgetary matters which may address some of the issues at stake in
the formal adjudication. See text accompanying notes 84-94 supra. Whether these advocates should also
be allowed to advise the decisionmakers privately in a factually related informal adjudication, at least
where the party in the formal adjudication is also a party to the informal proceeding, is dubious after
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, No. 79-2382 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 1980). In Bethlehem Steel the EPA had
commenced an enforcement action in federal court against a steel company, while at the same time, in an
informal adjudication, the agency was entertaining review of a state order which would have permitted
the company to delay compliance with the state air pollution implementation plan. Although § 554 is
inapplicable to informal adjudications, the court ruled that the due process clause was violated because the
attorney who was prosecuting the enforcement action had privately advised the EPA decisionmaker in the
informal adjudication. It is possible that the court meant to prohibit such private advice from prosecutors
in all related informal adjudications, although the ruling might be read more narrowly. The court was
concerned that the agency may have been using the informal adjudication in an effort to improve its
position in the enforcement action; that the decisionmaker's rationale in the informal adjudication was
expressed in language identical to that used in an internal agency memorandum dealing with the enforce-
ment action; that the agency had failed to disclose adequately the documents upon which it relied in
making its adjudicative decision; and that the private communications between enforcement attorneys and
the decisionmaker in the informal adjudication had taken place after the period for public comment on
the EPA review of the state order.
194 The combination of investigative and limited adjudicative functions was upheld, following
Withrow, in NLRB v. Aaron Bros. Corp., 563 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1977). See also O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544
F.2d 543 (1st Cir. 1976).
195 In Withrow, the Supreme Court noted that the board had assigned the actual investigation to its
staff, and that the recommendation to prosecute was made by an assistant attorney general. The Court
stated that this internal board organization, geared to minimize the risks from combining investigative and
adjudicative duties, was "not essential" to the decision upholding the constitutionality of the board's com-
bination of both duties. 421 U.S. at 54 n.20.
196 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), struck down a "one-man grand jury" system in which ajudge
could compel witnesses to testify before him about possible crimes, and then accuse and try them for
contempt and perjury. Although Withrow gave a narrow reading to Murchison and indicated that it would
not apply to a combination of adjudicative and investigative functions, Murchison could well still be appli-
cable to a combination of adjudicative and prosecutorial functions. In another pre-Withrow case, Amos
Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the court ruled that it "would be tantamount to that
denial of administrative due process against which both the Congress and the courts have inveighed" to
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APA itself permits a combination of prosecuting and judicial functions in agency
heads, cited a number of pre-Withrow state court decisions upholding this combi-
nation against due process attacks.1 98 At least one court has reached a similar
result after Withrow. 199
Confronted by such differences of opinion, agencies handling initial and
other licensing cases should seek a middle course. Commissioners should be per-
mitted during the course of these proceedings to communicate with the staff in-
volved in an accusatory proceeding to supervise and guide the staff on general
legal and policy considerations. However, commissioners should limit discussion
concerning the precise facts of the case. Commissioners would thus decrease the
risk of error which might later result if they identified with the prosecutorial
attitude toward the facts, absorbed off the record information during the adjudi-
cative process or prejudged the facts of the case. By overseeing the prosecution
generally, commissioners could coordinate their various statutory duties and as-
sure that the agency's policies are reflected in the theories pursued by its prosecu-
tors. Moreover, a lack of detailed involvement would help avoid embroiling the
agency members in individual cases to the exclusion of their other, broader du-
ties. Lack of detailed involvement would also contribute to fairness and the ap-
pearance of fairness. Thus, balancing these various factors, as required by
Mathews, allows agency members to achieve limited, but meaningful, involve-
ment in supervising agency prosecutors during trials.
Prosecutors or investigators advising agency members on how to decide an
accusatory case presents a very different set of concerns. 20 0 The APA prohibits
allow a commissioner to partake in an agency adjudication after having been promoted from a staff posi-
tion where he initiated an investigation, weighed its results and perhaps recommended the filing of
charges. Id. at 266-67. Withrow specifically notedAmos Treat, but refused to either reject or endorse it. 421
U.S. at 50 n.16. Finally, in Mack v. Florida State Bd. of Dentistry, 296 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D. Fla. 1969),
modiftd, 430 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971), the court found due process viola-
tions where, in an accusatory license revocation proceeding, the legal advisor to a board made adjudicative
decisions for the board and also acted as the prosecuting attorney, and where that same person was present
during the deliberative sessions of the board. See also Hoberman v. Lock Haven Hospital, 377 F. Supp.
1178 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (dictum).
197 In Huber Pontiac, Inc. v. Allphin, 431 F. Supp. 1168 (S.D. Ill. 1977), revidon other gromunds, 585 F.2d
817 (7th Cir. 1978), the court held that Withrow dictates that combining prosecuting and adjudicating
functions in one person violates due process. The court stated that the adjudicator would become "psycho-
logically predisposed" toward one side of the controversy. 413 F. Supp. at 1172. See also Doremus v.
Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975), which came after but did not cite Withrow.
198 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.10 at 237, 240 n.15 (1958).
199 Halleck v. Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1225 (D.D.C. 1977).
200 The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutionality of a combination of prosecutorial and
adjudicative functions in the same administrative agency officials, be they commissioners or staff members
who advise commissioners. In Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. at 579 n.17, the Court found no need to
comment upon cases like Maak or Amos Treat. In Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 578 n.2 (1968),
it refused to rule on a claim that the due process clause was violated in that an impartial tribunal did not
exist where the trier of fact was also both the victim of the accused's statements and the prosecutor who
brought the charges. Citing Murchison and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), however, it did "not
propose to blind [itself] . . . to the obvious defects in the fact-finding process occasioned by the Board's
multiple functioning vis-a-vis appellant." Id. at 573 n.2. In Withrow, 421 U.S. at 53 n.19, the Court noted
that the due process claim in Pickering was different from that in Withrow and that, in any event, the claim
was not resolved in Pickering. In Pangburn v. CAB, 311 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1962), which the Withrow court
found to be "instructive", 421 U.S. at 50 n.16, the board members alleged to have violated due process had
played an investigative role in one proceeding, followed by an adjudicative role in a factually related
proceeding, both in accordance with the agency's statutory mandate. The due process claim was rejected.
Yet, Panghurn is clearly distinguishable from a case involving a combination, in the same proceeding, of
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions in agency commissioners or staff members. Not only were very
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such private consultations in most formal adjudications, 20 ' including accusatory
initial licensing cases.20 2 The risks of error prompting congressional enactment of
a separation of functions rule are relevant to a due process analysis of all accusa-
tory cases involving initial or non-initial licensing. Likewise, the nature and im-
portance of the affected private interests does not significantly differ in the two
types of cases. As for governmental interests, extending separation of functions to
initial licensing cases would entail increased costs, problems in taking advantage
of specialized knowledge within an agency, and perhaps greater frustration in
carrying out an agency's statutory mandate. Yet, the importance of these inter-
ests can be questioned in light of Congress's willingness to forgo them in licensing
cases covered by section 554(d). Balancing these various factors should lead to
the conclusion that due process is violated if prosecutors or investigators privately
advise the adjudicators in their deliberations.20 3
2. Communications between Agency Adjudicators and Agency Regulatory
Staff in Non-Accusatory Proceedings
20 4
Many of the private interests at stake in accusatory licensing cases are also
different proceedings involved in Pangburn, but the board members performed investigative-not
prosecutorial-and adjudicative functions. 311 F.2d at 356.
201 To the extent that the "members of... the agency" exemption in § 554(d)(2)(C) has been viewed
as permitting consultations between members and agency employees involved in "prosecuting" or "investi-
gative" activities, this view is erroneous. It would make meaningless the restriction in § 554(d)(2) on per-
sons who perform these activities participating or advising in "review" of an initial decision. At the time
the APA was passed, virtually all agency review processes were appeals directly from initial decisionmakers
to agency heads. If the "members of... the agency" exemption were viewed to allow private consulta-
tions in those situations, there would be nothing left of the separation of functions section of the APA. See
Grolier, Inc. v. FTC, 615 F.2d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 1980).
202 For a discussion of how Congress had not intended the initial licensing exemption to be applicable
to contested accusatory-type cases, see text accompanying notes 28-41 supra. A court which rejects this
reading of the initial licensing exemption should nonetheless find separation of functions a constitutional
requirement in accusatory-type cases.
203 See, e.g., Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460 (C.D. Cal. 1977), in which the court held that the
expulsion process in a high school violated due process when the counsel for the administration (the prose-
cutors) also advised the school board (the adjudicators). The court also condemned the presence of the
school superintendent, who was the chief of the prosecuting team, at the deliberations of the adjudicating
board, saying that it was "fundamentally unfair" and raised a "presumption of bias." Id. at 465.
The case of Marcella v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955) has been cited by Professor Davis in support of the
proposition that a combination of judging with the performance of prosecuting or investigative functions
does not violate due process. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.02 at 175 (1958). Sealso
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955). In Marcella the adjudicating officer was
subject to the supervision of those performing prosecuting and investigative functions in a deportation
proceeding. The case is of doubtful validity today, at least outside of immigration law. The Court's terse
conclusion was based solely on its recognition of "the long-standing practice in deportation proceedings,
judicially approved in numerous decisions in the federal courts, and against the specific considerations
applicable to deportation which Congress may take into account in exercising its particularly broad discre-
tion in immigration matters." 349 U.S. at 311. Moreover, this conclusion was reached without the type of
balancing analysis now required under Mathews. Finally, Marcello has not been cited by the Supreme
Court in 15 years, since Woodby v. Immigration Service, 385 U.S. 276 (1966), a particularly serious omis-
sion in light of the Court's treatment of the separation of functions issue in cases like Withrow and
Hartonville.
204 The previous section dealing with accusatory proceedings discussed the due process implications of
communications between adjudicators and staff investigators or prosecutors. Contacts between
adjudicators and other agency employees in such proceedings were not discussed (e.g., conversations with
staff witnesses or with non-involved staff members). However, the due process discussion in the case of
non-accusatory proceedings is also relevant to such contacts not specifically discussed in the text
accompanying notes 194-203 supra.
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involved in non-accusatory proceedings. 20 5 The fundamental rule also remains
the same in that the parties are entitled to a decision by impartial decisionmakers
relying solely upon the evidentiary record compiled in the case. Yet, in non-
accusatory proceedings there are no prosecutors and, to the extent there are in-
vestigators, their functions often differ from those of investigators in accusatory
cases. Instead, staff may advocate a particular viewpoint opposed by a party to
the proceeding. Staff advocates include the agency's trial staff, if the agency ac-
tually advocates a position during and after the hearing as opposed to its merely
taking a neutral trial role. Additionally, staff investigators and witnesses are ad-
vocates when they compose an integral part of the trial team. The distinct staff
organizations at various agencies will lead to differing determinations of which
staff are advocates and what risks of error are associated with a combination of
advocacy and adjudicative functions. The strength of the government interests
may also vary since concerns unrelated to licensee misconduct are involved in
non-accusatory adjudications. Although generalizations are difficult to make in
predicting the application of the balancing analysis required by Mathews, it is
useful to look at the cases which have considered the issue of private contacts
between staff and agency decisionmakers in the context of informal rulemakings
because of the recent developments in that area.
Early case law left no doubt that due process did not require separation of
functions in informal rulemaking. 20 6 A few cases left the issue temporarily unset-
tled,20 7 though it is now clear that due process generally does not require separa-
205 The major exception, of course, is the absence of any stigma associated with the resolution of the
non-accusatory issues.
206 See, e.g., Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949)
(no violation of APA or due process where chief government witness and chief government counsel in
rulemaking proceeding aided and prepared portions of findings and conclusions); Wilson & Co. v. United
States, 335 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951 (1965) (no violation of APA or due process
where government counsel of record in ratemaking/rulemaking proceeding participated in decisional re-
view process within agency); A.T.&T. v. FCC, 449 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1971) (no violation of APA or due
process where agency staff members and staff witness in ratemaking/rulemaking proceeding advised
agency with regard to final decision); Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Kleindienst, 478 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973) (no
violation of APA or due process where government trial counsel in rulemaking proceeding helped prepare
agency's tentative and final orders).
207 In Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977), the court
flatly prohibited exparte communications between persons outside the agency and agency decisionmakers in
an informal rulemaking proceeding. One basis for the court's decision was that it had previously con-
demned agency decisions which were based upon information known only to the staff of the agency and
not commented upon by parties to the rulemaking proceeding. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1976) cert denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977); Portland Cement Ass'n v.
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); International Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Accordingly, the Home Box Ojte court found that "[flrom a
functional standpoint, we see no difference between assertions of fact and expert opinion tendered by the
public. . . and that generated internally in an agency: each may be biased, inaccurate, or incomplete
... "1 567 F.2d at 55. Thus, the court used the rationale of the impropriety of such secret staff informa-
tion to find contacts with persons outside the agency to be equally inappropriate.
The analogy would appear to have come full circle: if expoarte communications from interested per-
sons outside the agency are prohibited in light of Home Box Ofte, why should interested staff members
inside an agency-at least where they have taken an advocacy position adverse to other participants in a
rulemaking proceeding-be allowed to communicate in private with agency decisionmakers? The post-
Home Box Ojtce cases dealing with this issue have been confusing and contradictory: two courts have flatly
rejected the suggestion that staff-decisionmaker contacts are violative of due process, Marketing Assistance
Program v. Bergland, 562 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Katherine Gibbs School v. FTC, 612 F.2d 658, 670
(2d Cir. 1979); one court left this sensitive constitutional issue "to another day" in light of unique facts in
the case before it, Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1978); and another court raised
serious doubts about the practice but dismissed the challenge as premature, Association of Nat'l Advertis-
ers v. FTC, 617 F.2d 611, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Id. at 632-34 (Wright, C.J., concurring).
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tion of functions in informal rulemakings. 20 8 In light of the courts' willingness to
seriously reexamine this matter, there is reason to be concerned about such con-
tacts in formal, on the record non-accusatory licensing adjudications. This con-
clusion comports with the notion that private communications "by an adversary
party to a decisionmaker in an adjudicatory proceeding are prohibited as funda-
mentally at variance with our conceptions of due process."'20 9 To the extent
courts may view an agency's staff members as representing an "adversary party"
in a non-accusatory adjudication, due process limitations may apply to private
consultations between staff members and the adjudicators. The private contacts
in non-accusatory formal licensing cases between agency adjudicators and staff
advocates, witnesses, investigators and supervisors will be examined in turn.
208 A very recent District of Columbia circuit case appears to have settled the issue of whether due
process requires separation of functions in informal rulemakings. In United Steelworkers v. Marshall, No.
79-1048 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980), the court found no constitutional violation where an agency employee
reviewed preliminary research, drafted a proposed rule standard, helped organize public hearings on the
proposal, communicated regularly with prospective expert witnesses outside of the hearing, questioned
agency witnesses and cross-examined other witnesses during the hearing itself, and then assisted the Assis-
tant Secretary by reviewing the evidence, preparing summaries and analyses, and drafting recommenda-
tions for the final rule standard. The court recognized that the informal rulemaking proceedings may have
been transformed into an adversary proceeding, with the key agency employee having advocated a view-
point that was contrary to other views offered by industry parties. Nonetheless, the court noted that "the
mere fact that this particular proceeding became highly adversarial cannot transform informal rulemaking
into something else." d, slip op. at 30 n.24. It stated that even if the agency employee could be consid-
ered an advocate for a particular standard, his "conduct remained within the general boundaries of the
deliberative process and, however biased, his communications with the Assistant Secretary remained within
the boundaries of deliberative material." Id. at 27 n.20 (emphasis in original). The court distinguished its
language in Home Box Ofite, where it focused on the similarities between ex parte contacts from persons
outside the agency and staff advice given privately to agency decisionmakers. The court clarified that in
Home Box Ofce it meant to condemn only "a case where agency employees supplied the decisionmaker
with actual new evidence which the agency has identified as part of the basis for its decision, but which it
refused to disclose except through a 'blind reference.' " Id. The court also referred to its earlier concern
about combined functions in informal rulemakings, expressed in Hercules, as dictum. Id. at 34. In short,
the court concluded, "[r]ulemaking is essentially an institutional, not an individual, process, and it is not
vulnerable to communication within an agency in the same sense as it is to communication from without."
Id. at 35.
The evolution of the issue of separation of functions in informal rulemakings is a good example of how
due process analysis has matured. Although the UnitedSteelworkers court did not refer to the balancing test
envisioned by Mathews, the court did, in fact, conduct such a balancing. It contrasted the rulemaking with
other types of proceedings, stating that "the concept of advocacy does not apply easily where the agency is
not determining the specific rights of a specific party .. " Id. at 25. Moreover, the court focused on the
important government interest in assuring that rulemakings remain an essentially "institutional" process.
Any risk of error in arriving at a final rule appeared to the court to be quite small, and acceptable within
the confines of institutional decisionmaking, especially since it gave little weight to specific private interests
of specific parties which could be affected by the rulemaking.
Of course, one can find fault with the balancing done in the United Steelworkers case. The valuation of
the competing interests can be questioned since the adopted rule imposed substantial economic costs on
specific industries. Moreover, the court's minimization of the risk of error, and its acceptance of this risk, is
debatable since it is based, in part, on the terse conclusion that although Congress, in the case under
review, had added "to informal rulemaking the special requirement of a substantial evidence test[, this]
does not change the essential character of the rulemaking ...." Id. at 29-30. Thus, the court's clinging
to the rulemaking/adjudication dichotomy undermines its more important contribution, which is the need
for a balancing analysis to resolve the separation of functions issue. Finally, if nothing else, the case is a
good illustration of the fact that the separation of functions issue continues to remain as troublesome today
as it was when Congress first examined it in the 1940's.
209 Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d 265, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Doe was an accusatory adjudication, but it
cited the above proposition as a general rule and as support referred to Sangamon Valley Television Corp.
v. United States, 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1964). The latter case, however,
was a rulemaking proceeding involving exparte contacts by persons outside the agency.
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a. Communications with Sta fAdvocates
At some agencies the regulatory staff of technical experts and attorneys typi-
cally forms a definite opinion on a license application at the conclusion of the
non-adversarial pre-hearing investigative stage of the licensing process. The staff
members then take an advocacy position during contested adjudicatory proceed-
ings. Typically, on the merits of the license application the position is adverse to
an intervenor and adverse to either the intervenor or to the applicant on proce-
dural issues. 210 Like other parties to the adjudication, the staff at such agencies
files its proposed findings and conclusions with the initial decisionmakers, the
agency appeal board and finally with the commissioners themselves. Thus, ar-
guably, the staff has prejudged the issues by the time the adjudicators sit down to
decide the case and it also has a "will to win" for its position.
In these circumstances, there is a risk of error in allowing such staff advo-
cates to advise the decisionmakers. While the strength of their advocacy might
vary from agency to agency, or from case to case, generally such staff advocates
"would be so psychologically wedded to their [prior positions] that they would
consciously or unconsciously avoid the appearance of having erred or changed
position."'2 '1 Such a risk is somewhat smaller than it is in the case of prosecutors
in accusatory proceedings. In accusatory proceedings, there is a greater feeling of
right and wrong, of a desire to punish a particular person and of doing justice.
Many non-accusatory cases come down to debates over matters of financial or
technical qualifications.2 12 In such debates there might be controversy over lay
or expert evidence, but the agency advocate-unlike the agency prosecutor in an
accusatory proceeding-might involve himself more with the substance of the
disputed issues rather than with winning a case against a particular party. As in
accusatory cases, the decisionmakers would be aware of the advocates' interest
and could thereby discount or more carefully scrutinize the advice received.
However, these factors and the additional APA safeguards would not generally
reduce the risk of error to an acceptable degree.
The government interests in a non-accusatory case can also vary considera-
bly, even when compared with the government interests in accusatory cases. The
government interest in protecting public health and safety underlying an
agency's effort to deny or revoke a license in a non-accusatory proceeding de-
serves more weight than does the government interest in an accusatory case in
imposing a civil penalty against a Citizens Band radio operator for violating
FCC rules regarding maximum power for a transmitter. On the other hand,
there is an overwhelming government interest in conducting an accusatory pro-
ceeding to revoke the license of an aviator displaying a total disregard of air
safety rules, while the government interest in denying a radio license to a
financially unqualified applicant in a non-accusatory licensing case is far less im-
portant. To the extent that private consultations with agency advocates can be
210 In Withrow, the court pointed out that there were no due process problems involved in taking a
position during a non-adversarial investigative phase, and then adjudicating a matter. Hence, the court
was not dealing with an agency employee (whether staff or commissioner) who performed an advocacy
role during the adjudicatory phase of a proceeding.
211 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. at 57.
212 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (1976) authorizes the NRC to consider an applicant's technical and financial
qualifications.
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proved to significantly increase the decisionmakers' ability to achieve their public
health and safety goals in non-accusatory cases, the government interest in that
process must weigh heavily in the Mathews balancing test. However, equally im-
portant is the government interest in assuring the appearance of fairness in all
non-accusatory causes-a goal that is inconsistent with allowing private advice
from staff advocates.
Considering the totality of factors, agency advocates generally should be dis-
qualified from advising decisionmakers in non-accusatory licensing adjudications
on due process grounds. Even a strong government interest in achieving public
safety or health goals should not overcome a party's interest in obtaining, and the
government's interest in providing, an impartial adjudicator whose decision is
not tainted by private advice from staff advocates. Alternative mechanisms not
relying upon such combinations of functions must be developed to help an
agency attain its statutory goals. On the record briefings by advocates or an
expanded adjudicatory advisory staff are two possibilities.
Although it is a pre-Withrow case, Trans World Airlines v. CAB, 2 13 supports
this conclusion. The case involved a non-accusatory adjudication in which the
Postmaster General contested a compensation request filed by TWA. The Solici-
tor of the Post Office, who had signed the brief on behalf of the Postmaster Gen-
eral, was a member of the CAB by the time the case came before the agency.
After referring to the adjudicatory duties given the CAB by Congress, the court
stated:
The fundamental requirements of fairness in the performance of such functions re-
quire at least that one who participates in a case on behalf of any party, whether
actively or merely formally by being on pleadings or briefs, take no part in the deci-
sion of that case by any tribunal on which he may thereafter sit.
2 14
Although the case concerned the representation of a party outside the
agency and not the agency staff, the result would likely have been no different if
the represented "party" had been a CAB staff bureau. Arguably, consistent with
due process, the counsel for the bureau would not have been allowed to later
adjudicate the case although such consultation would not have been barred by
the APA. Even the Mathews balancing test would not countenance a biased deci-
sionmaker. It would not require a great extension of the rationale to reach a
similar conclusion were the former advocate an advisor to the decisionmaker
rather than the ultimate decisionmaker.
2 15
b. Communications with Staff Investigators or Reviewers
The propriety of private consultations between agency adjudicators and in-
213 254 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
214 Id. at 91.
215 As previously discussed, the risk of error is present, though in somewhat different form, where the
advocate is an advisor to the adjudicator, rather than the adjudicator himself. Certainly the government
interest in the Trans World Airlines case was substantial-to avoid hindering the appointment of exper-
ienced, highly qualified individuals to serve as CAB members. If top echelon officials, such as agency
solicitors general or bureau chiefs, were required to be disqualified from hearing a case as agency commis-
sioners because of their former roles in the case as advocates, the President would be far less inclined to
appoint such persons as commissioners. Yet, the risk of error and the countervailing interest in fairness
overrode the government interest in the appointment process. Significantly, the Wihrow court took note
of Trans World Airlines, but expressly declined to pass on its validity. 421 U.S. at 50 n.16.
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vestigators in non-accusatory licensing cases is easily resolved by many agencies.
Unlike the investigator in an accusatory proceeding whose investigation ferrets
out instances of misconduct, the investigator in a non-accusatory adjudication
may be a neutral employee whose primary function is to review an application or
amendment and discover all facts relevant to the issues in the proceeding.2 16 In
performing this function, the investigator is not often called upon to advocate
any particular viewpoint in the investigation or subsequent trial. The neutral
investigator does not become "psychologically wedded" to a position from which
he cannot retreat without confessing error, nor does he have a "will to win."
The Supreme Court has approved a scheme under which those charged with
gathering and introducing evidence may also sit in judgment in a non-accusatory
proceeding.21 7 Under the Mathews balancing terminology, the risk of error is low
in allowing such investigators or reviewers to advise the adjudicators based upon
the formal record in the case. The benefit to the government of having knowl-
edgeable staff members participate in the decisionmaking process is obvious.
Thus, there are no due process problems with such an institutional arrange-
ment.2
18
c. Communications with Staff Witnesses
At some agencies2 19 staff witnesses may be considered staff advocates. In
those situations, the previously discussed concerns regarding staff advocates ap-
ply. At other agencies, however, staff witnesses may be considered a separate
category. The government interest in an agency's attaining its statutory objec-
tives is promoted when staff witnesses possessing expertise in a complex area can
privately advise adjudicators. Moreover, the risk of decisional error appears dif-
ferent when staff witnesses, rather than staff advocates, provide private advice.
Professor Davis considers the risk of error not one of "contamination" of the ad-
judicators, but rather the "assurance of appropriate opportunity to meet what is
considered" in the private consultations. 220 Professor Davis recommends that
"[i]f deciding officers may consult staff specialists who have not testified, they
should be allowed to consult those who have testified."' 22' According to Professor
Davis, those experts who have served as witnesses have explained their positions
on the record and been cross-examined. Thus, their credibility and competence
can be determined by an adjudicator relying upon such private advice. On the
contrary, private advice from non-witness staff experts will more likely contain
new information and untested opinions, and yet the risk of error in such advice
has not been deemed sufficient to impose a constitutional or statutory prohibition
against such private advice. Significantly, Professor Davis's treatment of this is-
216 At some agencies like the NRC, there may rarely, if ever, be a neutral investigator or reviewer.
These persons at the NRC ultimately become part of the trial advocacy team.
217 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 408-10 (1971). In Peralkr an allegation of a due process viola-
tion was made with respect to thc roles performed by a social security hearing examiner. The examiner is
charged with developing information relevant to a claimant's request for social security benefits and also
ruling on that request, though the case is not one of formal adjudication.
218 This is not to say, of course, that a party should be precluded from making a showing of actual
partiality or prejudgment on the part of the investigator.
219 The NRC is an example of an agency in which staff witnesses serve as part of the trial advocacy
team.
220 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.11 at 249 (1958).
221 Id.
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sue was cited with approval in dictum in W4throw. 222
Although the Davis rationale is compelling, it overlooks potential sources of
error in private advice from witnesses. Some staff witnesses may be just as "psy-
chologically wedded" to a viewpoint as the staff attorney. More than the attor-
ney hired to perform an advocate's role, the staff witness may be more dedicated
to the principles he espouses on the stand. To expect a witness to overlook his
firmly held convictions approaches asking an expert to confess error. If staff at-
torneys and other advocates should be precluded for due process reasons from
privately advising adjudicators, a similar rationale might be applied to expert
witnesses. Additionally, Professor Davis's rationale assumes the staff witness
would repeat in private what he has testified to in public. While this assumption
might be true, making private consultation available to adjudicators could cause
the staff witness to assume a different testimonial tone or emphasis. Nevertheless,
the due process clause should not be a basis for prohibiting decisionmakers from
obtaining the advice of a non-advocate staff witness.
d. Communications with Supervisors
Determining whether a staff supervisor may privately advise agency adjudi-
cators without violating the due process clause requires an examination of the
precise role played by the supervisor in the particular non-accusatory case.
When a supervisor personally and actively participates in developing the posi-
tions presented by the agency trial staff in a particular non-accusatory case, there
are strong reasons for considering the supervisor an advocate in the licensing
proceeding. 223 The rationale for prohibiting private consultations with such su-
pervisors may be even stronger since the adverse "party" is often the division
headed by the supervisor rather than the trial staff.2 24 The Mathews balancing
test, which appears to bar private advice from staff advocates, should generate
the same result here, although the agency might have a greater interest in con-
sulting with one of its supervisors than in speaking with a lower level staff advo-
cate.
Where the supervisor's role has beenproforma, however, it is difficult to con-
clude there is a risk of error sufficient to preclude on due process grounds an
adjudicator's private consultation with the supervisor. Even in accusatory adju-
dications where a supervisor has supervised persons in the division charged with
the prosecutorial function, absent some significant personal involvement in that
or a factually related case, the supervisor is not precluded from later performing
adjudicatory functions. 22 5 But arguably, having formally associated himself with
222 421 U.S. at 56 n.24.
223 The most obvious application of this principle is when one considers a supervisor of an agency's
trial staff. If this supervisor has been intimately involved in a proceeding, he must be viewed as being as
much of an advocate as the trial attorneys.
224 At the NRC for example, in licensing proceedings the trial staff represents the various offices within
the staff, the totality of which constitutes the "party" in the proceedings. At the FCC, in broadcast licens-
ing cases the trial staff represents the Chief of the Broadcast Bureau. See Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306
F.2d 260, 266-67 (1962).
225 See R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 366 F.2d 446, 453 (2d Cir. 1966) (no due process violation where
supervisor of investigatory staff personally performed no role in investigation); San Francisco Mining
Exch. v. SEC, 378 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1967) (supervisors of prosecutorial division performed no role related
to pending prosecution and any other connection with facts of case was too remote in time to support
alleged due process violation); Giambanco v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 531 F.2d 141, 145 n.7
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the position of his staff, the supervisor may be unable or unwilling to provide
impartial advice to the adjudicators, and he thereby creates an unreasonable risk
of error in the decision. Moreover, the government interest in assuring the ap-
pearance of fairness in regulatory proceedings may be undermined if the supervi-
sor can privately advise an adjudicator on matters on which his staff has publicly
advocated a position to which the supervisor has even pro forma subscribed.
Nonetheless, because the risk of error appears small and the government interests
in obtaining that advice are probably substantial, a rigid constitutional barrier
should not be erected to such advice.
e. Communications with Non-Involved Staf
There is no due process bar to private consultations between agency adjudi-
cators and non-involved staff in non-accusatory proceedings. However, if as a
result of any consultations between adjudicators and staff-non-involved or in-
volved-the adjudicators are exposed to new information, due process has been
violated unless this information is disclosed to the parties and subject to rebut-
.. 226
3. Communications between Various Adjudicators in Accusatory and Non-
Accusatory Cases
Although various types of consultations between adjudicators are possi-
ble,2 27 private communications by a higher level adjudicator with a lower level
(3d Cir. 1976) (no due process violation where board member previously supervised prosecutor in pending
case but had no knowledge of case).
The primary case contrary to this principle is Trans WorldAirhse~r, in which a due process violation
was said to exist when a supervisor who was "merely formally. . . on pleadings or briefs" later became an
adjudicator in the case. 254 F.2d at 91. After Withrow, the correctness of this broad ruling is open to
question. One post- Withrow case has followed Trans WorldAirhnes, however. In American Gen. Ins. Co. v.
FTC, 589 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1979), the court ruled that a FTC commissioner could not sit on a case in
which he had earlier signed a brief and argued before a court on behalf of the agency. In dictum, it
suggested that the result would have been the same had his involvement been only superficial and supervi-
sory. Unfortunately, American Gm. Ins. Co. did not engage in the Mathews balancing test, nor did it cite
Withrow.
226 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1029-31 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The on the record decisional
requirements of the APA would also be violated. See note 95 spra. This argument may be extended to the
introduction of new rationales.
A more difficult question arises where an adjudicator desires the private assistance of non-involved
staff members whose supervisors were themselves advocates or prosecutors in the case. It is possible that
the non-involved staff members may seek to curry favor with their supervisors by privately emphasizing
the facts and arguments espoused by the supervisors. There is also an appearance of unfairness in a situa-
tion where a staff member reports to an adjudicator in the morning for the purpose of advising on the
strengths and weaknesses of the case presented by the supervisor, to whom he will report in the afternoon
for the purpose of working on other matters. Nonetheless, such consultations have long been recognized as
proper. 1947 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, subra note 20, at 55, 57-58. Furthermore, the alternatives
to such consultation are highly undesirable: either the decisionmaker must forgo important assistance
from uninvolved staffmembers (which itself creates a risk of error in the decision) or else the decisionmaker
must surround himself with a large and costly adjudicative staff which duplicates expertise found else-
where in the agency. Finally, there is some safeguard that the non-involved staff member's advice to the
decisionmaker is private, so that the supervisor should never know the extent to which the non-involved
staff member influenced the decision.
Where a staff witness or reviewer is to advise an adjudicator, see text accompanying notes 216-222
supra, and the supervisor of the witness or reviewer is an advocate in the case, analogous concerns exist and
they may be similarly analyzed.
227 Some of the other types of consultation include communications between an initial decisionmaker
who is about to decide a case and the commissioners of an agency and between an adjudicator in a case
and other adjudicators who have hot had, and will not have, any other contact with the case. The latter
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adjudicator who has already rendered a decision in the case present the greatest
due process concern. The government interest in this institutional arrangement
can be substantial, particularly in complex cases with masses of technical data.
More than any other party to the licensing proceeding, the lower level adjudica-
tor will likely have reflected upon the issues from all perspectives. The higher
level adjudicator's decision will likely be better, quicker and more focused if he
can tap the knowledge of those who have already wrestled with the case. Such
consultation can, in turn, increase the agency's ability to attain its regulatory
goals.
But the risks of error in such consultation cannot be overlooked. When a
lower level adjudicator reaches a decision after overseeing the trial process for
months or years, and he publicly issues that decision which is subsequently at-
tacked by one or more parties on appeal, he hardly has a disinterested position on
the ultimate resolution of the appeal. The lower level adjudicator might be as
"psychologically wedded" to his determination of the issues, and as unwilling to
"confess error," as the staff attorney who litigated the case. His studied neutral-
ity of the issues, although still sincerely held, would not outweigh the concern
that he might give biased advice to adjudicators taking another, fresh look at the
case.228 Yet, even assuming biased advice, what error could actually result? Pre-
sumably the grounds for the lower decision are set out in the statement of find-
ings and conclusions. Because he does not want to be reversed on appeal, the
lower level adjudicator must also have marshalled the best possible support for
his decision in the public opinion issued. Unlike staff advocates or others, the
lower level adjudicator has not been exposed to ex parte information which he
could inject, consciously or not, into his advice to higher level adjudicators. In
large cases he could emphasize portions of the record supporting his decision and
downplay contrary evidence. Even in that instance, however, the higher level
adjudicators must be presumed conscientious enough to assure the arguments
and evidence cited by the appellants have been thoroughly considered. In short,
obviously involves no risk of error of partiality or prejudgment, and is much like a judge consulting his law
clerk or a commissioner consulting his technical expert. The former situation also should not present
constitutional problems, even if the commissioners will later hear the case. The commissioners have an
overriding duty to coordinate agency policies, and this interest should be sufficient to allow them to give
general policy direction to guide the lower level decisionmaker. The major caution here, however, is that
commissioners must be careful, while giving advice, not to prejudge the merits of the case or destroy the
impartiality of the fact-finding process below.
228 Commenting upon a recent proposal before the Administrative Conference of the United States,
which would have endorsed the concept of allowing consultations between agency heads and lower-level
adjudicators who had issued an initial decision, the Federal Energy Bar Association argued as follows:
A presiding officer's decision should stand on the findings and reasoning which are expressed in
that decision. Permitting subsequent consultation with the decisionmakers would disserve the
public interest in two ways. First, it would tend to cause the presiding officer to become an
advocate for his position . . . There is no need or justification to force the presiding officer
into a position of advocacy.
The second, the equally serious concern is the possibility that the presiding officer will
provide further justification for reaching his decision in off-the-record consultation with the
agency decisionmakers.
Letter from Carl D. Hobelman, President, Federal Energy Bar Association to Reuben B. Robertson, Act-
ing Chair, Administrative Conference of the United States, (Dec. 10, 1980). It should be noted that the
Administrative Conference, at its December, 1980 plenary session, tabled the recommendation which in-
cluded the provision allowing for consultation between lower-level adjudicators and agency heads. Legal
Times of Wash., Dec. 15, 1980, at 4.
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although a risk of error exists in allowing lower level adjudicators to advise
higher level ones, other safeguards appear to substantially reduce that risk.
In addition to the risks of error, however, the government interest in assuring
an appearance of fairness to litigants before an agency warrants consideration. If
an agency's organic statute or the APA sets up a two or three tier adjudicatory
system, a party assumes that a lower level adjudicator ruling against him will
play no private role in an appeal. Although a multi-tier adjudicatory system is
not constitutionally required, having been established, it must operate in a man-
ner promoting public perceptions of integrity and fairness.
Unfortunately, the case law on higher level adjudicators consulting withlower level adjudicators is inconclusive. In Goldberg v. Kell, stressing the necessity
of an impartial decisionmaker, the Court noted that although "prior involvement
in some aspects of a case will not necessarily bar a welfare official from acting as a
decision maker. . . , [h]e should not, however, have participated in making the
determination under review." 229 Lower courts have followed this general rule
prior to Withrow.230 However, Withrow itself in dictum appears to give conflict-
ing signals on the issue. In a footnote, the Court quoted with approval Professor
Davis's view that no due process problem arises in allowing staff witnesses to
advise an adjudicator.231 By analogy, lower level decisionmakers are arguably
no more "wedded" to their positions or likely to inject error into the decisionmak-
ing process than are such staff witnesses. However, in another footnote, the
Court cited cases standing for the proposition that "when review of an initial
decision is mandated, the decisionmaker must be other than the one who had the
decision under review. ' 23 2 The Court then stated that "[a]llowing a deci-
sionmaker to review and evaluate his own prior decisions raises problems that are
not present here," 23 3 leaving the impression that were similar circumstances pres-
ent in the administrative agency context, the Court might find a due process
violation. Following Withrow, a major due process challenge was rejected when a
court upheld the EPA's non-adversarial initial licensing system for the issuance of
NPDES23 4 permits wherein the final decisionmaker could consult with the pre-
siding officer and the panel making the initial decision. In Marathon Oil a
229 397 U.S. at 271. Goldberg can be distinguished on the ground that the welfare official whose deci-
sion was being reviewed was performing more of an administrative or informal adjudicatory role than a
formal judicial role. Accordingly, the Court may have felt that there was more danger associated with
advice coming from such persons.
230 In Pregent v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security, 361 F. Supp. 782 (D.N.H. 1973),
vacated, 417 U.S. 903 (1974), the court made a strong case, in dictum, for a due process violation. "If the
Chairman of the Appeal Tribunal did have prior involvement with a claimant's case, whether in the
investigatory, fact-finding or decision-making state, we would regard such prior official contact as disquali-
fying and as violative of due process." Id. at 797.
[If] the certifying officer who made the initial decision to terminate claimant's unemployment
benefits sat on the Appeal Tribunal, we would regard this as a clear violation of due process. In
addition, the same individuals who either made the initial decision to terminate benefits or
conducted a review thereofshould not be permitted to sit in judgment of their own determina-
tion. For administrative review to be meaningful, each review officer must not have had any
prior official involvement with the case before him.
Id. at 797-98 n.24. This language is quoted with approval in King v. Caesar Rodney School Dist., 380 F.
Supp. 1112, 1119 (D. Del. 1974), which also warned that excessive familiarity with the facts would tarnish
the fairness of review proceedings.
231 421 U.S. at 56 n.24.
232 Id. at 58 n.25.
233 Id.
234 Set text accompanying notes 45, 46 supra.
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EPA,235 the court found no "unacceptable risk of bias" in such an arrange-
ment.2 3 6 An arguably inconsistent result was reached in National Rifle Association
v. United States Postal Service .237 In that case the court found that the due process
standards set forth in Withrow had been violated when an adjudicator issued a
proposed decision ordering that certain mailing privileges not be granted and
then purported to reconsider that decision on appeal. Although the Court found
no "institutional bias," it found a "well-defined predisposition" and "prejudg-
ment"-because of vulnerability to "psychological pressures"-which disquali-
fied the adjudicator from making the latter decision.2 38
Thus, the due process aspects of higher level adjudicators consulting pri-
vately with lower level adjudicators in formal licensing proceedings have not
been resolved by the courts. Strong arguments can be made on both sides. In
the context of a trial court decision before an appellate court on review, private
advice from the trial judge to the appellate judges would not be tolerated. Agen-
cies, however, are not imbued with the same sense of history and fairness as the
judiciary. Moreover, the combination of quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative du-
ties in a single agency indicates that as an agency attempts to achieve its substan-
tive statutory goals, procedures foreign to the courts might be appropriate.
Barring private advice from lower level decisionmakers to higher ones may cause
greater judicialization of the administrative process, but this may be a salutary
step, especially in the minds of litigants in licensing cases.
VII. An Examination of Alternatives for Achieving Separation
of Functions Objectives
Agencies possess substantial legal flexibility in fashioning their separation of
functions rules. While for policy reasons an agency might wish to be more pro-
tective of private interests in accusatory licensing cases, the accusatory versus
non-accusatory distinction drawn implicitly in the APA is outmoded. The trig-
gering mechanism for a separation of functions requirement should be whether
or not the licensing adjudication is contested, particularly regarding evidentiary
matters. Furthermore, the distinction explicitly drawn in the APA between ini-
tial licensing and other licensing cases conflicts with a realistic evaluation of pres-
ent day licensing proceedings. The importance of the interests at stake and the
balance in a particular case between evidentiary disputes and policy decisions
based upon legislative facts do not usually depend upon whether the case is one
of initial or non-initial licensing.
Keeping in mind these general principles and APA and constitutional limi-
tations, three alternative approaches for achieving separation of functions objec-
tives appear. The first alternative focuses on a model separation of functions
scheme for an agency choosing to conduct its licensing proceedings in a tradi-
tional manner, that is, where the agency is represented by a trial staff that takes
an advocacy role in the adjudication during which agency witnesses testify.
Under this approach, the role of each individual agency employee in a particular
235 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977).
236 Id. at 1265.
237 407 F. Supp. 88 (D.D.C. 1976).
238 Id. at 94.
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case determines the limitations on his ability to advise an adjudicator. The sec-
ond alternative offers a simpler approach. All agency employees within certain
divisions of the agency are deemed part of a "separated staff." This scheme
could also apply to licensing adjudications conducted in the traditional manner.
The third alternative attempts to solve the problems created by separation of
functions by establishing a "neutral staff' system which substitutes even-handed,
but aggressive, hearing assistants for trial advocates.
Examining these alternatives involves balancing the policy considerations
discussed throughout this article. Fairness and the appearance of fairness must
be weighed against the need for informed agency decisions reflecting policies es-
tablished by agency heads, reached under an efficient and economical separa-
tions scheme. Additionally, any separations system must assure that agency
heads or commissioners are sufficiently informed about the agency's overall activ-
ities. Because their responsibilities transcend individual licensing cases, commis-
sioners and agency heads must be able to set policies and adopt rules, the impetus
for which often depends upon their having an opportunity to speak with staff
members to identify problem areas common to several licensing cases. Analo-
gously, if commissioners are to be able to manage their agency, they must have
open lines of communications to staff supervisors. Finally, any separation of
functions system must take account of the exparte restrictions placed upon deci-
sionmaking personnel under APA section 557(d).
A. A Model Separation of Functions System in Licensing Cases: Agenqy Staf to
Perform a Traditional Advocay Role
In the typical licensing proceeding at many agencies, the agency staff per-
forms a traditional advocacy role. In initial licensing adjudications, the staff may
support or oppose the applicant's request for a license or a license amendment.
In revocations, suspensions or even license renewal proceedings, the staff opposes
the licensee. Intervenors in any of these proceedings complicate the scenario
since intervenors may either side with or oppose the licensee. A suggested rule for
each class of agency employees is discussed.
1. Staff Advocates
In deciding whether to allow staff advocates to privately advise adjudicators,
an agency faces a host of considerations. In contested cases there are opposing
sides. Often, the issues are sharply debated and the facts are hotly disputed. In
this setting, staff advocates generally entrench themselves on a side of a case in
which, despite the lack of accusatorial allegations, significant interests are at
stake. For example, a resolution of disputed nuclear scientific and engineering
issues affects construction permit applicants as much as or more than a prosecu-
tion for safety violations entailing a $100,000 fine. Additionally, priceless rights
of persons living near a nuclear facility site may be at stake and conflict with the
applicant's plans, as well as the agency staffs position.
In the context of the contested initial licensing case, there is a serious prob-
lem of fairness if only staff advocates-and not other parties to the proceeding-
are allowed to consult privately with agency adjudicators about the merits of the
case. Even if no new off the record evidence is interjected, private lobbying gives
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the staff advocate a unique opportunity to emphasize some arguments and ignore
others. Staff advocates with the "will to win" would contaminate the decision-
making process.239 Likewise, the appearance of fairness could be impaired by
such consultations. Furthermore, if staff advocates participate in the adjudica-
tors' private decisionmaking process, the staff advocates' contact with persons
outside the agency-such as the licensee-will be severely restricted by the ex
parle rule in APA section 557(d). Also, assuming case law already does not bar
such contacts, there are serious due process questions associated with private con-
tacts between staff advocates and adjudicators.
The benefits of adjudicators consulting with staff advocates are obvious.
The flow of information to adjudicators, particularly commissioners, will result in
more knowledgeable decisions reflecting agency policy. The commissioners could
better supervise the staff and could receive information about new uncertainties
in individual cases. In fact, the staff member most familiar with the facts of a
case can best provide the commissioners with advice.2 40
These arguments are all subject to dispute. For example, advice from staff
advocates might always be fair in those non-accusatory cases where policy and
technical matters predominate. Since no one is being tried, no bias would result.
In addition, commentators have suggested adjudicators are better off consulting
staff advocates whose views have been presented and disputed publicly and on
the record, than consulting in secret with uninvolved staff members whose ideas
have not been subjected to scrutiny by the parties.
In deciding whether, as a matter of policy, commissioners or other agency
adjudicators should be allowed to consult privately with staff advocates about
the merits of a case, an agency must weigh all of these factors. However, the legal
and policy arguments against such consultation are more persuasive.24 1 Accord-
ingly, an adjudicator should not be permitted to seek advice from staff advocates
involved in a case-be they staff attorneys, witnesses or others performing advo-
cacy functions.
2. Staff Witnesses
Because staff witnesses are typically considered staff advocates at agencies
like the NRC, adjudicators should not be able to seek advice from them in decid-
ing a case. However, at agencies where the staff witness is not part of the advo-
cacy team, a different analysis is appropriate. Commentators have approved of
private consultations with staff witnesses as entirely consistent with the spirit of
the APA on the ground that such witnesses merely provide information and do
not take sides. 242 Even if the witness's supervisor is an advocate in a case, the
239 As Professor Davis stated, "Judicial equilibrium gives way to partisanship. Materials on one side
are maximized and those on the other are minimized." 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE
§ 13.07 at 218 (1958).
240 See Administrative Conference Statement on ABA Proposals to Amend the Administrative Procedure Act, 25 AD.
L. REv. 419, 435 (1973).
241 This conclusion is consistent with the regulatory reform bills proposed by Senate and House com-
mittees in 1980, which would have separation of functions applicable to all non-expedited formal adjudi-
cations, including licensing cases. See note 44 supra. Even at the Environmental Protection Agency, which
relied upon the initial licensing exemption in the present APA to adopt one of the most informal and novel
licensing schemes utilized by any federal agency, there is a separation of functions rule applicable to staff
advocates who are not prosecutors. 40 C.F.R. § 124.78 (1980).
242 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 31 at 649.
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witness's advice to the adjudicator is given privately and is therefore unlikely to
be known by his supervisor. This alleged lack of bias allows the conclusion that
there would be no unfairness or appearance of unfairness in allowing these con-
sultations. Moreover, allowing adjudicators to seek advice from an expert who
has testified and been subjected to cross-examination may be more fair than per-
mitting adjudicators to consult experts who may have strong views which have
not been subjected to vigorous public scrutiny. Also, better decisions would re-
sult.
There are, however, compelling reasons for prohibiting adjudicators from
consulting privately with staff witnesses. Much like the staff attorney, the staff
witness may be "psychologically wedded" to his position and may have an unex-
pressed "will to win." The staff witness would thus subject the decisionmaker to
biased advice. In fact, the witness's views may be more rigid than even the staff
attorney's since they may come from years of experience molded into a "true
belief" about a subject. In this light, little difference appears between the staff
witness and the prosecutor or advocate: the prosecutorial advice is explicitly con-
demned in the APA and advice from advocates has been viewed as equally un-
fair. In AT&Tv. FCC,243 for example, although it refused to find any legal bar
to commissioner consultations with staff expert witnesses in a rulemaking pro-
ceeding, the court considered such private contacts "ill-advised." 2 " In addition,
where a witness's supervisor is an advocate in a case, one can question the wit-
ness's ability to serve two masters: the adjudicator and the advocate. Finally, if
such witnesses do assist the adjudicators, section 557(() of the APA would require
that they be prohibited from privately consulting on the merits of the case with
interested persons outside the agency. This is perhaps a troubling restriction,
although maybe not as troubling as placing a similar restriction on staff advo-
cates. If an agency believes it can live with the section 557(d) restriction and if it
is watchful for abuses in cases in which the witness's supervisor is an advocate, it
should allow private advice from non-advocate staff witnesses to adjudicators.245
3. Staff Investigators or Reviewers
In agencies with uncommitted investigators or reviewers, wide latitude is
given adjudicators to discuss the merits of the case with these agency staff mem-
bers in non-accusatory cases. As previously discussed in regard to due process
considerations, 2 46 such neutral investigators do not search for evidence to support
a prosecution, but typically ensure that all relevant facts are uncovered, whether
the case is contested or not. The agency advocate then uses these facts to mold a
position on the issues. Although a reviewer's supervisor may be an advocate, the
reviewer's advice is given privately to the adjudicator and is thus unlikely to
243 449 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1971).
244 Id. at 453.
245 The Senate committee report on the 1980 proposed regulatory reform bill states that "an agency
employee who testifies to any significant degree in a proceeding on behalf of the proposed agency position"
should come within the separation of functions prohibition on the assumption that the witness has devel-
oped a "will to win." S. REP. No. 1018, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (Oct. 30, 1980). Although this conclusion
seems overbroad, it offers a more definite standard which may be applied more easily, perhaps overempha-
sizing fairness at the expense of efficient, economical and knowledgeable decisionmaking. A statute that
would grant agencies some discretion with regard to witnesses would be more appropriate.
246 e text accompanying notes 216-218 jupra.
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reach his supervisor. Accordingly, there may be no unfairness or appearance of
unfairness in allowing adjudicators to consult with these neutral investigators. As
potential decisional employees, however, these investigators would be precluded
from ex parte communications with persons outside the agency once the formal
hearing has commenced. An agency may find these concerns minimal when
weighed against the benefits of competent decisions and better informed commis-
sioners possible from consultations.
A contrary argument, however, could be made. To the extent the facts un-
covered by the investigator are placed in the framework of a staff position, the
investigator is part of the advocacy team. Consultations with advocates raise
fairness problems with regard to biased advice. Even if the investigator is truly
neutral, he may have been exposed to large amounts of information which have
not been incorporated into the record, and which may unfairly affect his advice
to the adjudicators. In addition to exparte contacts in the pre-hearing stage being
prohibited under section 557(d) of the APA, some concern also arises about the
appearance of unfairness in having investigators who have been exposed to extra-
record information later serve as advisors to the adjudicators. Some may also
allege an appearance of unfairness, especially if the reviewer's supervisor is an
advocate in the case. However, in the case of uncommitted agency reviewers or
investigators, as with staff witnesses, the balance can be tipped in favor of al-
lowing private consultations with adjudicators if the agency can accept the sec-
tion 557(d) restrictions.
4. Supervisors
If a supervisor directly supervises staff advocates, reviews their work and
contributes to the development of the case, he may himself be thrust into the
position of an advocate. Thus, the fairness and appearance of fairness due proc-
ess concerns justifying criticism of private advice from staff advocates to adjudi-
cators apply here as well. Additionally, the supervisor who will serve as an
advisor during the decisionmaking process would be foreclosed from consulting
privately with persons outside the agency under section 557(d) of the APA. For
these reasons, supervisors who play such advocacy roles in non-accusatory initial
licensing cases should not advise the commissioners or other adjudicators in those
cases. 247 Some may also allege an appearance of unfairness; especially if the re-
viewer's supervisor is an advocate in the case.
The situation is more complicated where a supervisor's subordinates are ad-
vocates but the supervisor has little or no personal involvement in the direction
or review of their work in the case. Some would question whether a supervisor in
that situation would naturally tend to defend his subordinates' positions and pro-
mote their point of view. For this reason, the CAB prohibits even uninvolved
bureau supervisors from consulting with the Board in disciplinary or accusatory
cases in which any of the supervisor's subordinates are involved in prosecuting
247 See notes 117-121 supra and accompanying text (§ 557(d)) and notes 223-225 supra and accompany-
ing text (due process) for a more extended discussion of the § 557(d) and due process rationales.
On the other extreme, if neither the supervisor nor his subordinates are involved in an initial licensing




the case, regardless of whether the supervisor himself is personally involved.2 48
In a small, close-knit division where personal contacts among staff are often ex-
tensive, there may be pressures on even a non-involved supervisor called upon to
second-guess his staff in advising the adjudicators.2 49 Where the supervisor has
had some marginal involvement there is the risk that he may subconsciously in-
ject extra-record material into his advice to the decisionmakers. On the other
hand, the "bureau loyalty" rationale could disqualify all members of a bureau
when any member is involved in a case on the theory that they would all uphold
the view of their fellow staff members. Few agencies have gone this far, appar-
ently reasoning that professional objectivity and the cloak of anonymity in the
advising situation will overcome bureau loyalty. In addition, supervisors per-
forming advisory duties should, like the ultimate decisionmakers, be presumed to
be people of integrity who can set aside information gained from any prior mar-
ginal involvement in the case. Furthermore, the supervisory level may be the
point at which the benefit of increased information and expert advice begins to
outweigh the slight detriment to fairness associated with supervisors providing
advice to adjudicators. Forcing decisionmakers to seek advice from sources other
than trusted supervisors may also cause inefficient use of limited agency re-
sources. For these reasons, agencies should allow a supervisor not involved, or
only marginally involved, in a case to advise the adjudicators.2 50
5. Consultations between Adjudicators
When a case is under consideration by an adjudicator at one agency level, to
what extent should he be allowed to discuss the case with adjudicators at his or
other levels? For example, can an administrative law judge adjudicating a case
consult with other judges not on the case, members of an appeal board, or the
commission?
Few fairness problems result from consulting adjudicatory personnel on the
same level of the agency. The experiences of other panel members in similar
cases should help decisionmakers make more informed decisions which better ac-
248 14 C.F.R. § 300.4(a) (1980). The CAB rule in initial licensing cases, even if they are accusatory, is
more relaxed, and the debate over its adoption illustrates the conflicting policy considerations. In 1977 the
CAB adopted a rule which prohibited advice to the Board from any supervisor of a bureau employee who
participated in the adjudicatory hearing, regardless of the supervisor's personal involvement in the case.
42 Fed. Reg. 17436 (1977). After only one year of functioning under this rule, the CAB concluded that the
1977 amendment was too restrictive and had kept the Board from consulting senior bureau personnel in
cases where their general policy advice would be helpful. 43 Fed. Reg. 29936 (1978). The Board rejected
the notion that a supervisor would simply restate and support his bureau's position in the case, rather than
provide independent advice. As a result, the rule was amended in 1978 to allow limited consultation with
non-involved supervisors. They may advise the Board in cases involving rates or initial licenses, but that
advice must be given on the record, and the parties must be given an opportunity to comment in writing
on the supervisor's advice. 14 C.F.R. § 300.4(b) (1980). Though this change broadened the CAB rule, the
rule is still more restrictive than the APA and is out of line with most other agencies, where private advice
from non-involved supervisors is welcomed. The NRC, of course, prohibits such advice from any non-
involved staff members in contested initial licensing cases, including supervisory staff members.
249 See Columbia Research Corp. v. Schaffer, 256 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1958), which disapproved of a
situation in which an agency's general counsel adjudicated a case prosecuted by one of his subordinates,
the assistant general counsel. The court's rationale, however, was that the subordinate would be likely to
take litigative positions that he believed would please the general counsel. That possibility may exist, but
its impropriety does not seem clear since all agency advocates are answerable to the ultimate agency
adjudicators, the commissioners.
250 The proposed 1980 regulatory reform legislation apparently would have allowed for these results.
S. REP. No. 1018, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (Oct. 30, 1980).
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cord with agency policy. Trial judges in the judicial system often engage in such
consultations, as do members of administrative appeal boards. A problem might
arise if two panel members deciding factually related cases concerning the same
party at the same time confer. Such consultation might inject off the record facts
and taint the decisionmaker. However, such a situation is unlikely and in this
context, perhaps it should not be assumed adjudicators will stray from the record
in arriving at a decision.
For many of the same reasons, appeal board members should be allowed to
consult with lower level adjudicators who did not initially decide the case under
consideration. Similarly the commission should be allowed to consult with ap-
peal board members and lower level adjudicators who did not previously decide
the case under consideration.
More problems are associated with commissioners consulting initial or ap-
pellate decisionmakers when the latter two are making a decision because the
commission may eventually have to decide the same case. If the commission
seeks information about the case from the initial or appellate decisionmakers, a
party might argue that the commission's receipt of selective information would
render the commissioners less than impartial in the formal review. Conversely, if
the commission seeks to guide the lower boards with private policy advice, a
party might argue that the commission is judging the merits of a case before
receiving the formal record and arguments during the review to follow. In addi-
tion, individual commissioners could pressure boards to decide a case in a man-
ner inconsistent with the record or other commissioners' policies, thereby also
compromising the independence of the lower level adjudicators.
Absent this appearance of unfairness, many benefits will result from such
consultations, such as more knowledgeable decisions, more informed commission-
ers, and decisions more accurately reflecting agency policy. Although these con-
sultations appear improper at first, because of their benefits and their slight risk
of unfairness, they were expressly encouraged by the 1947 Attorney General's
Manual.2 5 t
For the same reasons, there are no significant legal problems in allowing
communications between appeal board members who will hear a case and lower
level adjudicators before whom the case is pending.2 52 However, the wisdom of
such consultations can be questioned. Although appeal boards effectuate agency
policy, they are not the ultimate source of such policy. Thus, unlike commission-
ers, appeal boards have less reason to privately advise initial decisionmakers.
Also, unlike commissioners who have a broad range of experience as a result of
their rulemaking duties and congressional appearances, appeal board members
have less to offer to lower level adjudicators in terms of overall policy guidance.
And because they are not ultimate policymakers, appeal board members have
less reason to keep advised of initial decisions or interlocutory rulings through
private consultations. This is especially true since public records of such matters
are available. Therefore, private consultations between appeal boards and initial
251 ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, squra note 20, at 55.
252 Typically, when a case is before an initial decisionmaker it is not known which appeal board mem-
bers will hear a case. Hence, the suggested scenario is not very likely. However, there are instances when
an appeal board has heard a case and has remanded it to the initial decisionmaker. In these instances,
informal advice between the appeal board and the initial decisionmaker might take place.
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decisionmakers, while the case is pending before the latter, should not be al-
lowed.253
Finally, the most difficult question is whether a commission, in the course of
considering a case on review, should be allowed to consult with lower level adju-
dicators who heard the case below. 25 4 The major benefit of such consultation is
that the lower tribunals have given the case extensive thought from a neutral,
adjudicative perspective. The lower level adjudicators are probably most famil-
iar with the facts and the weaknesses and strengths of the parties' arguments.
Their advice to the commissioners would be invaluable, and would produce a
more knowledgeable decision by the commission. However, to the extent the
lower tribunals might have a vested interest in seeing their decisions upheld, they
may not put aside their prejudices and objectively advise the commission. In
terms of the Withrow rationale, lower level adjudicators would be "psychologi-
cally wedded" to their views. To advise otherwise would amount to a confession
of "error."
In response to these due process concerns, one might argue that because the
lower tribunals have already given their advice in their formal decisions, there
would be few secrets in what they would tell the commissioners in private. How-
ever, privacy allows different emphasis and more strident commitment to the
public decision. Thus, the due process concerns of avoiding error and promoting
the appearance of fairness should encourage agencies to prohibit such consulta-
tions unless the agency's ability to attain its statutory mandate would be jeopard-
ized.255
6. Non-Involved Staff and Personal Staff
There would appear to be no doubt that adjudicators should be allowed to
consult with staff members not involved in a case. Presently decisionmakers at
the NRC, for example, can consult with non-involved staff, as with staff involved
in a case, only in uncontested initial licensing proceedings. There is clearly no
problem allowing consultations in such cases. The question is whether the rules
such as these should be changed to allow consultations with non-involved staff in
a contested licensing case.
Rules like those at the NRC could be an overreaction to fears of the appear-
ance and reality of improper consultations. They are designed to absolutely as-
sure that no tainted advice or ex parte material will reach the decisionmaker's
ears. The by-product of this assurance is difficulty for the decisionmaker in ob-
253 For these same reasons, when an initial decisionmaker has consulted informally with members of an
appeal board panel prior to any appeal board contact with a case, an appeal board appointed to review
the case should generally not include those appeal board panel members who were informally consulted.
At agencies like the NRC, where appeal board members are drawn from a large panel, this is possible.
However, as long as the board members who were consulted have not prejudged the merits of the case, this
result is not compelled by any existing court decision.
254 The same considerations to be discussed also apply to determining whether the initial deci-
sionmaker who decided a case should be allowed to advise the appeal board which is considering it on
review.
255 But see Pedersen, The Decline of Se paration ofFunwtions in Regulatog Agencies, 64 VA. L. REv. 991, 1001
(1978). Pedersen argues that the concept of a hearing examiner has changed from the original "gatherer of
evidence" who makes a recommended decision to the present "administrative law judge" concept. He
advocates a return to the old concept, under which there is no problem with the agency heads consulting
the hearing examiner in private, since the examiner is not really judging, but is just preparing the record
for an agency decision. Consultation by the agency is more appropriate under this view.
[Vol. 56:351] 411
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
taining expert advice, thus reducing the information flow within the agency and
hindering efficiency by forcing decisionmakers to gain information by more time
consuming means. This would not be an unbearable sacrifice in the interest of
fairness, but the likelihood that the decision will be improperly affected by al-
lowing consultations with non-involved staff is negligible. Staff members may
possibly become prejudiced through some indirect involvement with the case or
the parties, but even where the issues are sharply contested, allowing such cons~l-
tations presents small difficulties in comparison with the resulting benefits. 256
Furthermore, the adjudicator is as likely to be exposed to extra-record material if
he consults a textbook or his own staff member to understand the record. Fi-
nally, where a non-involved staff member advising an adjudicator in a case is, as
to other matters, subject to the supervision of an agency official who is an advo-
cate or oversees the advocates in that -case, the appearance of unfairness associ-
ated with the service of two masters must be considered. Although a broad
constitutional ban seens unwise, agencies should be sensitive to the potential for
abuse and might prohibit advice to the adjudicator from the non-involved staff
member in some instances, particularly where the supervisor is heavily involved
in the case. Of course, absent any problem of personal bias or insertion of extra-
record material, there is also no question that a decisionmaker should be able to
consult his permanently assigned staff.
B. The Separated Staff Sysem
In a "separated staff' system, entire offices regularly involved in proceedings
as prosecutors or advocates, as well as other employees detailed on a case-by-case
basis, would be precluded from advising adjudicators deciding a case. Those not
on the separated staff could advise the adjudicators, although they would be pre-
cluded from communicating exparte with persons outside the agency in violation
of section 557(d) of the APA.
A separated staff system provides many benefits. The system is designed to
avoid overlapping inconsistent functions within a single bureau or division. If
one bureau engages exclusively in advocacy, while another bureau engages exclu-
sively in advising decisionmakers, decisionmakers will know better with whom
they can talk without inquiring whether that person was involved in a particular
adjudication. Such institutional separation would decrease the likelihood of un-
fairness to parties attributable to inadvertent contacts. Moreover, this system
eliminates the possibility that biased staff members serving in the same bureau as
agency prosecutors will advise the decisionmaker. The system also reduces the
likelihood that biased staff members would absorb off the record information
they could later inject during consultations. Additionally, a separated staff sys-
tem increases the appearance of fairness, since parties and the public can see a
definite line drawn between those with whom the decisionmaker may consult
and those with whom he may not speak. Absent a separated staff system, the
APA requires that this line change from adjudication to adjudication, depending
upon which staff members from several divisions prosecute a particular case. Fi-
256 It is important to note, as was stated in the discussion of due process, that the advice involved here
is in interpreting the record. Advisors may not offer new facts or arguments unless those facts or argu-
ments have been put on the record and subject to public scrutiny. See notes 95 and 226 supra.
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nally, a separated staff system may encourage informed decisions because deci-
sionmakers will be able to develop a rapport with non-separated staff members
with whom they may consult regularly.
A separated staff system does, however, present some problems. The system
would constrict the flow of information to decisionmakers, since they could not
consult separated staff members not involved in the particular case. Inefficiency
and duplication might also result, since staff resources would be diluted due to
staff members' inability to perform variously as advocates and advisors in differ-
ent cases.
A balance must be struck between the increased fairness and appearance of
fairness associated with a separated staff and the less efficient flow of information
to decisionmakers resulting from placing non-involved staff members off limits to
decisionmakers simply because the members belong to the separated staff. The
separated staff system's benefits to fairness would generally be greater in agencies
with many adjudications. In such agencies there would be more commission-staff
consultation and greater occasion for improper contact absent a separated staff.
A separated staff system would also be more effective in agencies with small bu-
reaus because bureau members advising adjudicators would more likely support
each others' positions out of bureau loyalty.
The AEC and the FCC have used the separated staff system. The AEC's
system was instituted in 1957. At that time, the agency eliminated the Division
of Civilian Applications, which had performed both promotional and regulatory
functions, and substituted a Division of Licensing and Regulation and an Office
of Industrial Development. The entire Division of Licensing and Regulation and
a portion of the general counsel's office were barred from advising the commis-
sioners and hearing officers. Other staff members, including the promotional
staff and the military program staff, unless designated part of the separated staff
for a particular case, were free to consult with decisionmakers. The AEC
adopted this system to assure fairness and impartiality in its first contested licens-
ing case, .n re Power Reactor Development Corporation 257 This practice was contin-
ued through other contested licensing cases. In 1959, however, the AEC adopted
a very strict exparte rule, applied originally to contacts between adjudicators and
license applicants. Although not initially intended to cover intra-agency con-
tacts,258 soon after its adoption the AEC began interpreting the ex parte rule as
prohibiting commissioners and presiding officers at licensing hearings from con-
sulting with the separated staff.259 Thus, except in a very few instances the staff
was effectively separated from licensing boards and commissioners by rule.
When the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 divided the AEC into two
257 1 A.E.C. 128 (1959).
258 10 C.F.R. § 2.757 (1960), 24 Fed. Reg. 9330 (1959). But see Legal Times of Washington, Dec. 15,
1980 at 4, referring to a decision by the Administrative Conference of the United States to table a recom-
mendation that would have allowed such consultation, in part because of criticism that it "would destroy
the independence of the administrative lawjudge, create innumerable conflicts and bring back the horrors
that occurred before the [APA] . . . and before the independence of the administrative law judges." Id.
259 See II JOINT COMM. ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 87TH CONG., IsT SEss., IMPROVING THE A.E.C. REGU-
LATORY PROCESs 123-24, 401, 756 (Comm. Print 1961). The AEC had a separation of functions rule at
that time, 10 C.F.R. § 2.734 (1959), which contained the initial licensing exemption, and which was there-
fore inapplicable to staff contacts in licensing cases. It is for this reason that the expare rule, and not the
separation of functions rule, was used to endorse the separated staff system.
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agencies,260 the promotional and military staffs were transferred to the Energy
Research and Development Agency (ERDA) while the regulatory staff, which
had composed the bulk of the separated staff, remained with the newly-created
NRC. Because the NRC retained most of the old AEC rules on licensing proce-
dure, the strict separation of functions and ex parte rules remained in effect and
separated the vast majority of NRC staff from consultation in all but a few licens-
ing cases. Now, under the separation of functions rules, a licensing board mem-
ber making the initial decision is limited to consulting privately only with
members of his personal staff.26 1
On review, a commissioner may consult his own staff, and the Office of Gen-
eral Counsel and the Office of Policy Evaluation, the legal and technical arms,
respectively, for the commissioners. The members of these offices are the "other
NRC officials and employees who advise the commissioners in the exercise of
their quasi-judicial functions" allowed by the NRC's exparte rule to consult com-
missioners privately. All other agency staff members are off limits to adjudica-
tors. The NRC's strict rules mean that decisionmakers have even fewer technical
staff available for consultation in adjudications than under the AEC because
they no longer have access to the promotional staff which formed the largest part
of the non-separated staff. However, there is at least a distinct line between staff
offices which commissioners may and may not consult. Had the NRC relaxed its
rules to the extent permitted by the APA, this line would vary from case to case.
Although concerns about unfairness and the appearance of unfairness have
prevented the NRC from relaxing its rules, charges of inefficiency leveled in the
wake of the accident at Three Mile Island have prompted some commissioners to
recommend expanding communication with the NRC's technical staff.262 Be-
cause of the relatively small number of licensing cases handled by the Commis-
sion, keeping track of which staff members are working on which case would not
be difficult. It remains to be seen, however, whether the growing sentiment to
abandon the institutionally separated staff concept will result in any changes.
In contrast, the FCC's analogous system seems unlikely to be modified. The
FCC is larger than the NRC and handles many more adjudications, and more
licensing cases. The FCC maintains a separated staff system whereby certain
officers are designated "decisionmaking personnel" and may advise in adjudica-
tory decisions. All other offices are designated as "nondecisionmaking personnel"
and may not advise. 263 Under the FCC's separated staff system, the entire
Broadcast Bureau, dealing primarily with licensing and license revocation cases,
consists of nondecisionmaking personnel who may not advise the Commission
once a hearing has been set. The Common Carrier Bureau, dealing primarily
with ratemaking and rulemaking cases, consists of decisionmaking personnel who
may consult the Commission unless there is a trial staff, in which case that trial
staff alone is separated. The Broadcast Bureau deals with cases typically involv-
ing many "adjudicatory" facts often non-technical in nature. In contrast, the
260 Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1234 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5811-5891 (1976 & Supp. II
1978)).
261 10 C.F.R. § 2.719(c) (1980).
262 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, suera note 7, at 51; CHIEF COUNSEL'S REPORT, suepa note
8, at 43.
263 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1201(c), (d); .1205, .1209 (1979).
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Common Carrier Bureau more often deals with "legislative" facts related to
ratemaking. In such cases the Commission has greater need for staff technical
advice to understand the difficult issues involved. The FCC system appears well
adapted to the caseload and structure of the FCC. Few complain that the system
unduly restricts the flow of information to commissioners in broadcasting cases or
treats parties unfairly in common carrier cases.
The FCC separated staff system was arrived at after years of experimenta-
tion with different statutorily mandated systems. In 1952, for example, Congress
focused on the need for fairness at the FCC and separated virtually the entire
agency staff, including its Chief Engineer's Office and its general counsel, from
agency adjudicators. 264 This system soon proved to hamper decisionmaking be-
cause of a lack of adequate expert staff support. When the statute was relaxed in
1961, the chief engineer and general counsel were placed on the non-separated
side. The system has operated to the present to the satisfaction of the agency.265
To be sure, the separated staff system constitutes an extreme approach to the
separation of functions problem. Its advantage of simplicity of application may
be useful at agencies with an abundance of non-separated staff available to ad-
vise the decisionmakers, or at agencies where there are no complex scientific or
economic issues upon which decisionmakers might seek staff advice. In modified
form, it might be useful to designate as a separated staff at least an agency's staff
members who regularly litigate licensing proceedings. However, broader appli-
cation of the separated staff system is not desirable.
C. The Neutral Staff Concept
Changing the role of agency staff so that they perform a neutral factfinding
function in adjudicative proceedings, rather than a prosecuting or advocacy
function, has received little practical acceptance. This "neutral staff" would
scrutinize each side's position before and during the public proceedings and sum-
marize the issues and alternatives for an agency without publicly committing
itself to one side or the other. The decisionmaker would then make a decision
based upon the outlined alternatives. An adjudicator's privately consulting any
staff member would present no problem under the APA or the due process clause
because no staff member would be performing prosecuting or advocacy func-
tions. Because of section 557(d) of the APA, however, staff members could not
consult ex parte with persons outside the agency, at least after the hearing was
noticed.
A neutral staff system would allow the staff to perform both an advisory and
a factfinding role in developing a complete record. Efficient use of staff resources
and an increased flow of information to the decisionmakers could result. Under
the neutral staff system, the staff could perform as a "devil's advocate" toward
both sides of the controversy and bring out all relevant facts and alternatives.
A neutral staff system would, however, place greater importance on public
proceedings, as opposed to informal staff-applicant negotiations. It is questiona-
ble whether neutral staff could negotiate privately with an applicant on the suffi-
264 See [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 683 for the former wording of 47 U.S.C. § 409(c)(2).
265 See 47 U.S.C. § 409(c)(2) (1976). For the history of the 1961 amendment, see [1961] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 464.
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ciency of the application, and then be truly neutral during subsequent public
proceedings. Staff members who have negotiated substantive changes on an ap-
plication would probably find it difficult to be neutral scrutinizing those changes
when they are considered in the public hearing. Such involvement would raise
fairness questions. The staff member's acting as an advocate in the negotiating
situation could create due process and prejudgment problems in his later advis-
ing the decisionmaker. A truly neutral staff system would probably require that
staff members refrain from substantive pre-hearing negotiations with applicants.
Such a requirement would leave more issues to be aired and resolved in the pub-
lic proceedings, considerably expanding the public portion of application pro-
ceedings.
The FCC once attempted to maintain a neutral staff posture in its Common
Carrier Bureau ratemaking proceedings. In the A T&T case266 the Commission
investigated the reasonableness of Bell's rates for various services. Although the
Commission wanted the expert advice and assistance of the agency's technical
staff in preparing its decision, it remained sensitive to the need to maintain fair-
ness in a proceeding relating to a single carrier. For this reason, the Commission
promulgated a procedural order allowing the Common Carrier Bureau to advise
in the final decision but instructing the Bureau
not to be an advocate of a preconceived position or to take a conventional adversary
position. Rather it is to insure the development of a full and complete record which
presents the facts and other ratemaking considerations relevant to a fair and mean-
ingful legislative determination by the Commission of the complex issues involved.
2 6 7
The Commission majority justified the order by relying on Wilson & Co. V.
United S/ates,268 which declared that in ratemaking the Common Carrier Bureau
could act as counsel in the proceedings and advise in the final decision without
violating the APA. The Wilson court held that a proceeding similar to that in
AT&T was not an adjudication and therefore was not only legal under Wilson,
but was sound policy "in view of the legislative nature of these proceedings and
the nonadversay role of the Bureau. '269 The Commission felt that AT&T would be
treated fairly, and the Commission would have access to the expertise of its tech-
nical staff.
Commissioner Loevinger filed a strong dissent to the neutral staff system as
applied in A T&T. 270 The commissioner asserted the staff was already an adver-
sary in the case because it had filed a report which urged initiating the proceed-
ings.2 7 1 Commissioner Loevinger also pointed to the APA's legislative history
that the initial licensing-ratemaking exemption should not be used in contested
accusatory cases. 272 The majority tersely dismissed the dissent by sayng the pro-
ceeding was not accusatory, and that the staff had merely recommended initiat-
ing proceedings, not any final action.
Commissioner Loevinger's AT&T dissent underscores the two main objec-
266 2 F.C.C. 2d 142 (1965).
267 Id. at 146 (emphasis in original).
268 335 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964).
269 2 F.C.C. 2d at 147 (emphasis added).
270 Id.




tions regarding the neutral staff concept. First, in practice, can the staff stay
neutral and subject both sides to equally rigorous scrutiny? As Commissioner
Loevinger pointed out, because a staff member is usually involved in a case
before the hearing, he may develop an advocate's point of view on the case. Ad-
ditionally, in the course of their investigations, staff members come into contact
with exparte facts which they might inject into the decisionmaking process. Sec-
tion 554(d) of the APA was adopted to prevent these problems. Furthermore, if
an agency whose staff had traditionally performed an advocacy role adopted a
system that suddenly called upon that staff to impartially present both sides of
the case to the decisionmaker, it would be especially difficult for staff members to
become and remain neutral. For example, the NRC staff is accustomed to scruti-
nizing applications before the hearing, negotiating and approving technical
changes, and strongly advocating granting the license. Such an orientation
would probably have some lingering effect were those staff members called upon
to become neutral. Finally, adopting the neutral staff concept might require re-
structuring licensing processes like the NRC's. As noted above, staff members
who had privately negotiated and approved changes in a license application's
technical specifications would have difficulty being neutral in presenting that
application to the licensing board in the hearing. With a neutral staff system,
negotiations would have to be performed on the record under the supervision of
the licensing board. Such a procedure would be cumbersome.
Second, even if staff members could remain neutral, adversarial proceedings
may still be the most efficient way to arrive at the best decisions. A basic premise
of the American legal system is that factfinding is best done when two sides zeal-
ously present their arguments and attack opposing arguments, thereby revealing
the strengths and weaknesses of each argument.2 73 Faced with several cases in-
volving complex technical issues, a decisionmaker might rather have the staff sift
through the evidence and then advocate a result. Under this approach, the deci-
sionmaker can work from one point of view or another, rather than start with a
mass of facts and develop his own point of view. Moreover, he can make full use
of the staff's expertise.
Without more practical data it is difficult to evaluate the neutral staff sys-
tem. Such a system would expand the pool of expertise available to deci-
sionmakers needed in evaluating a case's record. However, the neutral staff
system places great faith in the staffs ability to remain truly neutral and yet
develop the case's record, and in the decisionmaker's ability to focus on a case's
central issues. Judging from the infrequent use of such a system, most agencies
do not have such faith at present. 274 Nonetheless, agencies might wish to con-
273 In the 1970 supplement to his treatise, Professor Davis sharply criticized the FCC neutral staff
system. Not only did he feel that the staff could not remain totally neutral, but he also felt such a system
would cripple the testing process whereby ideas and policies are challenged. Professor Davis argued that a
primary role of a regulatory agency is to be a zealous advocate for the public interest and present a point
of view different from the industry's. A neutral staff, he argued, would be a lukewarm check on the
advocacy of a company like AT&T. I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.00 at 445-57
(Supp. 1970).
Ideally, of course, the neutral staff would rigorously scrutinize all sides of an issue, including the
industry's. Whether this would actually happen in practice must await more practical experience with the
system than we currently have.
274 EPA's "Non-Adversary Procedures for Initial Licensing" are the closest thing to a "neutral staff"
system in the present administrative spectrum. In its NPDES permit proceedings, EPA would substitute
[Vol. 56:351]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
tinue experimenting with neutral staff systems. In that event, agencies should
also consider a modified version under which the staff retains an open-minded
and neutral posture during the trial itself, but summarizes the evidence and
makes recommendations to the initial adjudicator, as might the adjudicator's law
clerk. Then, the neutral staff could privately advise the adjudicator, and perhaps
even higher level adjudicators if the agency allows consultation between the vari-
ous adjudicatory tiers.
VIII. Conclusion
Although the separation of functions debate has continued over decades, in
light of the relatively few judicial decisions there are still many uncertainties
about APA and the due process restrictions. Compounding the legal dispute is
the philosophical battle over reconciling conflicting policy considerations involv-
ing agency efficiency and fairness to litigants. Unfortunately, many agencies
seem unwilling to take a fresh look at separation of functions issues. More impor-
tantly, Congress has failed to assume responsibility in reexamining its own out-
moded assumptions about the regulatory process which led to the separation of
functions balance drawn in the APA. In particular, the nature of the licensing
process, the rights involved therein, the agency staffs changing roles and the
complexity of the decisionmaking process must be reevaluated. This article at-
tempts to provide some answers, though it is written with the understanding that
no single solution appears likely. Perhaps its major contribution will be the iden-
tification of the issues yet to be resolved and the factors relevant to their resolu-
tion, allowing individual agencies or Congress to focus with more acuity on the
problem.
for its trial staff a non-adversarial "panel," which would prepare an initial summary of the evidence (usu-
ally written) and cross-examine witnesses, but would not take one predetermined side in the controversy.
Unfortunately, though the system was introduced by rule in 1978, it has never really been used by EPA, so
one cannot evaluate the system.
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